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Abstract

Over the past twenty years, virtue ethics has seen a resurgence of interest in understanding
how virtues are cultivated. Philosophers are now teaming up with psychologists to better
understand how psychological research on skills can inform us about the relevant kinds of
skills that aid in cultivating virtue. However, this promising line of research rests on a
heavily-debated philosophical foundation. To what extent are the moral virtues like and/or
cultivated by certain kinds of skills? One group of scholars, whom I refer to as the
“proponents of the moral motivation objection,” argue that the moral virtues are
motivational dispositions that skills not only lack but also cannot cultivate. This objection
challenges the idea that skills are a helpful way to understand virtue and its development.
In working through this objection, I argue that the discourse around this objection lacks
clarity about what moral motivation is and how it relates to different kinds of psychological
skills. As a result, the discourse faces an impasse in understanding the viability of skills.
This project aims to remove the impasse in the contemporary literature by providing
a detailed account of moral motivation and its relation to psychological skills. I find that
Aquinas’s moral psychology provides ample resources for understanding moral
motivation, its development, and the relevant kinds of psychological skills that are useful in
cultivating virtue. In this way, I find that Aquinas’s perspective enables us to reimagine the
relationship between skills and virtue, while providing new insights into the kinds of skills
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that aid in cultivating virtue. I conclude that Aquinas’s work helps to sharpen the
contemporary literature and inform the philosophical foundation on which it is based.

iv

Introduction

Over the past twenty years, contemporary virtue ethics has experienced a resurgence of
interest in answering how virtue is cultivated. There are two primary reasons for the
renewed interest in this perennially puzzling question. First, explaining how virtue is
cultivated is a crucial part of the effort to substantiate virtue ethics as a viable ethical theory.
Second, now more than ever before, contemporary scholars see themselves as able to come
to new insights into this question thanks to the collaboration of behavioral, personality,
social, and developmental psychologists. More specifically, given the parallels between
virtue and skill, philosophers and psychologists see new potential for psychological models
of skill and skill development to inform philosophical discussions of virtue and its
cultivation. I what follows, I explore both reasons for the resurgence of interest and how
they lead to the current focus on skill.
Up until about forty-five years ago (arguably shortly after G.E.M. Anscombe wrote
her famous paper “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958), normative ethics was dominated
by two theories: duty ethics, or deontology, inspired by Immanuel Kant, and utilitarianism,
derived from eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century philosophers Jeremy Bentham and
J.S. Mill. At that time, virtue ethics was regarded not as an ethical theory in its own right,
but as an approach that emphasizes motives and character that utilitarians and
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deontologists could usefully incorporate into their own theories.1 However, as Hursthouse
articulates, many philosophers “grew dissatisfied with duty ethics and utilitarianism”
because, when compared to virtue ethics, these theories seemed to “sideline” issues many
believed should take center stage: motives, moral character, moral education, moral
wisdom, the role of the emotions in our moral life, meaning, and how one should live.2 For
this reason, several philosophers found cause to develop virtue ethics into a substantive
theory of its own.3 Scholars such as Anscombe, Foot, Murdoch, Hursthouse, MacIntyre,
Williams, McDowell, Nussbaum, Slote, Christian B. Miller, Nancy Snow and many others
work to put virtue ethics “back on the map” as a viable theory in its own right, and not
merely as an approach that emphasizes motives and character.
Within this pursuit, there is a recognized need to develop answers to the practical
yet central question: how does one cultivate virtue? Julia Annas writes, “We cannot
understand what virtue is without understanding how we acquire it.”4 Like Annas, Nancy
Snow recognizes the need to develop answers to this question: “Despite the rising interest
in virtue, however, little attention has been paid to the question of how virtue is
developed.”5 Christian B. Miller takes up this charge and began a robust research program
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Rosalind Hursthouse. On virtue ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 2.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 21.
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devoted to answering how we, as modern people, can cultivate moral and intellectual
virtues. Since the early 2000s, there have been dozens of publications addressing how virtue
is cultivated and the issue remains central to contemporary controversies in virtue ethics.
Much of the research developed around this question is interdisciplinary in nature,
welcoming philosophy, theology, and psychology. Furthermore, from the philosophical
side, the dominant approach among contemporary philosophers in addressing this question
is grounded in a return to the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. Many
contemporary virtue ethicists work to retrieve from these primary texts a solid groundwork
for defining what virtue is and how it is cultivated.
In addition to the effort to substantiate virtue ethics by addressing the virtuecultivation question, the second reason for the resurgence of interest in cultivating virtue is
the promise of new insights on this question thanks to the collaboration of behavioral,
personality, and developmental psychologists. Teaming up with psychologists,
philosophers challenge the possibility of virtue as a stable character trait and provide new
resources for understanding how to cultivate virtue in light of psychological research on
behavior. Owen Flanagan (1991), Gilbert Harman (in a series of papers dating back to 1999),
and John Doris, for example, lead the way in calling for moral philosophers to take
seriously psychological research on human behavior.6 Doris and Harman proclaim that

Furthermore, this group of scholars “question the extent to which human lives displayed enough
internal coherence and temporal consistency to justify the attribution of character traits.” Dan P.,
McAdams, "Psychological science and the Nicomachean Ethics: virtuous actors, agents, and authors." In
Cultivating virtue: Perspectives from philosophy, theology, and psychology ed. by Nancy Snow (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 307. See also, Christian B. Miller, "Empirical Approaches to Moral
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behavior is driven primarily by environmental (situational) factors or contingencies rather
than stable characteristics of the person.7 Their findings have galvanized work from
philosophers and psychologists alike. In response to what is now called “the situationist
debate,” several contemporary virtue ethicists are using the tools of psychology to better
understand human behavior, virtue as a character trait, and the ways in which virtue can be
cultivated.
One of the most important developments from this debate is the call for moral
philosophers to change their approach. Moral philosopher, Matthew Stichter, writes that
“recommendations for moral development cannot be done merely from the philosophical
armchair anymore, as theorists need to be aware of the psychological mechanisms that
affect how people actually behave.”8 Stichter’s point is inspired by Flanagan’s “Principle of
Minimal Psychological Realism,” which states that “any prescription of a moral ideal
should involve only those processes or behaviors that we have reason to believe are

Character", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2017, Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/moral-character-empirical/>.
See: Walter Mischel. Personality and Assessment. (New York: Psychology Press, 2013). Also see John M.
Doris. Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
2002. In his new book, Doris draws on an array of social scientific research, especially experimental social
psychology, to argue that people often grossly overestimate the behavioral impact of character and
grossly underestimate the behavioral impact of situations. Circumstance, Doris concludes, often has
extraordinary influence on what people do, whatever sort of character they may appear to have. He then
considers the implications of this observation for a range of issues in ethics, arguing that with more
realistic picture effect, cognition, and motivation, moral psychology can support more compelling ethical
theories and more humane ethical practices.
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Matthew Stichter, The Skillfulness of Virtue : Improving Our Moral and Epistemic Lives. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018) 7.
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possible for humans.”9 Flanagan’s principle, along with the situationist debate, continue to
galvanize research by moral philosophers, particularly those interested in moral
development, to come up with ways to develop virtue using psychological models that
provide a possible path for moral development.
To this end, the study of psychological skills and expertise takes center stage. Darcia
Narvaez and Daniel Lapsley, for example, are two prominent developmental psychologists
who argue that the development of virtue is parallel to the development of an expertise. By
studying the psychological development and skillset of experts across domains we can
better understand how virtue is cultivated.10 Furthermore, Daniel Russell, Christian Miller,
and Matthew Stichter, collaborate with psychologists to identify psychological skills, such
as self-regulation and social-cognitive skills, which they argue have great potential to help
us understand and develop the kinds of capacities, intelligence, and acumen that virtues
require. Their research, and the interdisciplinary movement on which it is based, builds
upon the long-held claim that possessing a virtue is highly analogous to possessing a skill
or acquired competency. Dating as far back as Aristotle (and before), philosophers look to
skill as a way to understand how virtue is cultivated and what virtue is. Moreover,
philosophers continue to debate about the extent to which virtue resembles a skill. Today,
however, in light of the potential for psychological skills to contribute to the discourse,

9

Ibid.

To name a few scholars working in this area that have yet to be named: Jonathan Weber, Alan Wilson,
William Fleeson, Daniel Russell, Ernest Sosa, and others.
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5

there is added pressure for moral philosophers to figure out the extent to which skills are
analogous to virtue and, more generally, how psychological skills generally relate to moral
virtue. Despite this contemporary interdisciplinary movement and added pressure,
relatively little work has been done to work out the relationship between moral virtue and
psychological skills. Furthermore, many moral philosophers remain pessimistic about the
ability for skills to teach us about moral virtue and its development. For others, though they
generally accept the virtue-skill analogy, the question still remains regarding the extent to
which virtue is cultivated by psychological skills.11
One group of contemporary virtue-ethicists, whom I refer to as the “proponents of
the moral motivation objection,” are often cited for offering compelling reasons to question
the extent to which we can look to skills to understand virtue and its development.12
Adhering to an Aristotelean-inspired account of moral virtue, these scholars argue that
moral virtues are primarily concerned with moral motivation, or motivational dispositions,
and that skills not only lack the kind of moral motivation constitutive of virtue, but because
they lack such components, they cannot help us understand how to cultivate virtue.13 If
these respected scholars are right, the trajectory of current research that looks to skills as
resources for cultivating virtue is fraught with limitations from the outset.
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Annas holds such a view. See Julia Annas. Intelligent Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

This set of scholars include Linda Zagzebski, Anselm Mueller, Gary Watson, and James D. Wallace.
Chapter 1 explores their work in detail.

12

The virtue under discussion is only moral virtues (i.e., temperance, courage, justice, and prudence) not
the intellectual virtues.
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6

In an attempt to build upon and contribute to the discourse on cultivating virtue, my
goal is to explore the relationship between moral motivation and skills in an attempt to
develop answers to the question “can psychological skills help to cultivate moral virtue?”
To this end, I build off of two points from the current literature. First, I take seriously the
objection posed against skills. If moral virtue is primarily a motivational disposition, which
we have good reason to believe it is according to a traditional Aristotelean account of
virtue, then how do skills help us to cultivate moral virtue? To answer this, I argue that we
need a robust account of moral motivation that develops Aristotle’s view while also
exploring the relationship moral motivation has to psychological skills. I find that
Aquinas’s moral psychology provides this resource.
Second, given the need to do moral philosophy in a way that engages with
psychological research on skills and behavior, I aim to address this question by exploring
skills of a psychological nature that aid in cultivating moral motivation itself. I argue that
Aquinas supplies us with these skills. In addressing the moral motivation objection headon, I hope to contribute to the currently underdeveloped discourse on the relationship
between psychological skill, moral motivation, and moral virtue. Furthermore, given that
the relationship between skill and virtue is central to the current discourse, I find that this
research strengthens and informs the conceptual foreground on which much of the
contemporary discourse on cultivating virtue is based.
To this end, in chapter one, I begin by outlining the current discourse on virtue’s
relationship to skill. I articulate two sides of the discourse: those who propose the “moral

7

motivation objection,” and those who attempt to overcome the “moral motivation
objection.” I argue that the current discourse is at an impasse because neither side is clear
about what moral motivation means and continue to posit limited conceptions of skill. I
propose that, if we are to understand how skills can cultivate virtue, more work needs to be
done to clarify what moral motivation is and how psychological skills relate to and cultivate
moral motivation.
In chapter two, I set out to construct an account of moral motivation. Instead of
building out an Aristotelean account of moral motivation, I turn to Thomas Aquinas who
offers a robust moral psychology that closely resembles an Aristotelean account of moral
motivation. Like Aristotle, Aquinas thinks moral motivation has both teleological and
efficient-causal aspects. In addition, Aquinas offers a developmental account of moral
motivation that enables us to see both the psychological mechanisms at work in moral
motivation and the way in which such mechanisms develop over time. In light of his
developmental perspective, I argue that Aquinas also displays the relationship
psychological skills have to moral motivation and the cultivation of virtue.
In the third and final chapter, after having laid out an in-depth account of moral
motivation, I explore Aquinas’s account of skill and argue that Aquinas not only has an
account of psychological skill that parallels the psychological skills offered by psychologists
today, but his account also highlights the relevant kinds of skills that can be used to
cultivate moral motivation. I call these “emotion-regulation” skills. Furthermore, and most
importantly, I find that, contrary to the moral motivation objection, Aquinas helps us

8

understand how psychological skills of emotion-regulation can aid in the cultivation of
virtue and moral motivation.14 After articulating Aquinas’s account of moral motivation,
psychological skill, and their relationship, I conclude by returning to the authors discussed
in the first chapter. I find that Aquinas’s account of moral motivation and skill help to
remove the impasse that plagues the contemporary discourse. He adds nuance to their
discussion of moral motivation and provides compelling answers to the way in which
virtue is cultivated with the aid of psychological skills.

In chapter three, I address how Aquinas methods for regulating the emotions parallel contemporary
emotion-regulation skills. I find that Aquinas offers his own emotion-regulation skills which, I argue, can
be called “psychological skills of emotion-regulation.”

14

9

Chapter 1: Virtue, Skills, and the Moral Motivative Objection
I. Virtue and Skill
Building on the long-standing tradition in virtue ethics that relies on the analogy between
virtue and skill, several contemporary scholars propose that skills are a promising way to
think about virtue and its development.15 As Aristotle famously notes, there are important
similarities between virtue and skill: “what we need to learn to do, we learn by doing; for
example, we become builders by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre. So too we
become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions and courageous by
courageous actions.”16 This ancient analogy between virtue and craft (or techne) continues to
take center stage for many moral philosophers concerned with the development of virtue.
Julia Annas, for example, argues that the moral knowledge required for virtue is analogous
to the practical knowledge involved in acquiring a skill. The process of learning a virtue
involves gaining the knowledge of how to act well in various situations, which is largely a
kind of practical knowledge, much like the knowledge of how to do something, such as
building a house or making shoes.17 In her recent book, Intelligent Virtue, Annas argues that
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For example, Julia Annas, Christian Miller, Daniel Russell, and other I list throughout.
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NE II 1103b
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Ibid.
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an understanding of how we acquire skills is necessary for learning about how we acquire
virtues.18 Annas notes,
This is an important analogy, because ethical development displays something that
we can see more clearly in these more limited contexts: there is a progress from the
mechanical rule- or model-following of the learner to the greater understanding of
the expert, whose responses are sensitive to the particularities of situations as well as
expressing learning and general reflection.19
Annas emphasizes the possibility within this analogy to forge a path for understanding
ethical development from the novice to the expert. Similar to Annas, Paul Bloomfield states
that the skill analogy can yield “a viable epistemology in which moral knowledge is shown
to be a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect.”20 Other
philosophers such as Howard Curzer, Christian B. Miller, Robert C. Roberts, Matthew
Stichter, Nancy Snow, and Daniel Russell all agree that skill provides a promising path
forward in understanding how virtue is developed. Each of these scholars is both
committed to a primarily Aristotelian account of virtue and confident that skills, including
the study of experts, provide insight into how we can acquire virtue.
Not only do several philosophers agree that virtue resembles skills in ways that
provide a promising pathway learn how virtue is cultivated, but also, thanks to this

18

Ibid.

Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory ed. by David Copp (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 518.

19

Paul Bloomfield, “Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 60 no.1 (2000): 23.

20
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analogy, they welcome psychologically advanced conceptions of skill and expertise to
contribute to the moral development discussion. Daniel Russell, for example, focuses on
social cognitive theory’s ability to understand the network of mediating processes by which
people interpret their surroundings and adjust their behavior in order to support the view
that virtue is a skill, one that can be understood in terms of such mediating processes.21
Matthew Stichter, as I will go on to discuss in depth, agrees that the social cognitive model
offered by social and developmental psychologists is the most promising path to
understanding the skills that comprise virtuous activity. Narvez and Lapsley also argue
that moral behavior (including virtuous behavior) should be understood as the multifaceted skills displayed by experts that, when practiced, change the agent “to be the kind of
person who fully embodies the skill, consciously and intuitively… modifying one’s
perceptions, attention, desires, and intuitions.”22 Daniel Russell, Christian B. Miller, Nancy
Snow, Darcia Narvaez, Daniel Lapsley, Matthew Stichter, and several others continue to

Russell writes, “My proposal is that both the virtues and skill could be understood in terms of such
mediating processes. Why focus on social- cognitive theory? Even though social-cognitive theory is
generally regarded as an empirically plausible approach to personality, I advert to it here only as
a representative illustration of how a single personality theory might account for both virtue and
skill...What is distinctive of the social- cognitive approach to personality is the idea that
personality is an organized suite of reciprocal mediating processes by which people both (1)
interpret or construe the situations in which they find themselves and imbue those situations
with meaning, and (2) adjust their behaviors to those situations so interpreted. Psychologist Nancy
Cantor gave a nice summary of these mediating processes in her 1990 paper, “From Thought to Behavior:
‘Having’ and ‘Doing’ in the Study of Personality and Cognition.” Daniel Russell, “From Personality to
Character to Virtue” in Current Controversies in Virtue Theory ed. By Mark Alfano (New York:
Routledge, 2015). 93.

21

Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley. "The psychological foundations of everyday morality and
moral expertise." in Character psychology and character education. (University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).
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develop theories that build upon what they think to be a strong relationship between
acquiring certain skills and cultivating virtue.23
Though most scholars in virtue ethics agree that virtue is analogous to skill in some
way, there is still a large amount of disagreement on the extent to which virtue is analogous
to skill and therefore helpful in understanding how virtue is developed. For example,
Annas argues that, for Aristotle, moral virtues are not skills but merely share the
intellectual structure of a practical skill. 24 She writes that, for Aristotle,
Skill involves a mere capacity, for knowledge can be used in ways opposed to the
right ones, whereas a virtue cannot be used equally well for opposed ends (NE
1129a11-16); virtue cannot be forgotten, whereas skills, being mere intellectual states,
can (NE 1140b28-30) ; with a skill the person who deliberately makes mistakes is
preferable to the person who makes them without intending to, whereas the reverse
is true with virtue (NE1140b22-8); virtue is more accurate than skill (1106b14-17) …
Aristotle [also] makes the claim (NE1105a25-b5, 16-17, 1b-4, 6-7) that with skills all
that matters is the product be good, whereas with virtue actions cannot be
appropriately judged without bringing in the agent’s intentions.25
Skills involve a mere capacity, can be forgotten, and are less precise than virtue is for
Aristotle. Furthermore, unlike skills, the agent’s intentions must be part of our assessment.

It is important to note that many of these scholars (i.e. Russell, Narvaez, Stichter, Miller) are motivated
by or at least sympathetic to Flanagan’s principle which calls scholars to reassess virtue and moral
development in light of what we know to be psychological feasible (aka what humans can do/are capable
of). One implication of this principle is a suggested change in the division of labor between philosophers
and psychologists on moral development. Many current philosophers believe psychologists should take
the lead to ensure that the moral ideal is construed in terms of what we know people are capable of
achieving rather than a philosophical ideal. As a result, these philosophers seek to construe virtue as a
kind of psychological skill that psychologists help to define.

23
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Annas also notes that, despite this list of differences, this list is not decisive because the
modern thesis that virtue is a skill is only to say that virtue is one kind of skill (e.g., a
psychological skill). Like Aristotle who emphasizes the difference between skill and virtue
largely on the basis of motivational elements present in virtue but not in skill, several other
scholars also emphasize motivational differences between virtue and skill. What I call the
“motivation objection” relies on an Aristotelian understanding of moral virtue and states
that moral virtues are primarily motivational dispositions of a certain sort that are not
present in skills. Skills, therefore, are not helpful, or only very limitedly helpful, in
understanding virtue and its development.26 If this objection is correct, the trajectory of
current research that looks to psychological skills and the psychological study of experts to
answer how virtue is cultivated is fraught with limitations. If virtue is primarily a certain
motivational disposition that skills not only lack but do not cultivate, then this line of
research can never fully teach us about how virtue is cultivated.
Given that this objection threatens the viability of an otherwise promising line of
research, it is worth taking a closer look at the proponents of the moral motivation
objection. In what follows, I identify and analyze two sides of this discourse. The first side
is composed of a group of philosophers who propose the motivation objection and the
second side is composed of a philosopher who responds to the motivation objection. The
first side is made up of Linda Zagzebski, Anselm Mueller, Gary Wallace, and James Watson

The virtue under discussion is only moral virtues (i.e., temperance, courage, justice, and prudence) not
the intellectual virtues.

26

14

each of whom identifies specific motivational differences between virtues and skills and
thereby challenges the view that skills help can contribute to our understanding of how
moral virtue is developed. The second side is made up of Matthew Stichter, along with the
help of developmental psychologists Darcia Narvaez and Daniel Lapsley. Stichter argues
that certain psychological skills of self-regulation do in fact account for the motivation
required of moral virtue.
Starting with the first side, or what I call the “proponents of the moral motivation
objection,” in what follows, I analyze this side’s objections to display three points. First, I
find that each of their objections to the virtue-skill analogy crystalize around specific
motivational differences they identify between virtue and skill. Second, I argue that each
philosopher leaves both the notion of moral motivation ambiguous and the notion of skill
too restricted. Third, though their work points to the significance of moral motivation for
virtue, their focus on the disanalogy between skill and virtue ultimately leaves unanswered
the question for which the analogy between skill and virtue was originally posed: how
could skills (of various sorts) help us understand how virtue is cultivated? Next, turning to
the second side, or an opponent of the moral motivation objection. I find that though
Stichter’s work focuses on psychological skills, he fails to capture what moral motivation is
and how psychological skills relate to the motivational components required for moral
virtue. In sum, my analysis of both sides points to the need to first gain clarity on what
moral motivation is if we are to understand how skills can help us to cultivate virtue.
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II. The Proponents of the Moral Motivation Objection
Linda Zagzebski, James D. Wallace, Gary Watson, and Anselm Mueller all take issue with
the skill analogy due to important motivational differences they each specify between skill
and virtue. Zagzebski is perhaps the most explicit of the group in defining her position on
the difference between virtue and skill. In her book, Virtues of the Mind, she emphasizes that
virtues are defined by, what she calls, their “motivational components” which are
psychically prior to action. Skills, on the other hand, are essentially aimed at helping us
become “effective in action” and have very little to do with motivational components. More
specifically, Zagzebski argues “virtues and skills have numerous connections, but ... the
motivational component of virtue defines it more than external effectiveness does, whereas
it is the reverse in the case of skills.”27 Her emphasis on the motivational components of
virtue derives from the following passage from Aristotle’s NE. Aristotle writes:
Again the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the products of
the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have
a certain character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have
themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or
temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the
first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose
them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and
unchangeable character. These are not reckoned as conditions of the possession of
the arts, except the bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the
virtues knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a
little but for everything, i.e., the very conditions that result from often doing just and
temperate acts (II.4.1105a22-35).28
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Aristotle emphasizes that there are three conditions required for virtue that are not required
for skill (techne). Zagzebski calls these conditions the “motivational components” of virtue.
Though she does not expand upon what these conditions are, nor does she attempt an
analysis of Aristotle’s well-known yet notoriously difficult passage, she does emphasize
that the conditions Aristotle outlines are motivational in that they highlight the importance
of an interior choice made in accordance with certain reasons (i.e., to do the act for its own
sake), a choice that precedes action. These components are distinctive of virtue but not
necessarily of skill, according to Zagzebski. Skill is concerned with effectiveness in action
itself and not the interior choices that motivate such an action. Zagzebski emphasizes that
the motivational components are “psychically prior” to skill because the motivational
component spurs the acquisition of skills that then allow the agent to be effective in action.
She writes, “to the extent that a virtuous person is motivated to produce external
consequences desirable from the point of view of the virtue, he would also be motivated to
acquire the skills that are associated with such effectiveness in action.”29 For example, she
continues, “a courageous person in certain roles would be motivated to acquire the skills of
effective combat. [Similarly] a fair person who is a teacher would be motivated to learn
procedures for fair grading.”30 Though Zagzebski thinks that “many moral virtues have
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many skills associated with them,” these skills always come after first having the moral
motivation required to spur their acquisition.31 Zagzebski emphasizes the differences
between virtues and skills by identifying virtues as primarily motivational, or defined by
motivational components. Skills, on the other hand, are primarily about being effective in
action, a task one takes up only after motivation is in place. Thus, on her account, the
analogy between skill and virtue breaks down principally because of motivational
components that are a central part of moral virtue but not of skill.
Similarly, James D. Wallace argues in Virtues and Vices that virtue essentially
involves a “change of heart” or “motivational components” that are not found in skill.
Wallace writes that skills essentially involve “know-how” required for gaining the capacity
to overcome a “technical difficulty” inherent in an action. He writes,
The sort of difficulty that a skill is the capacity to overcome--[a] technical difficulty-is not some contrary inclination that opposes the action. Rather the difficulty is
inherent in the doing of the action itself. In some cases, the technical difficulty is due
to the complexity of the action, as in cooking or theorizing. There is much one must
know in order to do these things. In other cases, such as hitting a baseball or
performing eye surgery, the action is hard because of the coordination required.32
According to Wallace, a skill is a capacity to overcome a technical difficulty that requires
obtaining “know-how” or technique in order to perform or master an action. However, this
technical difficulty is limited to certain kinds of difficulty that do not include overcoming
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some contrary inclinations or “having a change of heart” in coming to care about
something. Overcoming a contrary inclination (i.e., overcoming the desire to lie instead and
instead tell the truth), what he calls having a change of heart, Wallace thinks, is strictly
within the realm of motivational components of virtue. In addition to having a change of
heart, virtue is centrally about caring. He writes, “Honesty, for example, is a matter of
taking certain things seriously--a matter of caring about certain things. To cease to be
honest would be a matter of coming to care less or ceasing to care--a change of heart rather
than a loss of information or the loss of a skill through forgetting how to do something.”33
The key contrast Wallace describes it that virtue is about caring, or having a change of
heart, and/or overcoming contrary inclinations. Skill, on the other hand, is about knowing
or acquiring “know-how” in order to gain the capacity to overcome technical difficulties.
Once again, like Zagzebski, virtue is not analogous to skill because virtue requires a kind of
interior motivational state that skills do not require.
Gary Watson also points to motivational components definitive of virtue that skills
do not seem to incorporate. Watson writes,
The appraisal of skills or talents is importantly different from aretaic evaluation in a
way identified by Aristotle. Knowledge of an agent's ends, intentions, and efforts
has a different effect on aretaic appraisals than on the others. Indifference in a
performance doesn't count against one's skill, whereas a less than wholehearted
effort to save someone's life does impugn my moral character. Talent and skill are
fully displayed only in wholehearted performances, whereas the aretaic perspective
is also concerned with the "will," that is, with one's purposes, ends, choices,

33

Wallace, 47.

19

concerns, cares, attachments, and commitments. Not trying can be a failure of virtue
but not of skill.34
As I see it, Watson’s main point is that wholeheartedness, according to an Aristotelian
perspective of virtue, requires that the agent’s performances are expressions of the agent’s
deeply held notions of purpose, concerns, cares, desires, etc. otherwise described as “the
will” in ancient conceptions of virtue. Skills do not require this kind of wholeheartedness.
Indifference in a performance does not count against a performance, you need not be
wholehearted in performance for it to be excellent. However, the reverse is not the case
with virtue. Central to Watson’s claim is the idea that virtuous actions have motivations
that are connected to and an expression of agent’s cares, concerns, purposes, intentions, etc.
or that which makes up an agent’s will. In the case of skills, there need not be such
motivational components at play because a performance (e.g., playing tennis) can be
excellent without expressing overarching cares, concerns, intentions, etc. Lacking
wholeheartedness does not count against one’s having a skill; it does, however, count
against one’s having a virtue.
A final philosopher in the first group who also makes sharp distinctions between
skill and moral motivation is Anselm Mueller. Thus far, Zagzebski, Watson, and Wallace all
reject the analogy because virtue has motivational components that skill lacks. Mueller
rejects the analogy for a different reason: because virtues and skills are acquired in quite
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different ways. Mueller argues that the habituation involved in acquiring virtue is so unlike
that involved in acquiring a skill that the acquisition of skills is not at all a helpful model for
the acquisition of virtues. He holds this view largely because he, like Watson, Zagzebski,
and Wallace, thinks virtue and its habituation is primarily about having a moral
motivation. According to Mueller, virtue is centrally a qualification of the will wherein the
will is disposed to respond to certain ends as good. Put in other words, this qualification of
the will is moral motivation or a firm motivational pattern in the will wherein the will is
disposed to respond to certain ends as good. The kinds of practices that institute or
cultivate this habitual disposition are ones that engage in/cultivate a responsiveness to
certain kinds of reasons. Mueller argues that the habituation involved in gaining this
responsiveness to reason, this moral motivation, is quite different from the habituation
involved in acquiring a skill.
Following Aristotle, Mueller emphasizes that virtue centrally requires a firm
motivational pattern. He writes, “There is no virtue without a virtuous pattern of
motivation.”35 Additionally, he states that “a virtue is the firm attachment of the will to a
motivational pattern constitutive of acting well – what Aristotle calls a good hexis
prohairetikê, i.e. a disposition unconditionally to choose the right way of behaving for the
right kind of reason.”36 By contrast, he states, “A skill is a capacity to produce a certain type
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of result in accordance with specific procedures.”37 According to Mueller, a skill (e.g., the
computer engineer’s skill at fixing computers), is chiefly a capacity to act in accordance
with knowledge, rules and procedures (e.g., about how computers work). The virtuous
person, unlike the merely skilled person, must gain the motivational disposition
unconditionally to choose the right way of behaving for the right kind of reason which is
active in all areas of his/her life. This requires a responsiveness to “teleological concerns” or
certain reasons that are beyond merely a responsiveness to rules and procedures within a
certain domain, as is the case with skills.38 One way he conveys this difference between skill
and virtue is by articulating the way in which virtue, unlike skill, treats certain reasons as
imperative. The skilled person is motivated by the exercise of the activity of the skill itself,
including the knowledge and reasoning involved in the employment of the skill. A virtuous
person, by contrast, is motivated by a “why” that points beyond the activity itself. Mueller
writes, in the case of the virtue of charity, “one’s x-ing does not manifest charity unless one
would answer an Anscombian Why? by pointing to another’s need or wish, or the like.”39
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Mueller distinguishes two kinds of reasoning to explain the difference between the kinds of
reasons that take place in the practice of a skill verses the kinds of reasons that take place in
the practice of/habituation of virtue. Virtue is cultivated by practicing a responsiveness to
“occasioning reasoning” and skills are cultivated by practicing “telic reasoning.” Telic
reasoning involves “knowledge of what is to be produced by its exercise (including
knowledge of the product’s characteristic use)” such as the knowledge a carpenter uses to
produce a table (what a table is, how it can be used, the purpose it serves). Occasioning
reasoning, by contrast, requires some knowledge of the point of its practice or the ultimate
reason why you took up an activity (i.e., the “Anscombian Why?”).40 Mueller illustrates the
difference in the following passage,
But as we compare the reasons that guide the practice of a skill as such with the
reasons that guide the practice of a virtue as such, we find telic rationality in the first
case, and occasioning rationality in the second. If you have promised to fix a bicycle,
your purpose – the bicycle’s functioning – does indeed supply you with a telic
reason to make use of suitable means and ways (such as getting the tools). But qua
act of justice, or fidelity, what you do is nonetheless motivated by an occasioning
reason, viz. your promise. Its poietic telos – viz., the bicycle fixed – is not the
ultimate reason on which you act.
What we learn in the practice of skill is merely a responsiveness to telic reasons (i.e. the
means of making the bicycle) and not a responsiveness to occasioning reasons (i.e.,
considerations of why it is good to fix the bicycle, why one would take up this activity).

It is a reason supplied “not by a purpose that x-ing would serve to achieve [a telic reason], but rather by
something the agent takes to be the case and to make x-ing the right thing to do in response.” For
example, in the case of practicing justice, “one has to have some idea, however nebulous, of what ideal
gives point to the practice of justice” under conditions of pervasive nepotism, or under a tyrant. Ibid.
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Virtue, on the other hand, requires qualifying the will which involves being motivated in
the right ways, or responsive to the right reasons, what Mueller calls “occasioning reasons.”
Only in practicing a reflection on and responsiveness to the right sorts of reasons does this
firm motivational pattern or disposition in the will come about. This difference, particularly
in learning to attend to the right sorts of reasons, is the biggest difference between virtue
and any skill according to Mueller.41 The habituation process involved in acquiring a skill,
therefore, does not display a helpful analogy to the kind of habituation process that
cultivates virtue. Though Mueller emphasizes a unique way in which skill and virtue differ,
like Watson, Wallace, and Zagzebski, Mueller agrees that a key difference between skill and
virtue is based on motivation. Virtue is primarily about qualifying the will to be responsive
to certain kinds of reasons which requires a certain kind of habituation process that skills
lack. All four author’s arguments crystalize around moral motivation as the key
differentiator between skill and virtue.
Despite this first side’s emphasis on the importance of moral motivation in an
account of virtue, these scholars are not clear about what moral motivation is. Zagzebski

Mueller, 10. Mueller writes, “There is another side to the cognitive constitution of virtue that does not
find a parallel in any skill, however reasoned. This is the disposition to be aware of the presence and
relevance of relevant reasons – a qualification not included in the enduring disposition to treat as a
relevant reason a certain type of situation once its relevance is recognized…. A particular carpenter, X,
may or may not intend to, say, make a table. In either case, X has qua carpenter no further reason, beyond
that purpose, to fasten legs to a table top. Hence the question of “awareness of the presence and relevance
of reasons” cannot arise for X qua carpenter with respect to any such further reason. If, then, X does
intend to make a table, there can be no such thing as his being unaware of a relevant reason, except by
way of failing to think of and attend to it at the right time. But such forgetting is not a deficiency in
carpentry, as forgetting about a promise is deficiency in the virtues of justice, fidelity, and reliability.”
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defines moral motivation as “motivational components” and loosely points to Aristotle’s
passage indicating three conditions or interior choices that make up moral motivation.
Moreover, she claims that moral motivation is always “psychically prior” to skill. Wallace
vaguely describes moral motivation as a “change of heart” or “caring about something,”
both of which are distinct from the capacity to overcome “technical difficulty.” Watson
describes moral motivation as “concerned with the "will," or an array of “one's purposes,
ends, choices, concerns, cares, attachments, and commitments.” What Watson means by
these terms is again loosely connected to an Aristotelean conception of will and intention
which he, like the other proponents of the moral motivation objection, does not clarify.
Finally, though Mueller does the best job of the group in identifying moral motivation as a
quality of the will by taking from Aristotle’s notion of prohairetikê, or a disposition
unconditionally to choose the right way of behaving for the right kind of reason, he too
leaves this unexplained and points to Aristotle (who, to Mueller’s credit, also does not do a
great job of explaining this).
Not only do their definitions vary greatly and, if charitably interpreted, only loosely
hang together, but they also offer different views about the role moral motivation plays in
moral virtue. For Zagzebski, moral motivation as something that operates upfront and is
“psychically prior” to action. For Wallace and Watson, it is unclear whether moral
motivation is psychically prior to action or something that shows up during an action (e.g.,
a concern expressed in an act). Also left unexplained is whether moral motivation is a
quality ascribed to certain actions once they display an expression of certain interior cares,
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concerns, intentions, etc. or are whether moral motivation is something that grows and
develops over time and is not just a quality ascribed to certain fully morally motivated
actions. For Mueller, moral motivation is clearly something that must be developed and
habituated if it is to guide our actions. On his account, motivation is not just an upfront
choice but something that grows over time through certain habitual practices.
The ambiguity in each scholar’s conception of moral motivation presented thus far is
perhaps explained in part by their primary interest in the task of pointing out the
disanalogy between virtue and skill. They define moral motivation only insofar as to
distinguish it from their conception of skill. Yet, in so doing, they leave behind unclear
views about what moral motivation is, views that are propped up by contrasting views of
skill that, when challenged, pose further questions about what moral motivation really is
and how it actually relates to skills.
Similar to the ambiguity found in their notion of moral motivation, so too is the
notion of skill left undefined and narrowly construed. Zagzebski, Watson, Wallace, and
Mueller all conceive of skills as comparable to various crafts or “how to” methods, which
they take to be representative of skills generally. Beginning with Zagzebski, she uses the
following examples to describe the kinds of skills she has in mind. She writes,
Examples of skills that a person with each of these virtues might have are as follows:
Compassion skills: knowing what to say to the bereaved. Moral wisdom skills: being
able to talk a young person into staying in school or getting out of a street gang.
Fairness skills: knowing how to fairly evaluate student papers or papers submitted
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to a professional journal…Skills of courage: knowing how to stand up to a
tormentor.42
Each of the examples highlight a kind of how-to knowledge required to be effective in
action that comes after first having the “psychically prior” motivational components. In
analyzing her account, the kinds of skills Zagzebski has in mind, though perhaps involving
psychological aptitude at some level (i.e. displaying compassion), are narrow in scope in
that they are supposed to be representative of skills generally but do not account for
important cases of other kinds of skills, say, psychological skills. As Stichter, the lead
proponent of the second side, states, the more advanced psychological skills found in
experts require multi-step skills of self-regulation towards a chosen goal.
In addition, some kinds of psychological skills go beyond how-to knowledge and
deal directly with the kinds of things moral motivation is about. As I will go on to discuss
in chapter three, emotion regulation skills entail psychological techniques that, when
adopted, enable the modulation and discernment of emotions in light of a target emotion or
emotional goal.43 Returning to the example of virtue, if the goal is to choose to do an act for
its own sake, which is what Zagzebski says is a motivational component definitive of
virtue, then it is important to regulate our emotions such that the choice is made for the
right reasons and not, for example, because our anger tells us it is the thing to do. In this
case, skills of emotion regulation seem to align closely with the kinds of things moral
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motivation is about. It enters directly into the act of discerning and choosing certain ends,
which is the kind of interior act that Zagzebski thinks is constitutive of moral motivation, at
least according to her loose definition of moral motivation. If this is so, skills of this kind are
not separate from moral motivation but could impact its formation quite directly. Zagzebski
neither acknowledges the existence of such psychological skills in her view of skills, nor
does her account of moral motivation provide enough depth to exclude this possibility. As
a result, the case of psychological skills challenge Zagzebski’s basis for distinguishing skills
from virtue and puts added pressure on the need to get clear about what moral motivation
is and how it relates to skills.
In a similar vein, Watson, Wallace and Mueller also offer narrow conceptions of
skills. Watson and Wallace have in mind technical skills such as “cooking,” fixing a
“bicycle”, or becoming an expert “tennis player.”44 The kinds of skills Mueller thinks are
representative of skills generally are skills of carpentry, bicycle repair, gardening, and those
of a computer technician.45 While all are examples of skills to be sure, they are quite
removed from psychological skills whose content are the thoughts, feelings, and actions
that make up much of the moral life.46 Take for example social-cognitive model of
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personality and the discriminatory skills put forth by Daniel Russell.47 Russell indicates that
certain skills cultivate a kind of responsiveness to reasons concerning deep-standing goals.
Such skills are far more promising examples of virtue-relevant skills than the skills of
carpentry and gardening that Mueller and others took as representative of skills generally.
More needs to be said about what skills are and how psychological skills (e.g., emotion
regulation skills, social-cognitive skills, self-regulation skills, etc.) are not just analogous to
virtue but could actually facilitate the kinds of things moral motivation is about. However,
answering how skills could facilitate or cultivate a moral motivation again requires getting
clearer about what moral motivation is and how it relates to skills.

Concluding Thoughts on the Proponents
In analyzing the proponents of the moral motivation objection, I hope to have made clear
how their arguments against the virtue-skill analogy crystalize around the issue of moral
motivation. They each stand behind the view that moral virtue is rooted in Aristotle’s
conception of virtue that emphasizes the centrality of moral motivation in moral virtue.
Moreover, they think that skills do not account for the motivational components required
for virtue. Though these philosophers aim to stay true to Aristotle’s account of virtue and
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for the activation of schemas for interpreting the social landscape, as well as discriminatory skills for
defining determinate goal-relevant tasks and strategies for adjusting behavior so as to realize those
goals.” Russell, Daniel, “From Personality to Character to Virtue” in Current Controversies in Virtue Theory
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emphasize the importance of moral motivation, their accounts fail to clarify what moral
motivation is.
Furthermore, I find their narrow conceptions of skill and moral motivation keep
them from exploring how skills relate to and contribute to moral motivation. In other
words, their focus on drawing distinctions between virtue and skill prevents them working
out answers to the more nuanced and interesting question for which the analogy between
skill and virtue was originally posed: how could skills (of various sorts) help us understand
how virtue is cultivated? If our goal is not merely to point out the disanalogy between
virtue and skill, but to better understand how virtue is cultivated (especially that which is
most important to virtue, moral motivation), it is important to work out what moral
motivation is and what resources skills have to offer towards this end.

III. An Opponent of the Moral Motivation Objection
Matthew Stichter responds to the motivation objection by arguing that psychological skills
do in fact account for moral motivation and therefore do cultivate moral virtue. Stichter
sees his work in large part as a reply to the “long-held objection to understanding virtues as
practical skills,” that focuses on motivational differences between virtues and skills. Stichter
engages directly with the proponents of the moral motivation objection. He argues that the
separation of motivation and skill are mistaken largely due to the antiquated conception of
skill presupposed by the authors who wage such objections. When virtue is seen as a
psychological skill of self-regulation, Stichter argues, the motivational differences between
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virtue and skill are resolved and thereby allow skill (of a certain kind) to be an effective
way to cultivate virtue.
In what follows, I recount Stichter attempt to use his view of skill to reply to
motivation objections offered by Zagzebski and Watson. Though Stichter is optimistic about
the potential for psychological skills of self-regulation to account for all motivational
differences identified by the proponents, I argue that Stichter’s account fails to account for
the kind of Aristotelean-inspired view of moral motivation that Zagzebski and Watson take
seriously. As a result, his account fails to overcome the motivation objection but points to
an important gap in the discourse. His work highlights the need to gain clarity about what
moral motivation is if we are to understand how it relates to psychological skills in the
development of virtue.

Stichter’s Reply to Zagzebski and Watson
Zagzebski makes two claims about the motivational differences between virtue and skill.
Zagzebski thinks that what is distinctive about virtue is that it has motivational components
that are “psychically prior to the acquisition of skill” that allows one to be “effective in
action” or produce “external consequences.” Second, she claims that the motivational
component of virtue “defines it more” than in the case of skills.48 Despite Stichter’s claim
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that his view of skill addresses both claims, I find that his view misinterprets what moral
motivation is for Zagzebski.
In reply to Zagzebski’s first claim, Stichter pushes back against the idea that skills
and virtues can be separated on the basis of virtue having a motivational component that is
“psychically prior.” In other words, Stichter challenges the idea that motivation is
something that only happens upfront and not during the skill itself. In the case of
psychological skill of self-regulation, Stichter argues, motivation entails both “goal-setting”
and “goal-striving” or a commitment to a set goal. Both are required throughout the process
of self-regulation towards a goal. Goals are required upfront in goal-setting, but
commitment to a goal is also required throughout the process of achieving expertise, or a
high level of self-regulation. Stichter writes,
One of the most important factors for determining whether someone can attain and
maintain expertise is motivation. Nobody can acquire expertise by accident, and
only those who dedicate themselves to excellence in performance can reach that
level of skill development. Insofar as deliberate practice requires setting up
challenges to overcome, it requires being strongly motivated to perform well, and a
high level of motivation is required to maintain that level of performance. Like our
expectations for acquiring virtue, achieving expertise requires being consistently
motivated to achieve high standards that one sets for oneself.49
Both goal-setting and commitment to a goal or goal-striving, Stichter argues, is essential to
successful self-regulation, which entails overcoming many obstacles over time. In this way,
Stichter challenges Zagzebski’s idea that skills and virtues can be separated on the basis of
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virtue having a motivational component that is “psychically prior” to skill. Though Stichter
displays how psychological skills do not require “motivational components” upfront, but
rather throughout the process of exercising the skill, he is defines moral motivation as “goal
setting” and “goal striving.” Yet this is not clearly what Zagzebski had in mind, as we see in
her second claim.
Turning to Zagzebski’s second claim that the motivational component in virtue
“defines it more” than in the case of skills, Stichter’s reply struggles to capture what she
means by this claim. He writes,
What then of Zagzebski’s claim that the difference between virtues and skills lies in
the motivational component defining virtue more than success, in contrast to skills?
Perhaps it is the case for virtue, but not similarly for expertise, that the motivation to
act well must always be present in order to possess the virtue. ….Heather Battaly
provides [another] possible explanation when she distinguishes conceptions of
virtue by whether virtue requires good motives, good effects, or both.50
Stichter guesses at what Zagzebski might mean and proceeds to display how the
motivational components described in each possible interpretation are also found in skilled
experts. For example, in reply to the possible claim that the “motivation to act well” must
always be present in the case of virtues but not in skills, he posits that if virtue is typically
understood as a matter of degree, then “someone could possess a virtue even with some
lapses in motivation.” He concludes that this consideration “puts virtue back on a par with
expertise, since expertise also admits of degrees.”51
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These interpretations might hold if they did not ignore the explanation Zagzebski
herself gives by reference to Aristotle’s passage at NE II.4.1105a22-35. She writes that there
are “several arguments for distinguishing virtues and skills that I find persuasive. I will
mention several from Aristotle…” Following this, she cites Aristotle’s passage where he
identifies three characteristics that define virtue (i.e., virtuous actions are chosen for their
own sake, etc.). According to Zagzebski’s reading of Aristotle, these three conditions pick
out the “motivational components” that “define” virtue but not skill. 52 Read in light of this
quote, Zagzebski’s second claim that the motivational components “define it more” than
skill is not such a mystery (or is no more mysterious than is Aristotle’s view). Yet, because
Stichter ignores the heart of Zagzebski’s claim, he fails to address how self-regulation skills
accounts for or contribute to the motivational components that, according to Aristotle,
define virtue but not skill. Though Stichter’s account fails to display how psychological
skills account for the kind of moral motivation Zagzebski has in mind, his confusion about
moral motivation highlights an important need for the discourse to get clear about what
moral motivation is if we are to understand the way in which various psychological skills
relate to moral motivation.
Turning to Watson, Stichter again fails to capture what Watson means by moral
motivation and how it differs from skill. Watson writes,
The appraisal of skills or talents is importantly different from aretaic evaluation in a
way identified by Aristotle. Knowledge of an agent's ends, intentions, and efforts
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has a different effect on aretaic appraisals than on the others. Indifference in a
performance doesn't count against one's skill, whereas a less than wholehearted
effort to save someone's life does impugn my moral character. Talent and skill are
fully displayed only in wholehearted performances, whereas the aretaic perspective
is also concerned with the "will," that is, with one's purposes, ends, choices,
concerns, cares, attachments, and commitments. Not trying can be a failure of virtue
but not of skill.53
As I see it, Watson is making two connected points. His first point is that wholeheartedness,
according to an Aristotelian perspective of virtue, requires that the agent’s performances
are expressions of the agent’s deeply held notions of purpose, concerns, cares, desires, etc.
otherwise described as “the will” in aretaic conceptions of virtue. Skills do not require this
kind of wholeheartedness in order to be considered a great performance. Second, Watson
emphasizes that expertise in a skill allows for an agent to be indifferent or half-hearted
about her performance without it counting against the agent’s skill where the reverse is not
the case with virtue (largely because virtue has a different standard for wholeheartedness,
as described by the first point).
In reply to Watson’s objection, Stichter only addresses Watson’s second point,
ignoring the first point’s Aristotelian-inspired view of moral motivation. Stichter argues
that, contrary to Watson’s critique that skills allow for indifference in a performance, the
study of expertise (or people who have highly developed self-regulation skills) indicates
that experts must be continuously committed to the ends of their practice. Stichter argues
that the expert can be assessed as a performer who, rather than being indifferent, must be
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committed to an end goal and continuously respond to the demands of his practice (e.g.,
becoming a doctor requires being committed and responsive to the demands of medicine).54
Stichter concludes, “we do not need to look beyond the acquisition of skills and expertise to
incorporate a concern for the motivational commitments of the performer.”55
Stichter’s reply to Watson does not address the core of Watson’s view found in his
first point. Watson claims that skills, like virtue, require an expression of an agent’s ultimate
cares, concerns, etc. As Watson explicitly notes, he draws from “an aretaic evaluation” of
moral motivation “in a way identified by Aristotle” that describes the wholehearted action
of the virtuous person as one that is an expression of the agent’s "will," or “one's purposes,
ends, choices, concerns, cares, attachments, and commitments.”56 Virtues are different from
skills, according to Watson, because virtues express these kinds of motivational
components. Instead of engaging this point, Stichter interprets motivation merely as a
“commitment to being an expert” which entails a “responsiveness to the demands of a
practice.” Yet this does not amount to or require the kind of wholeheartedness Watson
picks out. For example, in the case of the expert doctor, it could be that the doctor is
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“responsive to the demands of her practice” but such responsiveness and expertise never
requires her actions as a doctor to express her cares or concerns beyond the domain of the
practice. Such an expression requires reflecting on one’s ultimate cares, concerns, and/or life
purposes. As Watson and Zagzebski’s Aristotelian-inspired accounts suggest, moral
motivation concerns a choice about ends and therefore must consider ends, concerns, and
cares that go beyond any one domain.
That said, Stichter’s failed attempts point, once again, to a larger issue within the
discourse. If we wish to take seriously an Aristotelean account of moral motivation, we
must get clear about what this means. Watson Zagzebski, and Stichter all use a number of
different, underdetermined definitions of moral motivation. In so doing, they complicate
any attempt to display how skills relate to moral motivation.

Concluding Thoughts on Stichter
Stichter’s account represents a side of the discourse that takes seriously psychological skills
and the moral motivation objection but, in attempting to show how skills themselves
account for moral motivation, he ends up highlighting the need for the discourse as a whole
to clarify what moral motivation is. Furthermore, we see that pinning down an account of
moral motivation is necessary for understanding how psychological skills relate to moral
motivation.
As a final point, Stichter’s view leaves us with further questions concerning the
relationship skills have to moral virtue. Due to his preoccupation with arguing for the thesis
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that virtues are certain kinds of psychological skills, his work stops short of exploring
answers to more interesting and helpful questions. For example, how psychological skills
help us to develop virtue? I propose that instead of arguing for ways that psychological
skills capture moral motivation and overcome the moral motivation objection, we take a
humbler stance. We first work out what moral motivation is, taking seriously the view of
moral motivation Aristotle had in mind, and explore how certain kinds of psychological
skills could be useful in cultivating moral motivation and, by extension, moral virtue. In
taking this stance, we open up the dialogue to explore the many ways psychological skills
can help to develop the different kinds of intelligence and acumen virtues and moral
motivation involve.

IV. The Task Behind and Ahead
After having laid out the landscape of literature on virtue and skill, pinpointing two sides
of the moral motivation objection, my aim has been to highlight a need or a gap within the
current literature. At present, the discourse is at an impasse. Neither side is clear about
what moral motivation is and, as a result, they fail to articulate how skills relate to and/or
could aid in the cultivation of moral virtue. Furthermore, more work needs to be done to
understand the psychological skills that relate most to moral motivation.
Going forward, to address the impasse in the current literature I take up the task of
building out a moral psychology of moral motivation. I do this with two ideas mind. First, I
take it that it is important to stay true to an account of moral motivation that builds upon
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Aristotle’s conception of moral motivation. Moreover, I hold that moral motivation is a
disposition that can be cultivated over time through habit. By way of exploring a robust
account of moral motivation that highlights both of these features, rather than turning to
Aristotle, I propose Aquinas’s account fulfills this task best thanks to his well-recognized
and detailed moral psychology that builds on Aristotle’s framework. I find that Aquinas’s
work not only explains how moral motivation is developed but also points us to the kinds
of skills and practices that cultivate it. Second, I seek to address how skills help us to
cultivate moral virtue, understood as primarily a motivational disposition. In light of this
goal, rather than arguing that psychological skills themselves have motivational
components comparable to virtue (as Stichter does), my goal is to explore how certain kinds
of psychological skills could be useful in cultivating moral motivation and, by extension,
moral virtue.
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Chapter Two: Aquinas on Moral Motivation
I. Why Turn to Aquinas on Moral Motivation?
Why turn to Aquinas when he never uses such terms as “moral motivation,” and it seems
that the current discourse is really only concerned with Aristotle’s view of moral
motivation? To the first point, though Aquinas, like Aristotle, does not use the specific
modern term “moral motivation,” as I will go on to display, he has an account of moral
motivation that heavily relies and builds on Aristotle’s ethics. Furthermore, Aquinas offers
a more developed moral psychology than Aristotle that, in turn, provides helpful insights
into how moral motivation works and develops.
Perhaps even more important than his close ties with Aristotle, Aquinas is a fitting
philosopher in his own right to consider in this contemporary discourse. Watson,
Zagzebski, and Mueller argue that moral motivation is primarily founded upon an
Aristotelian tradition that notably includes Aquinas. Watson’s description of moral
motivation, for example, refers to conceptions of the “will” or the agent’s cares, concerns, or
intentions. Such conceptions emerge from medieval moral psychology and are developed
and defined by Aquinas. Furthermore, as an Aquinas scholar and student of G.E.M.
Anslem, Mueller also aims to capture moral motivation and practical rationality in terms
consistent with both Aristotle and Aquinas. Exploring Aquinas’s moral psychology and his
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account of moral motivation is not only consistent with the aims of the scholars we have
discussed thus far but also, as I hope to illustrate, a resource for developing these views.
Aquinas is also a trusted resource within contemporary literature on virtue
cultivation. His moral psychology and account of virtue is one of the few historical accounts
that contemporary philosophers return to for insight into what virtue is and how it is
acquired. For example, John Hacker-Wright, in a recent publication by Nancy Snow titled
Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Psychology, wrote a chapter
devoted to Aquinas’s view of moral growth and his account of habit in cultivating virtue.
Moreover, as Julia Annas argues and has amply illustrated by her own work, the classical
accounts of virtue constitute our “best entry-point” into any discussion about virtue.57
Along with Annas, Christian B. Miller and Daniel Russell also aim to align their conception
of virtue with that of Aristotle and Aquinas.58 Though these scholars continue to invite
Aquinas into the discussion to help lay the foundation for what virtue is and how it
develops, very little work has been done to develop Aquinas’s view on virtue cultivation
and moral motivation as it relates to the current discourse. This chapter serves to help fill
this gap.
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As a final answer to why it is worthwhile to turn to Aquinas and to develop his
account of moral motivation, in addition to contributing to contemporary discourses, this
project is one that also contributes to Aquinas scholarship which, to date, says very little
about Aquinas’s views on moral motivation. Thomistic scholarship, generally speaking,
lacks a detailed account of Aquinas’s views on moral motivation. This is especially true
when it comes to an account that builds upon Aristotle’s requirements for virtuous action
and that focuses on the moral virtues. Aquinas scholars who explicitly discuss “moral
motivation” as it applies Aquinas are, as Michael Sherwin calls them, the “theologians of
moral motivation.” These theologians argue that Aquinas’s account of moral motivation lies
in Aquinas’s account of charity.59 For example, James Keenan, a well-known contributor to
this group, argues that “‘moral motivation,’ best expresses the charitable person who loves
self and neighbor formally out of union with God.”60 Though Keenan explicitly employs the
term moral motivation as it applies to Aquinas’s ethics, this account speaks neither to the
moral virtues nor to the psychological mechanisms at play in moral motivation for the
acquired virtues.61 Yet moral motivation, as I will go on to illustrate, is a contemporary term
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that focuses on the natural functioning of our human psychology, not the supernaturally
infused virtue of charity. If an account of moral motivation is to relate to the contemporary
use of the term, it needs to appeal to the plethora of resources available in Aquinas’s moral
psychology of intellect and will. My account will do just that.
Other explanations of Aquinas’s view of moral motivation treat his account in a
general fashion. They focus on Aquinas insofar as he broadly represents a medieval way of
thinking about moral motivation. Johnathan Jacobs offers such an account in "Moral
Motivation in Christian and Jewish Medieval Philosophy" in the anthology Moral
Motivation: A History.62 Though broadly informative, this account again does not explain in
detail what exactly Aquinas thinks moral motivation is. In light of the fact that little work
has been done to explain moral motivation, especially in the ways I intend, turning to focus
on Aquinas’s account of moral motivation is not only fitting for the task at hand but also
beneficial for the Aquinas literature at large.

II. Chapter Overview and Aims
Given that the authors discussed in the first chapter (Zagzebski, Wallace, Mueller, and
Watson) did not have a clear understanding of moral motivation and that they thought of
all skills as something separate from and ultimately unhelpful to cultivating a moral
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motivation, in this chapter I aim to clarify what moral motivation is using Aquinas’s moral
psychology. I find that Aquinas offers an account of moral motivation that applies to the
moral virtues and that builds on Aristotle’s view of moral motivation. I argue that
Aquinas’s account provides a developmental perspective to moral motivation that relies on
directing our powers, over time through habituation, to become responsive to the good,
otherwise known as happiness. After laying out his account, in the next chapter, I next
build out his account of skill and return to the authors in the first chapter to indicate how
Aquinas’s account of moral motivation allows ample room for skills of a certain sort (to
which he explicitly directs us) to aid in the development of moral motivation and moral
virtue.
To this end, I begin my argument with an overview of moral motivation and the
common contemporary understanding of moral motivation. Following this, I explore how
different questions come into focus in developing accounts of moral motivation for ancient
and medieval philosophers. Next, I take up the task of discussing Aristotle’s account of
moral motivation as it is presented by Susan Meyer. Meyer clearly articulates two necessary
conditions of moral motivation: teleological motivation, or end-directed motivation, and
efficient-causal motivation, or that which primarily concern the psychological mechanisms
that move an agent to act. I find that Meyer’s account is a helpful framework for
understanding Aquinas’s account. For this reason, I apply Meyer’s two conditions to
develop Aquinas’s account of moral motivation as both teleological and efficient-causal. In
displaying Aquinas’s account according to these two conditions, I find the efficient-causal
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features of moral motivation provide space for thinking of moral motivation
developmentally. It does this because this aspect of motivation parallels the development of
moral virtue that is achieved through a long process of habituation in order to gain a
responsiveness to reason in the appetites. In turn, in the next chapter, I go on to argue that
Aquinas’s developmental model of moral motivation leaves ample room for skills to play a
helpful role in cultivating moral motivation.

III. Moral Motivation: An Overview
Is important to first say a word about how I attempt to study moral motivation. Despite the
fact that “moral motivation” is a contemporary term, I find that it often marks a set of
questions that have been posited, developed, and addressed in a myriad of ways
throughout the history of philosophy: What does it mean to be morally motivated? How
does one become morally motivated? What is it to take a virtuous act? What does it mean to
act in a moral way? As I will explain in the next section, contemporary philosophical
discussions of moral motivation have narrowed their focus primarily on moral beliefs,
judgments, and action. Unlike Aristotle who focused on the ethical human life, telos, and
virtue more broadly in addressing questions concerning motivation, for contemporary
philosophers, as Iakovos Vasiliou writes, “the issue of moral motivation concerns how,
why, and whether moral judgments (i.e., judgments that some action is right or moral or
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ethical or virtuous) motivate agents to act.”63 In outlining a contemporary account of moral
motivation and comparing it with a more historical view, specifically Aristotle’s and
Aquinas’s view, my goal is neither to track moral motivation as a stable philosophical
concept nor to act as if the same question about moral motivation gets answered differently
over the course of history. Christia Mercer rightly warns, one ought to be suspicious of the
idea that “an unchanging philosophical question simply gets answered differently over
history without the answers themselves contributing to a transformation of the question.”64
In an attempt to acknowledge the complexity of the concept, my aim is to track the
shifting questions that undergird the concept of moral motivation for contemporary,
ancient, and medieval philosophers. In addition, I aim to highlight the broad and complex
array of positions, questions, and responses that arise from these questions. Let us begin
with the way contemporary philosophers view moral motivation.

IV. Contemporary Debates About Moral Motivation: An Overview
The contemporary view of moral motivation focuses on how or whether moral judgments
motivate us to act. As Robert Audi summarizes, moral motivation concerns “how, if at all,
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the behavioral will must respond to the moral intellect.”65 This focus turns out to be rather
technical in nature and has given rise to a series of debates concerning which cognitive or
conative features of the mind enable moral judgments to motivate action. Given that these
debates make up most of the contemporary discussion on moral motivation, it is
worthwhile to summarize what these debates are before turning to compare the
contemporary view with its historical counterpart.
The first widely recognized debate concerns various forms of internalism versus
externalism about whether moral judgments motivate necessarily (internalism) or only
contingently (externalism). Connie S. Rosati writes, “The main division of opinion
regarding the nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation is between
those philosophers who accept and those who reject a thesis known as motivational
judgment internalism.”66 Traditionally, judgment internalism (henceforth internalism)
claims that moral judgment is internal to motivation and itself motivates without need of an
accompanying desire (“strong internalism”). Conversely, weak internalism states that there
is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation. As Christine Korsgaard
says, internalists believe “moral considerations necessarily have some power to motivate
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us.”67 So motivational internalism holds that necessarily if one sincerely judges an action
right, then one is motivated to some extent to act in accordance with that judgment.
Externalists, on the other hand, hold that “any connection that exists between moral
judgment and motivation is purely contingent, though it may turn out to rest on deep
features of human nature. Moral motivation occurs when a moral judgment combines with
a desire, and the content of the judgment is related to the content of the desire so as to
rationalize the action.”68
A related question, also under debate, concerns how a moral judgment motivates,
via desire or belief? Few deny that desires motivate, but some hold that beliefs can also be
motivationally efficacious states. This is often characterized as a Humean debate because
the Humean (if not Hume himself) would deny that beliefs by themselves can motivate.69
On the other hand, an anti-Humean posits that beliefs can be conative states that motivate.
The ongoing set of responses regarding how moral judgments motivate divide up the
discussion based on which psychological phenomena is most responsible for motivation.
Based on these divisions, Timothy Schroeder nicely outlines four distinct camps or theories
of moral motivation: the sentimentalist, instrumentalist, cognitivist, and personalist. Each
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outline is in actuality an ideal type of the theory, nonetheless, collectively they provide a
helpful framework of the contemporary views on offer.
As the name suggests, what is most significant about moral motivation according to
the sentimentalist is emotion. The sentimentalist claims that emotions play a key causal role
in motivating moral behavior. The strongest formulation of this view maintains that an
action cannot count as being morally motivated unless it is driven by certain moral
emotions (e.g., compassion, etc.).70 Each sentimentalist has his or her own view about what
counts as moral emotions. Nonetheless, they agree that moral emotions are the primary
necessary factor in creating a morally motivated action. The instrumentalists, by contrast,
claim that people are motivated when they form beliefs about how to satisfy pre-existing
desires. Schroeder et. al write, “Motivation, says the instrumentalist, begins with intrinsic
desires. And desires are intrinsic just in the sense that what is desired is desired for its own
sake, and neither merely as a realizer of what was antecedently desired, nor merely as a
means to what was antecedently desired.”71
For the instrumentalist, intrinsic desire is the key necessary element in moral
motivation. For the cognitivist, moral motivation is not primarily about emotions or
intrinsic desires but begins with belief. Schroeder et. al write, “The cognitivist holds the
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view that moral motivation begins with occurrent belief. In particular, it begins with beliefs
about what actions would be right.” He continues, “The cognitivist holds that, at least in
cases of morally worthy action, such beliefs lead to motivation to perform those actions,
quite independently of any antecedent desires.”72
Finally, there is the personalist account. Unlike the previous three views, which
highlighted certain mental states as the key element required for moral motivation, the
personalist takes a character-centered view. The personalist thinks that morally good or
morally motivated actions stem from an agent’s good character. Schroeder et al. summarize
this kind of character in the following way,
Good character involves knowledge of the good, wanting what is good for its own
sake, long-standing emotional dispositions that favor good action, and longstanding habits of responding to one's knowledge, desires, and emotions with good
actions... Such a character involves long-standing conative dispositions, emotional
dispositions, and behavioral dispositions (i.e., habits), with these complexes of
dispositions generally being named “virtues.”73
What matters most for moral motivation, in this view, is that an action is performed by the
person in a certain way, a way that displays certain complexes of dispositions consistent
with the virtues. For example, Schroeder et. al write, “if action A is one that requires facing
a significant threat of harm for a good cause, then the cognitive emotional and behavioral
dispositions required to perform A in a praiseworthy manner will be that complex known
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as ‘courage.”74 What is unique about this view is that moral motivation is neither primarily
emotional nor about beliefs alone nor about intrinsic desires. It is about a complex of
emotional dispositions and habits that make up good character none of which can be
reduced to long-standing intrinsic desires or beliefs or emotions. Because of this focus on
states of character, the personalist view of moral motivation is particularly well-suited to
virtue ethics.

V. Historical Accounts of Moral Motivation
The contemporary view of moral motivation leads to a number of subsequent debates that
depend on nuanced distinctions between the cognitive, conative, and affective interior
states. It is no surprise that ancient and medieval philosophers (actually, all philosophers
prior to Hume) did not distinguish sharply between the powers of will and cognition in the
way that contemporary philosophers do. As Vasiliou writes, “Both Plato and
Aristotle...explicitly posit a species of desire that is itself rational—boulēsis, sometimes
translated as ‘rational wish.’ Aristotle’s central ethical concept of decision (prohairesis) is
described as either a ‘desiring understanding’ (orektikos nous) or a ‘thinking desire’ (orexis
dianoētikē) (Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b4–5).”75
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Susan Meyer rightly warns against forcing Aristotle to engage with contemporary
philosophers on the issue of moral motivation in her article titled “Aristotle and Moral
Motivation.” Summarizing Meyer, Vasiliou states,
Plato and Aristotle do not explicitly address the dispute about motivational
judgment internalism or about Humeanism... to force them to come down on one
side or the other is to misunderstand the way they are considering the matter, since
they do not understand the distinction between the cognitive and the conative as
mutually exclusive, which is an assumption important for generating the
philosophical problem, at least in many typical formulations of it.

Meyer makes clear that Plato and Aristotle did not concern themselves with the same
distinctions that give rise to the problems with which most contemporary philosophers are
primarily concerned. The answer then is not to force Aristotle, Aquinas, or others to “come
down on one side or the other” of the internalism, externalism, Humean, Anti-Humean
debates. These concerns do not capture the primary concerns Aristotle and Aquinas had
regarding moral motivation. Rather, we must understand their unique approach and focal
questions.
Both Aristotle and Aquinas offer a broader conception of motivation than
contemporary philosophers. Visiliou reminds us that in order to understand moral
motivation in ancient and medieval philosophers, we must consider “the context of
eudaimonism.”76 Given that their primary interest in ethics is to discern what constitutes a
flourishing, virtuous human life, their answer to moral motivation focuses primarily on the
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central question that leads to such a life: What is the human good? What makes an act
virtuous? In other words, in light of the fact that virtue is key to a good life, they were
concerned with a virtuous assessment of an action in terms of what actions, done in what
way, towards which ends or telos, are required for a virtuous action? 77
In exploring what Aristotle and Aquinas have to say about moral motivation, I turn
to focus on Meyer’s analysis of Aristotle’s account of moral motivation. Her account focuses
on two primary conditions for an act to be virtuous: it must be directed at the right ends
(teleological motivation) and involve certain psychological capacities to carry out the end in
action (efficient-causal motivation). Using Meyer’s framework, I then turn to Aquinas to
develop his view of moral motivation.

VI. Aristotle on Moral Motivation
The scholars discussed in the first chapter made clear that historically-minded
contemporary scholars, especially virtue ethicists, continue to turn to Aristotle for insight
on what it means to be morally motivated. In particular, the passage they frequently cite for
his position lists the three conditions required for a person to take a virtuous action.
Though the passage itself does not clearly relay a theory of moral motivation, Meyer offers
a helpful interpretation of Aristotle’s passage that brings to light his account of moral
motivation based on two essential motivations required for a virtuous agency (to perform

77

Ibid, 8.

53

virtuous actions): teleological motivation (the reason or goals for which one acts) and
efficient-causal motivation (the psychological apparatus that moves one to act).
Aristotle emphasizes that being virtuous is not a matter of what one does but the
way in which one does it (ean … pôs echôn prattêi—1105a30–31; see 1144a18). His focus is on
the condition of the agent who does the action. She must first act with knowledge. Second,
she must act on decision [prohairoumenos] and decide on them because of themselves
[prohairoumenos di’ auta]. Third, she must act from a firm and unchangeable disposition.
(1105a28–33; see 1144a13–20).78 In other words, an agent must act from knowledge that this
particular act is the right or noble act to do rather than accidentally doing and act without
such knowledge. She must be motivated to act for the sake of the good (i.e., because it is
good/kalon), and not because of some other reason (e.g., to get a good reputation). And the
act must not be a random (one-off) kind of event but rather expresses a characterological
feature of the agent who seeks to have virtuous dispositions and motivations.79 Of the three
conditions Aristotle offers for virtuous action at NE 1105a29, the second condition explains
what most take to be his views about motivation. Meyer, like many other scholars, writes
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that “the second of these three conditions concerns the agent’s motivation in performing the
action.”80
According to Meyer, the second condition emphasizes prohairesis, which is a decision
or choice that issues in a desire that prompts action. As such there are two essential types of
motivation taking place within this condition: teleological and efficient-causal. Both are
required for virtuous agency (acting virtuously). She writes,
The second condition invokes the notion of prohairesis. Translators often render this
term as “decision,” “choice,” or “preferential choice.” As Aristotle defines and
deploys the notion, it counts as a motivation in both the teleological and efficientcausal senses ….Prohairesis, as Aristotle defines it, is a desire (orexis) that is due to
deliberation (1113a2–12; see 1139a23, 32–34, b4–5), and deliberation, he explains, is
reasoning in the light of (pros) a goal (telos) (1112b11–34). The salient feature of an
action done on prohairesis is that it issues from the agent’s understanding of the
action as being “for the sake of” that goal. When an action issues from your
prohairesis, the goal for the sake of which you act is your teleological motivation,
while the desire that results from deliberating pros that goal (and that actually
moves you to act), will be your efficient-causal motivation.

According to Meyer, Aristotle emphasizes that a virtuous agent must “act on decision
[prohairoumenos]” and “decide because of themselves [prohairoumenos di’ auta]” or for its
own sake.81 This statement highlights two aspects of prohairesis that make up the two
necessary conditions of moral motivation. To act virtuously one must have a goal (sought
for its own sake), which is a teleological motivation, and one must have the desire that is
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elicited from deliberation about this goal that subsequently moves one to act on this end, or
an efficient-causal motivation. Meyer bases both motivations on Aristotle’s notion of
prohairesis. She writes that “Aristotle often uses the term prohairesis in the efficient-causal
sense (e.g. ‘prohairesis is the origin [archê] of the action, the source of the motion, not that for
the sake of which,’ 1139a31–32). But he clearly takes the goal that figures in the relevant
deliberation (the teleological motivation) to be an integral feature of the prohairesis.”82 She
continues, “In saying that the virtuous agent acts on decision (prohairoumenos), Aristotle is
telling us something about the efficient-causal motivation characteristic of virtue: the
virtuous agent is moved to act by a desire that is informed by his understanding that this
action realizes or promotes a particular goal.”83
Why is it that Meyer emphasizes both the teleological and efficient-causal
motivations? Several scholars, including Zagzebski and Watson from the first chapter,
interpret Aristotle as emphasizing merely a choice about an end done for its own sake
which, according to Meyer’s breakdown, is only the teleological motivation. Why include
the efficient-causal aspect of motivation? First, Meyer aims to capture a full picture of what
Aristotle meant by prohairesis as a desire that results from deliberation. In doing so, she
highlights the psychological mechanism that follows deliberation which helps to explain
what moves one to act on the decided goal. To this end, her explanation addresses a central
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aspect of moral motivation according to contemporary philosophers concerned not merely
with right ends but with how, psychologically speaking, we are wired in such a way as to
carry out those motives in action. As Robert Audi writes, moral motivation focuses on
“how the behavioral will respond to the intellect.” Meyer’s efficient-causal motivation
expresses Aristotle’s answer to this central question regarding moral motivation.
Last, Meyer explains that the efficient-causal features of motivation are significant in
their own right. She writes, “These psychological states (efficient-causal motivation) are
significant because they reflect and determine one’s reasons for acting (teleological
motivation).”84 Without the subsequent psychological desire or inclination (or causal
apparatus) that moves one to action, deliberation about the goal would not take shape and
solidify the end by putting it into action. As Aristotle repeatedly states, “it is by doing just
acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without
doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.”85 It is acting on the
good, not just thinking or deliberating about it, that makes one good. Aristotle reminds us
that those who take refuge in philosophy without carrying out the knowledge of the right
end into actions are “like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the
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things they are ordered to do.”86 Both the end and that which puts in motion the action
solidify and reinforce the choice made in deliberation.
Like Aristotle, Aquinas also provides an answer to moral motivation through an
explanation of what it means to be virtuous and perform virtuous actions. Yet, unlike
Aristotle, Aquinas has a robust moral psychology that explores in more detail the relation
between will and intellect in performing virtuous actions. In what follows, I explore how
the teleological and efficient-causal motivations provide a helpful framework for Aquinas’s
views on moral motivation.

VII. Aquinas on Moral Motivation
An account of Aquinas’s view on moral motivation would fall short if it omitted a
discussion of the unique way in which medieval philosophers approached questions of
moral motivation. Therefore, let us first discuss the uniquely medieval approach. Like most
medieval philosophers, Aquinas did not systematically use some particular term such as
“motive” or “motivation” as it is used in contemporary ethics or even in modern English.
As Jonathan Jacobs states, “Medieval philosophers tended to be mainly concerned with the
psychology of virtuous action and with the will. Neither of those concerns is quite the same
as a concern with motivation, though they have important points of contact and overlap.”87
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For medieval philosophers, whether or not an act is morally good depends on whether or
not an act is done in a certain way, from a certain character or set of dispositions and
towards a certain end. Contrasting medieval views from contemporary, Visiliou writes
Overall the concern of Augustine, Anselm, Maimonides, Bahya ibn Pakuda, Aquinas
and Scotus is not so much with whether it is belief or desire that motivates the agent
or with whether or not moral judgment necessarily motivates, but with acting from
the right efficient-causal motivations for the right ends. Inevitably in this period both
the efficient-causal motivation and the ends aimed at stem ultimately from God.88
Many medieval philosophers were not concerned with the narrow discussion of conative
and cognitive states that give rise to motivation. Rather, their concerns centered on what it
means to perform virtuous actions, acting for the right ends and with the right efficientcausal mechanisms.
In addition to their difference in focus, another distinctive feature of medieval
accounts is the idea that human activity overall is to be understood as a response to God or
a normatively authoritative reality.89 Contrary to contemporary philosophers who are often
reluctant to put forth normative claims about reality, and even ancient philosophers who
were not as forthcoming about God’s role in human life, medieval philosophers couch all of
their conceptions of ethics, human action, and human agency within a wider context of
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normatively significant relations between nature, will, reason, and God. Aquinas, for
example, makes clear that humans were made in the image of God. God instilled in us an
appetite for the good such that our desires are not fulfilled until we are united with God. In
other words, we are subject to both eternal and natural laws and are built to see and know
the good, which is God. Our wills naturally (with the help of grace) incline us to seek unity
with God. The goal of the ethical life for Aquinas ultimately is allowing one’s will and
intellect to align and to become responsive to the good, which is God. Jacobs writes, “In
general, it is fair to say that medieval philosophers understood action, volition, and
motivation as responsive— responsive (or not) to the good, and the good ultimately
responsive to God.”90 Though each medieval philosopher has his own idea of how human
action achieves this perfection in and responsiveness to the good or God, generally
speaking, a morally motivated person on a medieval view is one who has knowledge of the
good and whose will and intellect, or character, is responsive to the good. In no small way,
understanding Aquinas’s view on any one moral matter (e.g. moral motivation) requires
acknowledging this framework of normative relations and metaphysical presuppositions.91
Furthermore, as I will go on to clarify, his account of moral motivation centers on a
“responsiveness” to the good.
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Aquinas on Teleological and Efficient-Causal Motivation
a. Teleological Motivation
With this background in mind, let us now proceed to discuss in more detail how Meyer’s
two features of moral motivation map onto Aquinas’s moral philosophy and conception of
moral motivation. Once again, similar to Aristotle, Aquinas’s account of moral motivation
lies within his analysis of what it means to be virtuous. This includes both taking actions
directed at the right ends and employing the right efficient-causal mechanisms.
The teleological motivation, according to Meyer’s reading of Aristotle, is the “goal
for the sake of which you act.”92 For virtuous agency (an act to be virtuous), one must have
a goal or telos for which one acts and it must be chosen “for its own sake.” Aquinas agrees
with Aristotle on this point. According to Aristotle, Meyer writes that virtuous agents who
decide on virtuous actions “‘for their own sake,’ choose them because they are kalon [i.e.,
fine, admirable, noble] ... Aristotle’s view is thus that the virtuous person performs acts that
are kalon and decides to perform them because they are kalon rather than for some other
reason.”93
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Aquinas offers a similar interpretation to Meyer’s concerning Aristotle’s second
condition for virtuous action. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas
writes,
He [Aristotle] says, therefore, in order that actions be justly and temperately
performed, it is not enough that the things done be good but the agent must work in
a proper manner. Regarding this, he says we must pay attention to three things...The
second is taken on the part of the appetitive power. Here two things are noted. One
is that the action be not done out of passion, as happens when a person performs a
virtuous deed because of fear. But the action should be done by a choice that is not
made for the sake of something else, as happens when a person performs a good
action for money or vainglory. The actions should be done for the sake of the
virtuous work itself which, as something agreeable, is inherently pleasing to him
who has the habit of virtue.94
Aquinas emphasizes that the action should be done by a choice for the sake of the virtuous
work itself rather than some other end (e.g., money or vainglory). Like Aristotle, he
emphasizes that a virtuous action must be done for the right ends in the right way or “for
its own sake.”
A further testament to the seriousness with which Aquinas considered and adopted
Aristotle’s conditions for virtue, Aquinas references Aristotle’s three conditions for virtue

SLE II-III. xiii. Translation taken from: Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,
trans. C.J. Litzinger, O.P. (Notre Dame: Henry Regnery Company, 1964), 97. Sententia Libri Ethicorum a
Libro II Ad Librum III Lectionem XIII, (Et ideo dicit, quod ad hoc quod aliqua fiant iuste vel temperate, non
sufficit, quod opera quae fiunt bene se habeant; sed requiritur, quod operans debito modo operetur. In quo quidem
modo tria dicit esse attendenda. Quorum primum pertinet ad intellectum sive ad rationem, ut scilicet ille qui facit
opus virtutis non operetur ex ignorantia vel a casu, sed sciat quid faciat. Secundum accipitur ex parte virtutis
appetitivae. In quo duo attenduntur. Quorum unum est, ut non operetur ex passione, puta cum quis facit ex timore
aliquod opus virtutis, sed operetur ex electione; aliud autem est ut electio operis virtuosi non sit propter aliquid
aliud, sicut cum quis operatur opus virtutis propter lucrum, vel propter inanem gloriam, sed sit propter hoc, id est
propter ipsum opus virtutis, quod secundum se placet ei qui habet habitum virtutis, tamquam ei conveniens.)
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thirteen times throughout his ethics.95 Tobias Hoffman writes that “Aquinas makes
Aristotle’s solution his own, at times repeating Aristotle’s formula of acting knowingly,
willingly, and firmly(I-II 100.9c), at other times phrasing the conditions as acting promptly
and with pleasure (e.g., I-II 107.4c; II-II 32.1 ad 1).”96 At ST I-II 100.9, Aquinas reiterates his
claim made in the commentary by emphasizing all three of Aristotle’s requirements. He
writes,
Now according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2, the mode of virtue consists of three
elements: The first is that the agent acts knowingly (sciens)… For what someone does
in ignorance, he does per accidens… The second is that the agent acts willingly
(volens), i.e., ‘by choosing [the act] and choosing it for its own sake.’ … The third
element is that the agent has, and acts from, a firm and unchangeable character (ut
firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur). This firmness properly involves a habit, so that
he is acting from a rooted habit (ex habitu radicato).97
Michael Pakaluk, “Structure and Method in Aquinas’s Appropriation of Aristotelian Ethical Theory” in
Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics ed. Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, Roger Crisp, and Matthias Perkams
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 49. Pakaluk writes, “Some passages are cited with remarkable
frequency, such that four of these make up about one-third of all references to Book 2: the three
conditions of virtue (2.4.1105a31–3) are referred to 13 times (e.g., ST 1–2.56.2 arg. 2); that virtue makes
that which has it good and renders its work good (2.6.1106a15–16) is referred to 14 times (e.g., ST 1–2.20.3
arg. 2); the definition of moral virtue (2.6.1106b36–1107a2) is referred to 14 times (e.g., ST 1–2.58.1 arg. 2);
and the claim that virtue concerns what is difficult and good (2.6.1106b28–33) is referred to 11 times (e.g.,
ST 1.95.4 arg. 2).”
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Aquinas clearly adopts Aristotle’s three conditions for virtuous action and, in so doing, also
emphasizes the importance of choosing the end “for its own sake.”
However, unlike Aristotle, Aquinas does not emphasize that an action done for its
own sake is one that is chosen because it is kalon (because it is fine, noble).98 Aquinas offers
his own understanding of “the goal” that is chosen “for its own sake.” More generally,
Aquinas’s interpretation of doing an act for its own sake, means doing an action for the
good, or the good for humans, which is happiness. Aquinas’s notion of the good is always
couched in terms of the kind of being that a thing is. The highest, most perfect good for us
is happiness. Aquinas writes,
That is absolutely perfect which is desirable in itself and never for another. But
happiness appears to be of this nature, for we never seek it for something else but
always for itself. We do choose honor, pleasure, knowledge, and virtue for
themselves...In fact, we choose them for happiness precisely because we think we
will be happy in having them...We conclude then that happiness is the most perfect
good, and consequently the ultimate and best end.99
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Though not Aquinas’s most convincing argument for the highest good as happiness, this
passage gets across what he has in mind in doing a virtuous action for its own sake.
Choosing to do an action for its own sake means doing as action for the perfect human
good, which is happiness.100 He reiterates this idea throughout his Treatise on Human
Happiness. Aquinas writes, “Indeed, the real reward for virtue is beatitude itself, and it is for
the sake of beatitude that virtuous men act.”101 Also in his Treatise on Virtues, he writes, “The
end of the moral virtues is the human good...the good of the human soul is to live according
to reason.”102 Aquinas is insistent throughout his ethics and his commentary on Aristotle’s
ethics that happiness is the end or goal of virtuous action and it is the reason such actions
are taken.103
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A still further testament to Aquinas’s emphasis on the need for a teleological
motivation in order to have virtuous action is his view that moral virtue is essentially a
habit that is perfected only when it aligns with the end/telos. More specifically, moral virtue
is attained only when we habituate our appetites to align with right reason, or correct
knowledge about what happiness consists in for humans. Aquinas presents this idea
through his moral psychology of moral virtue as perfection of a power that happens
through many actions that are directed at their proper end. In a question titled “The
Essence of Virtue,” Aquinas writes,
Virtue denominates a certain perfection of power. Now the perfection of any given
thing is mainly thought of in relation to its end. But the end is the actualization of a
power or potentiality (potentiae actus).” Hence, a power is said to be perfect to the
extent that it is determined to its act…. rational powers, which are proper to a man,
are not determined to a single act, but are related in an indeterminate way to many
acts. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 49, a. 4), they are determined to
their acts by habits. And so the human virtues are habits.104
Unpacking this quote a bit, at its most basic form, Aquinas explains that moral virtue is the
perfection of our powers (i.e., the will (rational appetite), the passions (sensitive appetite),
and the practical intellect).105 These rational powers are only perfected in us by taking many

ST. I-II Q. 55.1. (Respondeo dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem. Uniuscuiusque
autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde potentia
dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum
seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales
secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae
ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis
patet. Et ideo virtutes humanae habitus sunt.)
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actions that are in accord with “right reason” or reason directed at the end (i.e., happiness).
As Tobias Hoffmann summarizes, it is reason’s job, according to Aquinas, to “correctly
assess the end Aquinas calls the ‘due end’ (finis debitus). Reason judges correctly about that
which promotes this end (ea quae sunt ad finem).”106 In other words, it makes a “correct
judgment about what happiness consists in” and can order our actions to this end.107 When
many such ordered acts are taken over time, Aquinas says that a certain quality is
generated in the powers that he calls a habit or disposition that is moral virtue. In ST I-II
Question 51 titled “The Cause of Habits,” Aquinas writes, “from repeated acts, a certain
quality is generated in the power that is passive and moved, and this quality is called a
habit. For instance, habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers insofar as
those powers are moved by reason.”108 As an example, the moral virtue of temperance is
formed by continually realigning one’s appetite away from acting on an impulse (e.g., to eat
an overabundance of food) and instead to only act (or eat as much food) as is conducive to
one’s health and flourishing (i.e., correct judgment about what is and is not conducive to

Tobias Hoffmann "Prudence and Practical Principles." in Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics ed. by
Tobias, Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, Roger Crisp, and Matthias Perkams, eds. (Cambridge University Press:
2013) 171.
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happiness).109 Temperance, like all moral virtues, requires aligning one’s appetites to reason
which itself is aligned to happiness. Based on Aquinas’s view of moral virtue as a habit that
is developed through many actions directed at the right ends, it is no stretch to say that
Aquinas finds what we are calling the teleological motivation essential to moral virtue.
b. Efficient-Causal Motivation
Meyer argues that the efficient-causal motivation accounts for the psychological apparatus
that moves an agent to act (i.e., a desire to act) after deliberation about the end. Based on
Aristotle’s notion of prohairesis, she argues that prohairesis is a decision or choice that issues
in a desire. This desire is the psychological causal mechanism that moves one to act on the
telos. 110 Aquinas follows Aristotle in his emphasis on a desire that results from deliberation.
At ST I-II question 14.1 titled “Deliberating or Taking Counsel, Which Precedes Choosing,”
he writes,
As has been explained (q. 13, aa. 1 and 3), an act of choosing follows upon reason’s
judgment (iudicium rationis) concerning things to be done… there must be an inquiry
on reason’s part before any judgment about things to be chosen, and this inquiry is
called ‘deliberating’ or ‘taking counsel’ (haec inquisitio consilium vocatur). This is why,
in Ethics 3, the Philosopher says that the act of choosing is ‘the desire for what has

Temperance, Aquinas writes, “withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying
reason.” ST II-II Q. 141. 2
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been deliberated about beforehand’ (appetitus praeconsiliati).111
Aquinas explains that deliberation precedes choice, which is the desire for that which has
been deliberated about (i.e., the end or telos). He uses the language of choice (electio) and
emphasizes that choice belongs to the faculty of the will. Moreover, he thinks that reason
(specifically, the apprehensive power found in the intellect) precedes and orders the will to
its object, but choosing that object remains a free act of the will. Aquinas writes,
Now it is clear that reason in some sense precedes the will and orders its act, viz.,
insofar as the will tends toward its object in accord with the order prescribed by
reason (secundum ordinem rationis), given that the apprehensive power presents the
appetitive power with its object… an act of choosing is in substance (substantialiter)
an act of the will and not of reason. For an act of choosing is brought to completion
in a movement of the soul toward the good that is being chosen. Hence, it is clear
that it is an act of the appetitive power.112
Aquinas makes clear that choice is primarily an act of the will, preceded by an act of the
intellect, that is primarily a desire for the end (i.e., the good).113
Matthias Perkams further connects Aquinas’s view with Aristotle’s. Perkams argues
that “Like many of his contemporaries, Aquinas used electio (choice), the Latin word
translating prohairesis, to describe the acts produced by man’s faculty of free agency, called
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liberum arbitrium.”114 Furthermore, Aquinas “ascribes to the faculty called will not only
Aristotle’s boulesis, but also his prohairesis, i.e., choice.”115 Perkams continues,
While not denying that in one respect ‘choice is essentially an act of the intellect,
insofar as the intellect orders the appetite’ (SLE 6.2 lines 209–10), [Aquinas] displays
a clear preference for ascribing choice primarily to the will...In this way Aquinas
explains at some length Aristotle’s short remark that it is ‘choosing that makes us
people of a certain quality’ (3.2.1112a1–3).116
As Perkams argues, Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s prohairesis or desire resulting from
deliberation but ascribes it to the power of the will. More specifically, choice is an interior
act performed by the faculty or power that is the will, or rational appetite.117
In order to spell out Aquinas’s full account of efficient-causal motivation, it is
important to dive into the psychological mechanisms that make up the faculty of the will
that allow the will to perform an interior act of choosing, and that enable an agent to carry
out an action. In laying out Aquinas’s account of efficient causal motivation, I find it fruitful
to turn Aquinas’s own language of efficient cause to learn what it means for an agent to be
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(voluntas), and sometimes it is the will’s act itself that is called ‘will’ (voluntas).”
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an “efficient cause” of an action. On his account of efficient-cause as it applies to the case of
human action, he offers an explanation of the psychological mechanisms that enable an
agent to act by highlighting the agent’s powers and inclinations. He argues that it is on
account of an agent’s powers and inclinations that an agent has the capacity to act, both
interior acts (e.g., choice) as well as exterior actions (e.g., helping someone in need). Once
his view of the psychological mechanisms at play in action is laid out, I turn to apply his
view to the case of moral virtue to understand what it means for an agent to perform good
acts, ones that carry out the telos or end (i.e., teleological motivation). It is here that I
highlight what makes Aquinas’s account of moral motivation, on the efficient-causal side,
distinct from views of moral motivation discussed in the first chapter. Aquinas emphasizes
that in order to have the psychological mechanisms that enable the will to be inclined
toward and thereby choose the right ends, the powers of will and intellect must be directed,
uprooting their wayward or contrary inclinations, so as to know and desire the right ends.
This only happens over time through a careful process of habituation. In this way, contrary
to the views of moral motivation that treat it as a fixed choice about certain ends, Aquinas
offers a developmental picture that underscores the psychological mechanisms underlying
an agent’s choice that can and must be developed over time if they are to know, want, and,
in turn, choose the right ends (or carry out the teleological motivation). As I will go on to
argue in the following chapter, Aquinas’s developmental picture leaves ample room for
certain kinds of skills to aid in the development of moral motivation and, in turn, cultivate
moral virtue.
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VIII. Aquinas on Efficient Cause
A promising approach to understanding Aquinas’s account of efficient-causal motivation is
to turn to Aquinas’s own usage of the term efficient cause as it applies to agents who are the
efficient cause of their action. Aquinas himself has a robust discussion of what it means for
an agent to be an efficient cause of an action. This discussion is helpful to our discussion of
efficient-causal motivation. To begin, Aquinas uses the concepts of efficient cause quite
broadly. He applies this notion to items from many different ontological categories. For this
reason, there is an abundance of scholarship on the role of efficient cause in Thomistic
metaphysics.118 Of these scholars, Michael Rota provides an especially concise explanation
of efficient cause as it relates to action. In his work titled, “Causation,” Rota writes that
“Aquinas applies the notion of an efficient cause to substances, to powers,119 to acts of will
(and thus to inclinations),120 and to processes or activities.”121 Aquinas introduces the notion

See Freddoso’s extensive discussion in Francisco Suárez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical
Disputations 17, 18, and 19, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); and
Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae,
2014). Also see Stefaan E. Cuypers, “Thomistic Agent-Causalism,” in Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the
Thomistic and Analytic Traditions, ed. John Haldane (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2002), 90–108. And Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa
Theologiae 1a (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 201.
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See ST I Q. 82.4, In Meta VII.6, DPN 5.26.
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See QDV Q. 28.8 ad 7: “Consent is the efficient cause of marriage”.

See Meta V.2.771 where Aquinas asserts that the (ancient medical) processes of reducing and purging
can be called causes from which motion comes, i.e., efficient causes. Michael Rota, “Causation” in The
Oxford Handbook of Thomas Aquinas, eds. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012). 13.
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of efficient cause in On the Principles of Nature in an attempt to explain change.122 Aquinas
writes,
But these [three factors: formal, material, and final causes] are not sufficient for
generation. For what is in potency is not able to reduce itself to actuality; just as
bronze, which is potentially a statue, does not make itself [into] a statue. But there
needs to be something operating, which draws forth the form of a statue from
potency to actuality. …Therefore, it must be that, besides matter and form, there is
some principle which acts, and this is said to be the maker [efficiens], or the mover, or
the agent, or that from which the beginning of motion comes.123
In this passage, the sculptor is an efficient cause of the statue. The sculptor is the agent
(agens, “the thing acting”) and the patient is the substance, or aggregate of substances (i.e.,
the bronze) upon which the agent acts. The change or motion produced by the agent is
what Aquinas calls the “passion.”
Given that the agent produces this change in the patient, how does the agent do this?
Aquinas thinks that it is the sculptor’s powers that enable the sculptor to act. For example,

Michael Rota writes, “Apart from his brief, early work On the Principles of Nature and some relatively
short sections of his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, Aquinas wrote nothing that
could be considered a systematic treatise on causation. His understanding of causation must therefore be
gleaned from comments scattered throughout his works. When those scattered comments are brought
together and analyzed, we find a complex and multifaceted theory. A good place to begin is with a
paradigm instance of ordinary efficient causation: the production of a statue.” Ibid, 104.
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DPN 3.15. Here by “generation” Aquinas intends to include both generation simpliciter (substantial
change) and generation secundum quid (accidental change). See DPN 1.4, and In Meta I.12.199. (Ad hoc
ergo quod sit generatio, tria requiruntur: scilicet ens potentia, quod est materia; et non esse actu, quod est privatio;
et id per quod fit actu, scilicet forma. Sicut quando ex cupro fit idolum, cuprum quod est potentia ad formam idoli,
est materia; hoc autem quod est infiguratum sive indispositum, dicitur privatio; figura autem a qua dicitur idolum,
est forma, non autem substantialis quia cuprum ante adventum formae seu figurae habet esse in actu, et eius esse
non dependet ab illa figura; sed est forma accidentalis. Omnes enim formae artificiales sunt accidentales. Ars enim
non operatur nisi supra id quod iam constitutum est in esse perfecto a natura.)
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the sculptor utilizes the power to move his hands and to form objects by moving them into
shapes. An agent might have many powers or features but only some of those are called on
to perform the action. Rota explains that “Aquinas generalizes this way of thinking, and
holds that any action of any agent occurs through the use of some particular power: ‘In any
action there are two things to consider, namely the suppositum acting, and the power by
which it acts, just as fire heats by heat.’”124 Aquinas thinks that in an action there is both the
substance or agent which acts and the powers that enable the agent to act.125 There are two
sorts of powers, active and passive. An active power is a feature of an agent that accounts
for an agent’s ability to act in certain ways, and a passive power accounts for a thing’s
capability of being acted upon (i.e., capable of undergoing a certain change or passion).126
For human beings, our distinctive powers are the powers of intellect (reason) and will
(rational appetite).
Interestingly, Aquinas identifies the power of the will as the agent or efficient cause
that is responsible for the exercise or movement into action. He writes,
There are two ways in which something is said to effect movement. The first way is
in the manner of an end, in the sense in which an end is said to move an agent. It is
124

Rota, 4. See ST I Q. 36.3 ad 1. Here, the term ‘suppositum’ refers to the substance which acts.

Ibid. Rota writes, “Why posit the existence of powers? Perhaps the idea is just this: If a thing performs
some sort of action, then it is reasonable, at least in many cases, to think that there must be some real,
positive feature of the thing which enables it to perform that sort of action. If a species of bird appears to
use the earth’s magnetic field to navigate, for example, then it is reasonable to think that members of that
species have some sort of faculty for detecting magnetic fields.”
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For active powers see ST I Q. 25. 1, QDP 7.9c and SCG IV.77. And for passive powers see In Meta
V.14.963.

126

74

in this way that the intellect moves the will, since the will’s object is a good as
intellectively understood, and it moves the will as an end. The second way in which
something is said to effect movement is in the manner of an agent [i.e., agent or
efficient cause]—in the way in which the thing that effects an alteration moves the
thing that is altered, and in the way in which the thing that gives an impulse moves
the thing that is impelled. This is the way in which the will moves the intellect and
all the powers of the soul, as Anselm explains in De Similitudinibus.127
Aquinas thinks that the will effects movement in the second way which is in the manner of
the agent, by which he means the will is the agent cause. Aquinas often uses agent and
efficient cause terminology interchangeably. Moreover, the actions that the will effects are
both interior acts, such as choice, as well as exterior acts, such as moving my hands to
sculpt the bronze. At ST I-II Q.13.5 reply 1 Aquinas writes,
Will is the intermediary between the intellect and external action: intellect presents
the will with its object, and the will itself causes an external action. So the principle
of the will’s movement is found in the intellect, which apprehends something as
good in general, but the termination or completion of the will’s act is identified with
reference to its ordering toward action.128
Aquinas argues that the will causes action and is directed at external action. A complete
action of the will includes the internal acts that lead to external action. Williams writes, “a
full-blown act of will-- a ‘complete’ act … extends all the way from the intellect’s
presentation of a good [e.g., attending a talk] to some external action by which that good is
to be attained [e.g., driving].”129 Even if the action is not taken (e.g., someone tied you up so
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ST I Q. 82.4
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ST. I-II Q. 13.5 ad.1 (William’s Translation)

Thomas Williams, “Commentary on the Treatise on Human Acts,” in The Treatise on Human Happiness
The Treatise on Human Acts, eds. Thomas Williams and Christina Van Dyke (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 2016), 360.
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you cannot drive to the talk), Williams writes, “the choice itself [to attend the talk]
completes the will’s act, because in that choice the will is directed to external action,
whether or not any action actually takes place.” As Aquinas argues and Williams clarifies,
the will as a power extends to both interior and exterior actions.130
Given that an agent’s powers or capacities, especially the power that is the will,
ground facts about how they are able to act, what then makes the sculptor get up in the
morning and want to sculpt? For this we must make reference to the sculptor's inclinations
or tendencies (inclinationes) as that which moves an agent to perform an act of will.131 What
it means to have an inclination for Aquinas is best described by examining ends. At Summa
Theologiae I-II, Q. 1. 2, Aquinas argues that every agent acts for an end out of an inclination

For a discussion on “How to will is moved?” see Williams’s commentary on ST I-II Q. 9.3. Williams
writes, “The will is in potentiality... (1) with respect to acting and not acting, which Aquinas calls the
exercise of the act; and (2) with respect to doing this or that, which Aquinas calls the specification or
determination of the act....In terms of exercise, the will is not moved by the intellect [Rather, it moves itself
in exercise]]. Quite the contrary, the intellect is moved by the will. In terms of specification, however, the
intellect moves the will. The intellect is what presents the object--remember the crucial point that the will
is intellectual [rational] appetite, and so we will things as apprehended - and the object is what ‘specifies’ the
act.” In particular, we will things as apprehended as good because “the will’s object is the good in
general.” Furthermore, in ST I-II Q. 9.3, Aquinas addresses the question “Does the will move itself?,”
Aquinas replies, “The will is in control of its own act, both willing and not willing are up to the will.” The
will has the power to move itself. Williams writes, “...by actually willing an end, it [the will] brings itself
from potentially willing things that are for the end to actually willing them. How exactly this self-motion
works ...is not further explained here. It will turn out to involve important contributions from the
intellect, particularly in the form of deliberation and judgment.” Ibid, 325.
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Inclinations are formed through desires, choices, and acts of will. By “act of will”, Rota writes, “I mean
to translate Aquinas’s ‘actus voluntatis.’ This is a generic term that encompasses at least six different acts
wherein the will is the subject: enjoyment (fruitio ), intention (intentio ), volition (voluntas ), choice (electio),
consent (consensus ), and use (usus ).” Rota, 5. See ST I-II, Q. 11-16.
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(i.e., an intention) for an end. A close look at his argument in the second article of question
one reveals a single line where Aquinas sheds light on what he takes an inclination to be.
He writes “An agent effects movement only because of its tendency toward an end (non nisi
ex intentione finis). For if an agent were not fixed on some effect, then it would not do this
rather than that.”132 Inclinations then are the things that move us to certain ends. More
specifically, they move us through our rational appetite (per rationalem appetitum) to will
(velle) one end rather than another.133 Rota interprets Aquinas’s explanation of inclination
by reference to the behavior of an electron. He writes,
Consider that electrons regularly repel other negatively charged particles when in
close proximity to them. To state the matter in terms of actions, an electron regularly
performs one sort of action (repelling negatively charged particles) and not another
(attracting negatively charged particles). That is, an electron does this more than
that. Faced with this fact about the behavior of electrons, it is natural to seek an
explanation. It would be absurd to think that the consistent behavior of electrons is
merely a coincidence. So it is reasonable to think that the regular behavior in
question (that electrons regularly repel other negatively charged particles) has an
explanation. A quite natural explanation is provided by positing a feature about the
electron itself, by supposing that it itself possesses some feature which leads it to
repel negatively charged particles. Call that feature an inclination. The inclination in
question here would be the electron’s negative charge, conceived of as a property of
the electron that makes it regularly repel negatively charged particles.134

ST I-II, Q. 1.2. (Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad
aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est
quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis.)
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Ibid.

Rota, 6. As another example, a stone that is located anywhere but at the center of the Earth always has
an inclination to fall. This is an always-present feature of the stone.
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According to Rota, Aquinas’s account of inclination is best explained by reference to the
way inclinations work in behavior. In the case of rational and non-rational agents,
inclinations are that which determine or move us to one way of behaving over another. For
rational (and nonrational) agents, inclinations explain purposeful behavior and therefore
are at the core of what means for us to act. At ST I Q. 87.4, Aquinas writes that “An act of
the will is nothing other than a certain inclination following upon an understood form.”135
Rota explains, “On Aquinas’s way of thinking, the best available explanation of the regular
behavior of agents involves the positing of inclinations, where an inclination is conceived of
as an intrinsic feature of an agent which leads it (inclines it, disposes it) to engage in some
action.”136 Returning to the case of the sculptor as an efficient cause, it is on account of the
sculptor’s inclinations and through the use of various powers that the sculptor is able and
willing to act.137 In summary, the explanation of efficient cause as it applies to action
captures a large part of the psychological apparatus that makes up efficient-causal
motivation. On Aquinas’s account, it is the agent’s powers (i.e., rational appetite/will) and
inclinations that allow the agent to act on an end and carry out the teleological motivation.

ST I Q. 87.4. (actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut
appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem.)
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Rota, 6.

Rota concludes, “In considering the sculptor and the bronze, we should keep in mind Aquinas’s fuller
story: the sculptor brings about a change in the bronze, via his powers and inclinations (and various tools
too, no doubt), and by so doing produces a statue and a new accidental form.” Rota, 9.
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The will, in particular, for Aquinas is the source of movement for actions, both
interior and exterior. Furthermore, it is on account of the will’s inclinations that it acts. This
idea is reiterated and developed in Aquinas’s explanation of the will’s inclination in his
Treatise on Human Acts. Aquinas makes clear that a core feature of the will is its inclination
for the good that moves it to certain ends.138 In ST I-II Q.8.1 he writes,
Will is a rational appetite. Now there is no appetite for anything but the good. The
reason for this is that an appetite is nothing other than an inclination of that which
has the appetite toward something, and nothing is inclined toward anything but
what is similar to it and fitting for it...every inclination is toward what is
good….Now it is important to note that since every inclination is consequent upon
some form...intellectual or rational appetite--which is called will--follows an
apprehended form...So for the will to tend toward something, it is not required that
the thing be good in actual fact, but that it be apprehended as good.139

The will is by nature an inclination for the good. It is naturally hard-wired to move us to the
good, or what the intellect apprehends as good or “fitting for it.”140 The object of the will or

In the commentary on Aquinas’ Treatise on Human Acts, Williams comments, “the will is not a neutral
steering wheel but an inclination toward what is good.” Williams, “Commentary on the Treatise on
Human Acts,” 332.
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ST I-II Q. 8.1. (voluntas est appetitus quidam rationalis. Omnis autem appetitus non est nisi boni. Cuius ratio
est quia appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. Nihil autem inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile
et conveniens. Cum igitur omnis res, inquantum est ens et substantia, sit quoddam bonum, necesse est ut omnis
inclinatio sit in bonum. Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Sed
considerandum est quod, cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur
formam in natura existentem, appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur
voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in
re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum. Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in
aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni. Et propter hoc
philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum.)
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Ibid, 317. Williams’s commentary on this passage is a helpful contextual reminder “Remember that we
are in an Aristotelian universe here, and an Aristotelian universe is purposive...It is aimed at some
definite purpose or ‘end,’ as Aquinas calls it. In particular, a thing is directed to ‘what is similar to it and
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that to which the will naturally inclines is the “good in general” and ultimately the
“universal good.”141 In question 10.1 titled “Is the will moved toward anything naturally?”
Aquinas states that the will is inclined to what is suitable to its nature. Williams writes,
Aquinas reminds us that objects such as life, health, and truth move our wills
naturally, that is, in accordance with the characteristic inclination that makes the will
the kind of thing (nature) it is; but by mentioning the ultimate end and the good in
general, he emphasizes that the ultimate source of this variety of motions is in fact a
single object, the good in general, which is fully realized in the ultimate end, which
in turn serves as the source of the motive power of all other ends.142
Importantly for Aquinas, it is God who gave us all this inclination to the good, without
which we could not will anything at all.143 To be sure, Aquinas thinks that God gives us all
this inclination in our rational appetite to will the good in general, but leaves it up to us to
freely determine whether we will this or that and whether or not we realize the ultimate
end which is unity with God. 144 Even though the will has a nature that inclines it in certain
ways, it nonetheless is in control of its own act.145 As I will go on to argue, developing a

fitting for it.’”
ST. I-II Q. 2.8 by universal good he means God. Nothing but the universal good can satisfy the human
will.
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Williams, 333.

143

Ibid. See Williams’s commentary on ST I-II Q. 9.6 ad 3.

Ibid. Williams and Van Dyke write, “God moves the human will as the universal mover...But we
determine ourselves to will this or that through reason, and our reason can be mistaken about what is
good. That is how the will’s God-given inclination to the universal good is consistent with particular
instances of bad-willing.”
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If the will has a natural inclination for the good, then how does it “in control of its own act”? Williams
nicely summarize Aquinas’s point, “Nature’s distinctive mode of causation is determined to a single
outcome, whereas will’s distinctive mode of causation is not so determined; rather, when the will causes
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rational appetite for the right ends, that acts or chooses the right or virtuous ends, requires
aligning our natural inclinations, over time through habituation, with those ends.

IX. Efficient-Causal Motivation: A Developmental Model
Based on this assessment of will and inclination, it is safe to say that we have identified the
efficient-causal mechanisms at play in action. However, all of this discussion of efficientcausal motivation thus far is an explanation of what, psychologically speaking, causes or
enables an agent to act. It is not yet an explanation that accounts for moral virtue. Meyer
argues that efficient-causal motivation is not just about the psychological mechanisms that
move one to act, but also how these mechanisms carry out the telos or teleological
motivation. She writes, in “the efficient-causal motivation characteristic of virtue...the
virtuous agent is moved to act by a desire that is informed by his understanding that this
action realizes or promotes a particular goal.”146 The psychological mechanisms must be
informed by the end and directed at the end if they are to cause virtuous action. In order to
understand what it looks like for the efficient-causal motivation to promote the right or
virtuous ends we need to turn to Aquinas’s view concerning the way the inclinations and

in its distinctive way, it is in control of its act. But the will does not always cause in its distinctive way
because the will is rooted in a nature and therefore also shares (‘participates’) in nature’s way of causing.
First the will is a certain kind of thing; only then, and as a result of that inclination, can it be in control of
the way it acts on that inclination. Though the will has a nature that inclines it toward certain ends, it is
nonetheless able to be in control of its act.” (Williams and Van Dyke, 333). See ST. I-II Q. 10.1.
146

Meyer, “Aristotle on Moral Motivation,” 48.
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powers are directed at and responsive to the telos (happiness) in the case of the virtuous
person. To this end, I aim to highlight the way in which his conception of efficient-causal
motivation is distinctively developmental in focus. Aquinas emphasizes that in order to
have the psychological mechanisms that enable the will to be inclined towards and thereby
act on or choose the right ends, the powers of will and intellect must be developed. They
must be redirected, uprooting their natural inclinations, so as to know and desire the right
ends. This only happens over time through a careful process of habituation. Underlying the
will’s ability to choose the right ends is a developmental story about the way our natural
inclinations are redirected over time to come to both know and desire what is good.
How do we begin to will the right ends? The morally virtuous person, according to
Aquinas, is someone who has moved from merely operating out of natural inclinations and
appetites that are variously disposed to acting out of inclinations and appetites that are
responsive to right reason which itself is ordered to the good, or that in which human
happiness consists. In his Disputed Questions on Virtue, Aquinas explains how this
development works. He writes,
A man is inclined by natural appetite to seek his proper good, but since this varies in
many ways and because man’s good consists of many things, there could not be a
natural appetite for this determinate good given all the conditions needed if it is to
be good for him, since this varies widely according to the condition of persons,
times, and places and the like. For the same reason the natural judgment, which is
uniform, does not suffice for the pursuit of a good of this kind. So it is that a man
must by reason, which compares different things, discover and discern his proper
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good, determined with respect to all its conditions insofar as it sought here and
now.147
Here Aquinas acknowledges not only that man’s natural appetite to seek the good is varied
in many ways and seeks the good in many things (e.g., a life of sailing, teaching, etc.), but
also that factors such as time, place, and community are at play in someone’s coming to
seek what is determinately good (i.e., that in which happiness ultimately consists). For this
reason, man must reason through, comparing ends and ways of life, discover and discern
that in which happiness consists. Put in a different way, Williams writes, “God moves the
human will as the universal mover...but we determine ourselves to will this or that through
reason, and our reason can be mistaken about what is good.”148 It is our job then to direct
our powers and inclinations to the right ends. Thankfully, powers and inclinations are the
kinds of things that Aquinas thinks can and should be developed and directed so as to
incline us to what is actually good. In fact, he thinks that this is a task we all must take up.

Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtutibus, Q.1.6. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues,
trans. Ralph McInerny (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999). (Per naturalem siquidem appetitum homo
inclinatur ad appetendum proprium bonum; sed cum hoc multipliciter varietur, et in multis bonum hominis
consistat; non potuit homini inesse naturalis appetitus huius boni determinati, secundum conditiones omnes quae
requiruntur ad hoc quod sit ei bonum; cum hoc multipliciter varietur secundum diversas conditiones personarum et
temporum et locorum, et huiusmodi. Et eadem ratione naturale iudicium; quod est uniforme, et ad huiusmodi
bonum quaerendum non sufficit; unde oportuit in homine per rationem, cuius est inter diversa conferre, invenire et
diiudicare proprium bonum, secundum omnes conditiones determinatum, prout est nunc et hic quaerendum.)
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Williams, 331. ST I-II Q 9.6 reply obj.3 Williams writes, “God moves the human will as the universal
mover...But we determine ourselves to will this or that through reason, and our reason can be mistaken
about what is good. That is how the will’s God-given inclination to the universal good is consistent with
particular instances of bad-willing.” Also, see ST. I-II Q 10.4 where Aquinas writes, “God does not
determine it [the will] necessarily to one outcome; instead, the will’s movement remains contingent and
not necessary, except in the things towards which it is moved naturally.”
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How then does this development work? It is important to first remember that the
morally virtuous person is one whose reason directs their appetitive powers to form an
inclination that aligns with right reason. As quoted earlier, Aquinas thinks “Virtue
denominates a certain perfection of power” and that a power is perfected to the extent it is
inclined or “in relation to its end.”149 Furthermore, moral virtues are also habits in that a
habit is the stable inclination in our appetitive powers (i.e., will and sensory appetite) to be
directed to or responsive to right reason.150 Having the habit/moral virtue of courage, for
example, means that you have the stable quality in your sensory appetite of overcoming
fear (a passion located in the sensory appetite) to act on right reason (which prudentially
tells us that acting courageously in a given situation is the virtuous thing to do). This

ST I-II 55.1. Aquinas says “Virtue’ denominates a certain perfection of power. Now the perfection of
any given thing is mainly thought of in relation to its end. But the end is the actualization of a power or
potentiality (potentiae actus). Hence, a power is said to be perfect to the extent that it is determined to its
act…. rational powers, which are proper to a man, are not determined to a single act, but are related in an
indeterminate way to many acts. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 49, a. 4), they are
determined to their acts by habits. And so the human virtues are habits.” (virtus nominat quandam potentiae
perfectionem. Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad suum finem. Finis autem
potentiae actus est. Unde potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem
quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et
ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt
propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad
actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo virtutes humanae habitus sunt.)
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Jared Brandt summarizes Aquinas’s position on the lastingness of habit. Brandt writes, “Aquinas
states, ‘From this it is clear that the word ‘habit’ implies a certain lastingness: while the word ‘disposition’
does not’ (ad 3). Habits and dispositions are similar in that they are both accidental forms through which
subjects exist in determinate ways with reference to their nature. They are distinct in that habits are
lasting, while dispositions are fleeting or easily lost.” Brandt, Jared. "Growth in Infused Virtue in the
Work of Thomas Aquinas." (Doctoral dissertation, Baylor University, 2018) 29. Brandt cites Aquinas’s
quote taken from Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 7-8, trans. Barrie Fleet (London: Gerald Duckworth
& Co. Ltd., 2002). Also see ST I-II. Q. 50.1 where Aquinas suggests that the causes of a disposition need to
be naturally lasting in order to have the nature of a habit.
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quality or habit is one that Aquinas reiterates is only achieved by taking many actions over
time.
Given that our inclinations and powers are variously directed, it is only in taking
many acts wherein we align our appetites with reason that we are able to overcome
inclinations in our appetites that are contrary to reason.151 In ST. I-II Q. 51.2, “Can a habit be
caused by an act?” Aquinas writes, “...from repeated acts (ex multiplicatis actibus) a certain
quality is generated in the power ...this quality is called a habit.”152 Not only are repeated
acts necessary, but they are necessary for a particular reason: to uproot contrary
dispositions. In article 51.3, “Can a habit be generated by a single act?” Aquinas writes,
Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason cannot totally overcome an
appetitive power in a single act. For an appetitive power is related in diverse ways
to many things, whereas through reason one judges in a single act that something is
to be desired with respect to determinate characteristics and circumstances. Hence,
the appetitive power is not totally overcome by this judgment in such a way as to be
borne toward the same thing in most cases in the manner of a nature (ut in pluribus
per modum naturae)—which is what belongs to the habit of a virtue. And so the habit
of a virtue cannot be caused by just a single act, but is instead caused by many

Aquinas writes in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, “Men, therefore, first perform just and
temperate actions--not in the same way as the just and temperate do--and such actions in their turn
produce the habit… If it should be asked how this is possible, since nothing can move itself from potency
to act, we must answer that the perfection of moral virtue, which we are treating, consists in reason’s
control of the appetite.” Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.J.
Litzinger (O.P. Notre Dame: Henry Regnery Company, 1964), 98.
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ST. I-II Q. 51.2 (Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex multiplicatis
actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum
moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur
in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus.)
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acts.153
Not only are our appetites inclined to diverse ends (all under the aspect of the good, of
course), but our lower appetites, otherwise known as the sensory appetite that houses
passion, are particularly inclined to do as they please. He writes, “the lower appetite has an
inclination of its own following on its nature and does not automatically obey the higher
appetite.”154 For example, Aquinas notes that it is often the case that passions (e.g., anger)
“overwhelm our judgment.” For this reason, Aquinas claims, “as regards the lower
apprehensive powers, it is necessary for the same acts to be repeated many times in order to
imprint something firmly.”155 Unvaryingly, Aquinas states that a single act will not
overcome the diverse ways that our appetites are variously inclined.
To bring his point home, Aquinas compares the process of habituation to the way a
fire burns.156 He writes,

ST. I-II. Q. 51.3 (Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non totaliter potest
supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa;
iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias.
Unde ex hoc non totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in pluribus, per modum naturae, quod
pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per multos.)
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DQVirt, article 1.4.
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ST. I-II Q. 51.3

DQVirt, article 9. Here Aquinas elaborates “things that can go in either direction [i.e.,, things that are
not determined by nature to one thing] do not possess the kind of form that makes them incline in one
determinate direction. Rather, it is their own motivating force that directs them in one determinate
direction. But the very fact that they are directed towards this, in some way also disposes them towards
this. Then, when they repeatedly incline and are directed in the same direction by their own motivating
force, then their inclination in that direction becomes determinate and reinforced. In this way, they
acquire a [disposition] towards it, like a sort of form, similar to a natural one, which tends in a single
direction. Because of this, we speak of habit as ‘second nature.’” (Sed ea quae sunt ad utrumlibet, non habent
aliquam formam ex qua declinent ad unum determinate; sed a proprio movente determinantur ad aliquid unum; et
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Hence, we see that because a given fire cannot immediately overcome something
combustible, it does not immediately make it burst into flame; instead, it drives the
contrary dispositions away little by little, so that by totally overcoming the
combustible thing in this way, it impresses its likeness on it.157
Jared Brandt provides a helpful explanation of this passage as it relates to moral virtue.
Brandt writes,
In the example, the combustible material is in potency with respect to being on fire,
and the existing fire is striving to actualize that potential. As Aquinas argues, this
cannot be done instantaneously; the fire must first expel contrary dispositions until it
has overcome the combustible material. Only then can it actualize the material’s
potency for being on fire. The process is analogous in the generation of habits. Take
a habit of moral virtue, for example. The active principle—reason—seeks to actualize
the potential of an appetitive power to be inclined to act in accord with reason. It
cannot do this all at once because the appetitive power is directed toward many
different acts, and because there might be dispositions in the appetitive power that
are contrary to reason. Therefore, reason needs to act on the appetitive power in
many different situations and in a way capable of removing contrary dispositions.
Only then does reason entirely overcome the appetitive power ‘so as to be inclined
like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases, which inclination belongs to
the habit of virtue’ (51.3). This is the process that generates most of the habits of
virtue.158
Brandt’s explanation highlights how important multiple actions over a longer period of
time are in gaining the inclinations that perfect the appetites, which are otherwise variously
inclined. This process is central to the development of powers that are inclined to the end of

hoc ipso quod determinantur ad ipsum, quodammodo disponuntur in idem; et cum multoties inclinantur,
determinantur ad idem a proprio movente, et firmatur in eis inclinatio determinata in illud, ita quod ista dispositio
superinducta, est quasi quaedam forma per modum naturae tendens in unum. Et propter hoc dicitur, quod
consuetudo est altera natura.)
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ST. I-II Q. 51.3
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Brandt, 44.
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virtue, responsive to reason, and ready to carry out the teleological end through a firm
motivational habit.
For Aquinas, the goal of this habituation process is to create in the will a firm
motivational disposition wherein we learn to desire and choose the right ends and to do so
“firmly, promptly, and with pleasure.”159 Aquinas thinks that a sign of the person with
moral virtue is that she chooses the moral acts with firmness, promptness, and even takes
pleasure in them. Aquinas also reminds us that achieving this way of choosing only
happens through habituating our appetites and minds over time. In his Disputed Questions
on Virtue in General, Aquinas addresses an objection that claims that acts of virtue do not
need anything facilitating them because they are primarily about choice and will and not
about habits. Aquinas replies to this objection by emphasizing the need for virtuous habits
in choice.160 He writes, “It should be said that what is a matter of choice alone can easily
come about in one way or another, but it is no easy matter for it to come about as it should,
that is, expeditiously, firmly, pleasantly. For that we need the habits of the virtues.161
Aquinas argues just the opposite of the objection. Choice is “no easy matter” when the goal
is to make virtuous choices, which for the virtuous person, are made promptly, firmly, and

159

See ST I-II Q. 100.9c and ST I-II Q.107.4; ST II-II Q. 32.1 ad 1.

DQVirt A.1 obj.13 “Habits are in powers that they might have ease of action. But we do not need
something facilitating the acts of virtues, as is clear. For they consist chiefly in choice and will. But
nothing easier than what is constituted in the will. Therefore, virtues are not habits.”
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with pleasure. Aquinas here underscores an important aspect of what it means to make a
morally motivated choice. A morally motivated choice is not a one-off kind of thing or
something that any agent can take. Rather, such a choice requires development through the
habituation of our powers and inclinations so as to not only align them with what is truly
good but to also enable us to come to desire and promptly choose what is good.
Thus far we have explored how the will and its inclinations must develop in order
for us to choose virtuously, however the story of efficient-causal motivation is missing one
last component: practical reason’s perfection. As Hoffman rightly points out,
Aquinas does not think that the acquisition of the virtues is a matter of mere
willpower, as if we could be consistently motivated to act rightly under every
existential circumstance. Nor does he think that moral progress depends on the
intellect alone, as if knowing what is right were sufficient for willing and doing what
is right. Yet he values the cognitive side of moral progress very highly: The main
obstacle to moral progress is not the failure to act according to one’s own resolve,
but rather the failure to realize which ends are worth pursuing.162
As Hoffman rightly points out, Aquinas recognizes that one of the biggest challenges to
moral progress is not (merely) the failure to will what is good but the lack of understanding
about which ends are worth pursuing. For this reason, he emphasizes the importance of
cultivating our ability to practically reason through the virtue of prudence. It is only when
“reason repeatedly inclines the appetitive power to some one thing” that “a disposition is
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implanted in it by which it is inclined to the thing to which it has become accustomed.”163
Aquinas continues,
Rightly considered, therefore, the virtue of the appetitive part is nothing other than
a disposition or form which is sealed and impressed on it by reason. Because of this,
no matter how strong a disposition to something there may be in the appetitive
power, it will only be a virtue if it is the result of reason. That is why reason is put
into the definition of virtue. Aristotle says in Ethics 2 virtue is a habit of choice in the
mind determined in the way that the wise man would determine it.164
Aquinas reminds us that reason is at the core of what it means to choose virtuously, and
that virtue is a habit of choice that relies on reasoning wisely about virtuous ends. For this,
we must have prudence. Aquinas writes,
In Ethics 6 the Philosopher says, ‘It belongs to the prudent individual to be able to
deliberate well.’ And deliberation concerns things that we must do in relation to
some end. But reason with respect to what is to be done for the sake of an end is
practical reason. Hence, it is clear that prudence consists only in practical reason.165
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DQVirt A. 9
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Ibid (Cum igitur ratio multoties inclinet virtutem appetitivam in aliquid unum, fit quaedam dispositio

firmata in vi appetitiva, per quam inclinatur in unum quod consuevit; et ista dispositio sic firmata est
habitus virtutis. Unde, si recte consideretur, virtus appetitivae partis nihil est aliud quam quaedam
dispositio, sive forma, sigillata et impressa in vi appetitiva a ratione. Et propter hoc, quantumcumque sit
fortis dispositio in vi appetitiva ad aliquid, non potest habere rationem virtutis, nisi sit ibi id quod est
rationis. Unde et in definitione virtutis ponitur ratio: dicit enim philosophus, II Ethicorum, quod virtus
est habitus electivus in mente consistens determinata specie, prout sapiens determinabit.)

ST II-II, Q. 47.2 (Et hunc finem intendit prudentia, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod sicut ille qui
ratiocinatur bene ad aliquem finem particularem, puta ad victoriam, dicitur esse prudens non simpliciter, sed in hoc
genere, scilicet in rebus bellicis; ita ille qui bene ratiocinatur ad totum bene vivere dicitur prudens simpliciter. Unde
manifestum est quod prudentia est sapientia in rebus humanis, non autem sapientia simpliciter, quia non est circa
causam altissimam simpliciter; est enim circa bonum humanum, homo autem non est optimum eorum quae sunt. Et
ideo signanter dicitur quod prudentia est sapientia viro, non autem sapientia simpliciter.) Also see, Q.47.6 “And
so it belongs to prudence not to set the end for the moral virtues but only to determine the means to the
end.” (Et ideo ad prudentiam non pertinet praestituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed solum disponere de his quae
sunt ad finem.)
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Prudence is the virtue that helps us deliberate well about what promotes the end. Williams
concisely states, “Prudence is what makes someone good at choosing things that are for the
end.”166 In other words, prudence is the moral virtue that perfects practical reason and by
which we become habituated to deliberate well and to make correct judgments about what
the good is and how it can be realized in particular circumstances. For this reason, Aquinas
thinks prudence is necessary for moral virtue. He writes, “The other [i.e., acquired] moral
virtues cannot exist without prudence, and that prudence cannot exist without the moral
virtues, since the moral virtues bring it about that one is related in the right way to certain
ends from which prudence’s reasoning proceeds.”167 Prudence is essential to the moral
virtues because it provides the practical knowledge that “perfect(s) the moral virtues in the
appetitive part ...inclining the appetite to some type of human good.”168 For these reasons,
Aquinas reiterates that prudence is essential to the moral virtues and to living well.169
Just as our non-rational and rational appetites need to be habituated to direct our
natural inclinations toward their final end, so too is prudence and practical reason perfected
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Williams, “Commentary on the Treatise on Human Acts,” 357.

ST. I-II Q.65.2 (Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse sine prudentia; prudentia
autem non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad quosdam
fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae.)
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DQVirt A.6. Aquinas writes, “This virtue is called prudence...is perfective of the moral virtues in the
appetitive part, all of which incline appetite to some type of human good.” (Et haec virtus dicitur prudentia,
cuius subiectum est ratio practica; et est perfectiva omnium virtutum moralium quae sunt in parte appetitiva,
quarum unaquaeque facit inclinationem appetitus in aliquod genus humani boni)

168

169
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by habit.170 Aquinas emphasizes that our ability to deliberate about means develops as we
practice virtuous actions and learn what things do and do not promote happiness. Aquinas
writes, over time we “might rightly judge the human good with respect to all the things
that must be done.”171 To illustrate what Aquinas has in mind take the example of
temperance. Practicing the moral virtue of temperance requires practically thinking through
which acts, in which circumstances, toward which objects, etc. promote or fail to promote
temperance. As we deliberate, choose, and perform these actions we gain information
about, for example, sensory information about the kind and amount of pleasure and pain
felt toward which objects and in which circumstances. As we practice virtuous actions, we
learn to perfect practical reason over time to make correct judgements about the courses of
action that best promote what is good or virtuous. A crucial part of prudence or coming to
choose the right means, for Aquinas, requires recognizing its intimate connection with the
moral virtues. As Sherwin succinctly summarizes, “In order for prudence to incline
practical reason to judge correctly about human actions, practical reason must be moved
toward a proper end by a will rightly inclined by the moral virtues.”172 Likewise, “in order

DQVirt A.6 Aquinas writes, “Thus it is that speculative reason needs to be perfected by the habit of
science in order to judge the objects pertaining to that science; so too practical reason is perfected by a
habit in order that it might rightly judge the human good with respect to all the things that must be
done.” (Et ad hoc faciendum ratio absque habitu perficiente hoc modo se habet sicut et in speculativo se habet ratio
absque habitu scientiae ad diiudicandum de aliqua conclusione alicuius scientiae; quod quidem non potest nisi
imperfecte et cum difficultate agere. Sicut igitur oportet rationem speculativam habitu scientiae perfici ad hoc quod
recte diiudicet de scibilibus ad scientiam aliquam pertinentibus; ita oportet quod ratio practica perficiatur aliquo
habitu ad hoc quod recte diiudicet de bono humano secundum singula agenda.)
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for the moral virtues to incline us toward actions we freely choose, they must be ordered
and specified by the right reason supplied by prudence.”173

Concluding Thoughts on Aquinas on Moral Motivation
After discussing both the perfection of the rational appetite and practical reason, at this
point, our discussion of efficient-causal and teleological motivation is complete. As I have
argued, Aristotle’s teleological and efficient-causal aspects of moral motivation map nicely
onto Aquinas’s moral psychology and provide a helpful framework for developing his
views of moral motivation. In working out in detail Aquinas’s account of efficient-causal
motivation, it is my hope to display how Aquinas’s account of moral motivation is
developmental in focus. He provides a compelling account of the way that our natural
inclinations, appetites, and reason develop over time through a long process of habituation
to come to desire, know, and choose the right ends in the right way. As I will go on to
argue, this developmental account of efficient-causal motivation is distinct, helpful, and
provides ample space for certain psychological skills, to which he directs us in his Treatise
on the Passions, to facilitate the development of moral motivation.
Now that Aquinas’s teleological and efficient-causal account of moral motivation is
laid out, the payoff is to explore the implications of this account in the discussion of moral
motivation and skill that took place in the first chapter. However, before diving straight

Ibid. If this seems circular see Tobias Hoffmann’s treatment of prudence in “Prudence and Practical
Principles” where he explores and, to a large extent, resolves this issue.
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into this discussion, it is important to take a bit of space to see how the account I have laid
out matches up to what others have said about Aquinas on moral motivation. As I said in
the beginning of this chapter, there is very little research that explores Aquinas’s account of
moral motivation. Nonetheless, there are two possible objections that speak generally to the
kind of thing moral motivation concerns in Aquinas’s work. Both stand to challenge the
account I offer. The first speaks to the role of charity and the second speaks to moral
motivation’s connection with human agency.
X. Possible Objections
Objection 1: Where’s Charity in all of this?
A group of scholars that are commonly referred to as the “theologians of moral motivation”
argue that what it is to be morally motivated for Aquinas is centrally about charity.174 As
James Keenan states, “In a word, the contemporary phrase, ‘moral motivation,’ best
expresses the charitable person who loves self and neighbor formally out of union with
God.”175 Charity is a divinely infused virtue that allows us to love the ultimate good, God,
for His own sake, and to love our neighbors. Moreover, charity is essential to Aquinas’s
picture of human beatitude wherein we are united to God in love. Given how central

Sherwin creates the designation “the theologians of moral motivation” which includes theologians
such as Josef Fuchs and James Keenan. Sherwin argues that the theologians of moral motivation “describe
charity’s act as the will’s motivation--distinguishing it from the will’s intentions or choices” (Sherwin, By
Knowledge and By Love, 6).
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charity is to growing to love the good and to will it for its own sake, it seems that an
account of moral motivation must incorporate charity in some substantial way. Yet the
account I have presented does not say anything about charity, nor does it tell a story about
how we come to love the good. This seems to be a substantial problem for my account.
This topic could take a large number of pages to address in full. In an attempt to be
brief, I think this objection can be addressed in large part by considering two points. First, it
is important to situate my discussion of moral motivation within Aquinas’s theology on
charity. Second, the account of moral motivation I have described accounts for developing
a love of the good.
To the first, the account of moral motivation I have given is based on the moral
virtues, which are distinct from theological virtues (faith, hope, and love/charity) according
to their objects. Nonetheless, the two kinds of virtues are connected insofar as the moral
virtues need the theological virtue of charity to direct them to the ultimate good, which is
unity with God. Aquinas claims that moral virtues have as their proper object the things
that human reason and appetite can comprehend, while theological virtues have as their
object ultimate ends, God himself, which “exceeds human reason.”176 He writes, “The

ST. I-II Q. 62. 2. Aquinas writes, “As was explained above (q. 54, a. 2), habits are distinct in species
according to the formal differences among their objects. But the object of the theological virtues is the
ultimate end of things, God Himself, insofar as He exceeds our reason’s cognition. By contrast, the object
of the intellectual and moral virtues is something that can be comprehended by human reason. Hence,
the theological virtues are distinct in species from the moral and intellectual virtues.” (Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum
autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostrae rationis cognitionem
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intellectual and moral virtues perfect man’s intellect and appetite in a way proportioned to
human nature, whereas the theological virtues perfect them supernaturally.”177 Though
distinct kinds of virtue, Aquinas calls charity the “form of the virtues” in that it directs the
will and reason beyond its natural inclinations to the good that is conducive to our
happiness, union with God. In other words, charity is a virtue infused in us that helps to
direct us to what the good really is, beyond what our natural abilities are able to do on their
own.178
That said, I am offering an account of moral motivation at the natural level. My
account of moral motivation focuses on the extent to which we can do something freely to

excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi
potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus.)
ST. I-II Q. 62.2 ad 1. (Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt intellectum
et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.)
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At ST. I-II Q. 13.1, Aquinas gives the example of charity as it directs the virtue of courage, “Now in the
acts of the soul, it is important to note that an act that belongs essentially to one power or disposition
receives its form and species from a higher power or disposition insofar as the lower power is directed by
the higher. For example, if someone performs an act of courage out of love for God, the act is materially
an act of courage but formally an act of charity. Now it is clear that reason precedes the will in a certain
way and directs its act, insofar as the will tends toward its object in accordance with reason’s direction,
since the apprehensive power is what presents the appetitive power with its object. Thus, the act in which
the will tends toward something that is proposed to it as something good is materially an act of will but
formally an act of reason, because it is reason that directs the act toward an end.” (Williams and Van
Dyke, 121). See also Ibid, 191. (Est autem considerandum in actibus animae, quod actus qui est essentialiter
unius potentiae vel habitus, recipit formam et speciem a superiori potentia vel habitu, secundum quod ordinatur
inferius a superiori, si enim aliquis actum fortitudinis exerceat propter Dei amorem, actus quidem ille materialiter
est fortitudinis, formaliter vero caritatis. Manifestum est autem quod ratio quodammodo voluntatem praecedit, et
ordinat actum eius, inquantum scilicet voluntas in suum obiectum tendit secundum ordinem rationis, eo quod vis
apprehensiva appetitivae suum obiectum repraesentat. Sic igitur ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod
proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis,
formaliter.)
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self-actualize through developing moral/acquired virtue. The supernatural motivation of
charity does not supersede natural motivation; nor does possession of the acquired virtues
presuppose possession of any supernatural virtue. Aquinas accepts the medieval maxim
that “grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it” (gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit).
Charity takes us beyond what natural reason by itself can apprehend, according to Thomas,
but it never overrides or contradicts what we know by way of natural reason. Moreover,
Aquinas clearly states that the natural virtues can exist without the aid of charity. He
writes, “As has been explained (q. 63, a. 2), insofar as the moral virtues do what is good in
relation to an end that does not exceed a man’s natural power, they can be acquired
through human actions. And in this sense they can exist without charity, as they did in
many Gentiles.”179 If, however, the moral virtues are to be truly perfect, they need the
infused virtue of charity to direct them to their supernatural end. Aquinas continues,
However, insofar as the moral virtues do what is good in relation to our
supernatural end, then in this sense they have the character of virtue perfectly and
truly, and they are infused by God and cannot be acquired by human acts. And
moral virtues of this sort cannot exist without charity. Thus, it is clear from what has
been said that only the infused virtues are perfect virtues, and only the infused
virtues should be called virtues absolutely speaking, since they order a man in the
right way, absolutely speaking, toward his ultimate end. The other virtues, i.e., the
acquired virtues, are virtues in a certain respect and not virtues absolutely speaking,
since they order a man in the right way with respect to the ultimate end in a certain
genus, but not with respect to the ultimate end absolutely speaking.180

ST. I-II Q. 65.2 (Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni
in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri.)
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Moral virtues are only perfect when directed to their supernatural end. For this we need
charity to uplift our natural faculties, specifically our will, to love God as the end to which
all actions should be directed. On the natural level wherein my account falls, once again,
charity is not required.
As for the second aspect of this objection, coming to know and love the good
happens as a result of habituating our appetites in moral virtue. My account lays this out
through the development of virtuous habits. Nonetheless, it is also worth highlighting that
Aquinas uses the language of love to describe the will’s inclination to the good. He writes,
Thus, first of all, the good causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination
toward, or aptitude for, or connaturality with the good (causat quandam inclinationem
seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum). This pertains to the passion of love
(amor)...Second, if the good has not yet been attained, it gives the appetitive power a
movement toward acquiring the good that is loved, and this pertains to the passion
of desire (desiderium) or sentient desire (concupiscentia).181
By nature, as our appetite is inclined toward the good through reason, it develops a love
and desire for the good. Thus, even on a natural level, there is a story about the will’s
coming to love the good. But, once again, if the will is to come to love the supernatural
good (i.e., God) charity must be infused in the will to create this kind of love.

ST I-II 23.4 (Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem,
seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte
mali. Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad
passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae.)
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Objection 2: Using Human Agency as a Gauge
Many virtue ethicists and contemporary philosophers think that moral motivation is
intimately linked to human agency. In general terms, ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or
manifestation of an agent’s capacity to act.182 A human agent is a being of a certain sort with
the capacity to act in a distinctively human way. Moral motivation is often thought to be
central to that which allows a human to act in a distinctively human way. Harry Frankfurt,
for example, famously argues that the difference between persons and other agents consists
in the structure of their will. Only persons have motivations in the form of cares that they
can reflect on and care about.183 If we think that agency, or acting in a distinctively human
way, is intimately linked with the way we are morally motivated, then it seems that a test or
gauge of whether or not I have gotten Aquinas’s account of moral motivation right is if it
aligns with his account of agency. Since my account thus far has not yet been linked to
Aquinas’s account of human agency, the question remains as to how my rendering of
Aquinas’s account relates to his concept of human agency.
This is again a question that deserves much more space and time than the scope of
this project permits. Nonetheless, I want to briefly point out that there is reason to believe
that Aquinas’s account of agency does quite nicely cohere with his account of moral

Markus Schlosser, “Agency,” (Stanford University, October 28, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/.
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Ibid. See also Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of
Philosophy, 68, no1. (1971): 5–20. doi:10.2307/2024717.
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motivation as both teleological and efficient-causal. For example, Stefaan E. Cuypers
develops a view of Aquinas’s account of agency that corresponds with my account of moral
motivation. Cuypers argues that Aquinas’s account of agency is both “teleological” and
“agent-causal.”184 In his article titled “Thomistic Agent-Causalism,” Cuypers argues that the
agent-causal side of causation accounts for the will’s natural inclination to the good that
enables it to act on that which the intellect presents.185 The teleological aspect accounts for
the context in which the will operates. He argues that the will only wills in light of “a
context of ends” that the will and intellect determine are good (i.e., conducive to
happiness).186 With just this much, Cuypers offers a view human agency that aligns nicely
with my rendering of Aquinas’s account of moral motivations as both teleological and
efficient-casual.187 More work would need to be done to draw out the parallels between the
accounts if we are to say that they truly align. Nonetheless, the striking similarity between
the accounts leads me to believe that my rendering of Aquinas’s view on moral motivation
is, at the very least, not far off from respected renderings of Aquinas’s account of human
agency.
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Cuypers, 100.

Ibid, 103. Cuypers even calls this agent-causal side the efficient-cause of action. He states, “will is the
efficient cause of other faculties and acts”
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Nick Austin, Aquinas on Virtue A Causal Reading, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2017) 100. Austin also agrees with Cuypers account of Aquinas’s view of agency.
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It is also worth noting that if human agency is supposed to capture that which
makes us able to act in a distinctively human way, a benefit of Aquinas’s account of human
agency and moral motivation is that they address this better than popular contemporary
accounts. For example, the dominant theory of agency is what is termed the “causal”
theory. This theory analyzes intentional action in terms of the efficient causality of internal
psychological states (i.e., desires, intentions, beliefs). Donald Davidson is perhaps the bestknown proponent of this view. He writes that “an action is performed with a certain
intention if it is caused in the right way by attitudes and beliefs that rationalize it.”188 Moral
theologians today rightly critique this view of agency for “focusing exclusively on acts in an
atomistic way—that is, divorced from a broader context of a person’s orientation to the
overall goal of human life.”189 Nick Austin writes,
Aquinas avoids the trap of the atomistic approach precisely because of his
teleological vision of agency. The moral manuals invariably begin with a treatment
of human action and omit the Treatise on Beatitude, whereas Aquinas situates his
definition of human action within a consideration of the overall end of human life
(I.II 1–5). His account of human agency is teleological from the beginning, in seeing
that human action is the motor of the journey of the dynamic imago Dei toward God.
For him, truly human moral agency flows from deliberation about ends, as well as
how best to realize those ends. Ethics must therefore begin not with the question of
what to do but with the deeper Final-causal question of what ends are worth
pursuing in the first place.190
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Austin picks out an important advantage to Aquinas’s account compared to contemporary
accounts of agency. Contemporary accounts tend to reduce intentional agency to the
efficient causality of psychological states and, in turn, lose sight of the agent and the context
in which and ends for which the agent acts. Compared to Aquinas’s view, the
contemporary viewpoint has lost sight of what it means to act in a definitively human way.
Aquinas provides an answer not only to what makes us able to act (efficient-causal
motivation), but also what makes an action definitively human.
Austin’s critique applies to the case of moral motivation as it is talked about by
contemporary scholars. Contemporary philosophers focus on the cognitive and conative
states that enable a judgment to motivate action. Moreover, many scholars (some of whom
we discussed in the first chapter) define moral motivation atomistically as a psychological
event or act (i.e., choice or intention) directed toward certain ends. For Aquinas, the focus is
not on acts but the person who performs these acts, or, to be more accurate, “the person
who is becoming more, or less, himself in an through his actions.”191 As John Mahoney
interprets Aquinas, human acts are not so much steps as “stages of personal growth, more
like rings in a tree.”192 Aquinas addresses the complex development of our psychology
underlying moral motivation. This is just one advantage of many that Aquinas’s account
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offers. Without further delay, let us turn to discuss how Aquinas’s account of moral
motivation compares to the authors discussed in the first chapter.
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Chapter Three: Correcting the Contemporary Discourse: Aquinas on the Relationship
Between Skill and Moral Motivation
I. Introduction
Now that we have laid out an in-depth account of moral motivation, we can now return to
the original question posed in chapter one: how do skills help us to cultivate moral virtue,
understood as primarily a motivational disposition? In the first chapter we focused on the
“motivation objection,” which challenged the idea that skills can be used to cultivate moral
virtue. Zagzebski, Wallace, Watson, and Mueller argue that moral virtue is primarily about
moral motivation and that skills do not aid in the development of moral virtue as a
motivational disposition. Based on their assessment, the trajectory of current research on
cultivating moral virtue using skills is bleak. As I argued in chapter one, the proponents of
this objection face two sizable problems. First, there is a serious lack of clarity around what
moral motivation is within this discourse. Moral motivation is described in multiple ways
and all with loose relation to Aristotle’s passage at NE II.4.1105a22-35 indicating three
conditions that make up moral motivation.193 Second, they continue to think of skills as

For example, Zagzebski defines moral motivation as “motivational components” and loosely points to
Aristotle’s famous passage at NE II.4.1105a22-35 indicating three conditions or interior choices that make
up moral motivation. Wallace describes moral motivation as a “change of heart” or “caring about
something.” Watson describes moral motivation as concerned with the ‘will,’ or a nice array of “one's
purposes, ends, choices, concerns, cares, attachments, and commitments.” Mueller defines moral
motivation as a motivational disposition of the will that develops over time. And Stichter defines it as a
commitment to an end.
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crafts and ignore contemporary kinds of psychological skills whose content are the
thoughts, feelings, and actions that make up much of the moral life.194 We need an adequate
understanding of moral motivation, a robust understanding of skill, and a discussion of
how the two relate if we are to move past the impasse in contemporary discourse. In an
attempt to fill in the missing pieces, now that we have a clear account of moral motivation
thanks to Aquinas’s moral psychology, we are in a position to make headway in
understanding how moral motivation relates to skill. Furthermore, we are ready to address
the larger question regarding whether or not psychological skills are useful for cultivating
moral motivation. To this end, contrary to the “moral motivation objection,” I argue that
psychological skills are exactly the kinds of things that can be used to cultivate moral
motivation. I find that Aquinas offers a new way to see the relationship between moral
motivation and skill, one where certain psychological skills play an instrumental role in
facilitating the development of moral motivation. More specifically, psychological skills can
contribute to the habitation of our inclinations and powers and therefore aid in cultivating
our ability to choose in the way the virtuous person does. Aquinas’s moral psychology not
only provide clarity on the development of moral motivation but also insight into the kinds

For example, Watson and Wallace have in mind technical skills such as cooking, fixing a bicycle, or
becoming an expert tennis player. The kinds of skills Mueller thinks are representative of skills generally
are skills of carpentry, bicycle repair, gardening, and those of a computer technician. For Zagzebski, skills
are always about “exterior action” and effectiveness. All of these skills are quite removed from
psychological skills whose content are the thoughts, feelings, and actions that make up much of the moral
life.
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of psychological skills that can aid in the cultivation of moral motivation and, in turn, moral
virtue.
By way of arguing for this new relationship between skill and moral motivation that
Aquinas offers, I begin by first clarifying Aquinas’s view of skill. I argue that we must look
beyond his semantic use of craft (ars) (which is frequently translated as “skill”) and instead
look to his Treatise on the Passions, wherein he employs the use of psychological skills,
specifically skills of emotion regulation. In outlining Aquinas’s emotion-regulation skills, I
emphasize the importance Aquinas places on regulating emotions and the impact emotions
have on our ability to make virtuous choices. In this way, I aim to display the instrumental
role emotion regulation skills play in cultivating moral motivation (on the efficient-causal
side). This instrumental relationship between moral motivation and skill, I go on to argue,
informs the contemporary discourse by adding much-needed nuance to the discussion and
by reimagining the possibility for skills to aid in the cultivation of moral virtue.

II. Aquinas on Skill
Similar to Aristotle, Aquinas does not use the English term “skill” but what he means by
skill is primarily taken from his concept of craft (ars) or the act of making something.
Aquinas writes that a craft (ars),
...is nothing other than right (practical) reason with respect to things to be made
(ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum). Yet the good of those works consists not in
the human appetite being disposed in a certain way, but rather in the work that is
made being itself good in its own right. For what is relevant to a craftsman’s
praiseworthiness insofar as he is a craftsman is not the sort of act of willing by which
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he makes his work (non qua voluntate opus faciat), but the quality of the work which
he makes (quale sit opus quod facit).195

Aquinas, like Aristotle, makes clear that crafts of this sort are quite different from virtue.
One primary difference that Aquinas emphasizes repeatedly is that the good of a craft,
unlike virtue, is not dependent on “human appetite being disposed in the right way.”
Instead, good craftsmanship is based on the quality of the work found in the product.
Aquinas continually refers to craft as that which is concerned with exterior action. He
writes “craft’s matter is things we can make, which are outside us.”196 Given his view of
craft, at this point Aquinas seems to side with the proponents of the moral motivation
objection. Seen merely as a craft, skill does not hold much promise as a resource for
cultivating moral virtue which, as we have seen, is primarily a motivational disposition in
the will to choose the right ends.
On contemporary accounts of skill, however, skills take on a much larger semantic
range, one that includes psychological skills (e.g., skills of self-regulation, cognitive habits,
emotion regulation, etc.). These skills target interior psychological states. It is these kinds of

ST. I-II Q.57.3 (Respondeo dicendum quod ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum.
Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in eo quod appetitus humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus
quod fit, in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat;
sed quale sit opus quod facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et tamen in aliquo convenit
cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam
considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad illas.)
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Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, trans. Jeffrey Hause and Claudia Eisen Murphy in
Thomas Aquinas Basic works eds. Robert Pasnau and Jeffrey Hause (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2014) 568 (Response 17).
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skills that scholars like Narvez, Stichter, and Russell think are promising aids in cultivating
virtue.197 If these psychological skills are what is most useful for cultivating virtue what
then does Aquinas’s account have to contribute to this discourse? Given that Aquinas’s
account of craft is too narrow in scope to account for psychological skills, I argue that we
need to look not where Aquinas uses the term craft (ars) but instead where he describes
what we would now call psychological skills. In his Treatise on the Passions, Aquinas offers
several psychological techniques for modifying adverse emotions. These techniques show
significant parallels with emotion regulation skills found in contemporary clinical
psychology wherein certain techniques are used to modify emotions in light of a target
emotional goal.198 What makes these techniques count as “skills” is that individuals can
learn to practice these techniques over time and gain the capacity to regulate their emotions
in line with an emotional goal.199 Techniques such as cognitive reframing, cognitive
reappraisal, and many more, are learned skills that all serve to regulate emotions in line

Stichter, as we have seen, argues that social cognitive skills of self-regulation are the relevant kinds of
skills to cultivate virtue.

197

Emotion regulation is defined as the ability of an individual to modulate an emotion or set of
emotions using techniques that alter and manage emotion in light of a target emotion or emotional
goal. An example of a technique used in emotion regulation is teaching an individual to consciously
monitor their emotional responses (i.e. feelings of anger) so as to begin understanding and altering
the schemas, or organizing perceptual frameworks, that give rise to that emotion. Emotion
regulation techniques typically include various cognitive techniques for modulating an emotion in
light of one’s desired or target emotion. See, “Emotion Regulation.” (American Psychological Association
Dictionary of Psychology. February 2019).
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For example, if my goal is to have more positive emotions (e.g., love) towards my husband, emotion
regulation skills offer a way to practice, for example, cognitively reframing my way of thinking about my
spouse and thereby work towards achieving my emotional goal.
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with a target emotional goal or state. I find that Aquinas offers such skills and it is here that
we find his most interesting, advanced, and virtue-relevant kinds of skills.

III. Aquinas on Emotion and Emotion Regulation
Before jumping into the exact emotion regulation skills that Aquinas offers, first, it is
important to note why Aquinas thinks emotions are so important for moral virtue and why
regulating the emotions in line with reason is key to cultivating moral motivation and, in
turn, moral virtue. Answering this will help to explain why Aquinas is so keen on emotion
and emotion regulation skills. To this end, a proper place to begin is Aquinas’s moral
psychology of virtue as the perfection of an agent’s powers (i.e., powers of the intellect and
appetites). Aquinas thinks that one power that requires perfection for moral virtue is the
sensitive appetite wherein he locates the emotions, or passions as he calls them.200 Aquinas
specifies that passions are the proper acts of the sensitive appetite.201 Just as all powers are
perfected by partaking in perfected acts, or actions that are aligned with right reason, so too
is the sensitive appetite perfected when the passions are aligned or regulated by right
reason. Robert Miner summarizes this point nicely:

For a provocative genealogy that explains how passion became the modern day “emotion” see Thomas
Dixon From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
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Scholars debate about Aquinas’s exact definition of passion and question whether he gives an explicit
definition. Nonetheless, Aquinas often refers to the following definition of passion offered by Damascene
at ST I-II Q.22.3. Aquinas writes, “A passion is a motion of the power of the sensitive appetite regarding
the imagination of good or evil. To say this differently: a passion is a motion of the irrational soul
occurring through a suspicion of good or evil.” (22.3.sc; cf. Damascene 1857–66, cols. 940–2).
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The sensitive appetite is perfected when the passions accept the politic rule of reason
– that is, when they acknowledge the right of reason to command, while
contributing something of their own that follows upon reason...passions are the acts
whose regular, prompt occurrence according to the judgment of reason constitutes
the perfection of the power from which they proceed. Without the passions, there is
no prospect of perfecting the powers, since to perfect the powers of the sensitive
appetite simply means to ensure that the right acts characteristically flow from those
powers.202
According to Aquinas’s logic, for example, in aligning the passion that is fear with reason’s
command (e.g., not letting fear withdraw us from difficult acts), we perfect the sensitive
appetite, and over time the passions begin to flow characteristically from this power (e.g.,
creating, in the case of fear, the virtue of courage).
Two virtues in particular Aquinas thinks are entirely about the passions and their
regulation: courage and temperance.203 The virtues of courage and temperance are “seated”
in the sensitive appetite and their perfection consists in regulating emotion toward the right
ends.204 Courage, Aquinas posits, is the regulation of fear so as not to allow fear to

Robert C. Miner. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae
22–48. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 289.
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Aquinas thinks that virtues that are about actions (i.e., justice) can exist without the passions (though
not as perfectly as they could with the passions).
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ST. I-II Q. 59.5. Aquinas states, “On the other hand, if what are calling ‘passions’ are all the movements
of the sentient appetite, then it is plain that those moral virtues that have to do with the passions as their
proper matter cannot exist without the passions….On the other hand, those moral virtues that have to do
with actions and not with the passions can exist without the passions (and justice is a virtue of this type),
since through these virtues it is the will that is applied to its proper act, which is not a passion.” (Unde
sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios
ordinatos. Virtutes vero morales quae non sunt circa passiones, sed circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus
(et huiusmodi virtus est iustitia), quia per eas applicatur voluntas ad proprium actum, qui non est passio. Sed
tamen ad actum iustitiae sequitur gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio. Et si hoc gaudium
multiplicetur per iustitiae perfectionem, fiet gaudii redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum; secundum quod
vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic per redundantiam huiusmodi, quanto
virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat).
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withdraw us from following reason in the face of difficulty.205 Similarly, just as courage
regulates fear by inciting us to do what reason demands, temperance regulates the passions
by preventing the passion from “withdrawing” us “from things that seduce [our] appetite
from obeying reason.”206 Miner writes, “At every stage, temperance regulates the…
passions, ensuring that its possessor experiences love and hate, desire and aversion,

ST. II-II, Q.123.3. Aquinas writes, “On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that
fortitude is about fear and daring. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be
withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil
that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II:42:3; I-II:42:5) in the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is
chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason.” (Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in II et in III Ethic., quod fortitudo est circa timorem et audaciam. Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, ad virtutem fortitudinis pertinet removere impedimentum quo retrahitur voluntas a sequela
rationis. Quod autem aliquis retrahatur ab aliquo difficili, pertinet ad rationem timoris, qui importat recessum
quendam a malo difficultatem habente, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo fortitudo
principaliter est circa timores rerum difficilium, quae retrahere possunt voluntatem a sequela rationis. Oportet
autem huiusmodi rerum difficilium impulsum non solum firmiter tolerare cohibendo timorem, sed etiam moderate
aggredi, quando scilicet oportet ea exterminare, ad securitatem in posterum habendam. Quod videtur pertinere ad
rationem audaciae. Et ideo fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, quasi cohibitiva timorum, et moderativa
audaciarum). Miner writes, “without a field of objects that have the potency for activating the passions of
fear and daring, the virtue of fortitude would have nothing to be about – no materia circa quam – and
would therefore not exist.... these virtues directly require the passions, since to speak of the perfection of
these powers without their acts is meaningless.” (Minor, .290).
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ST II-II Q. 141.2. Aquinas writes, “temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word
‘temperance’ signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human
operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference
between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance
withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him
to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.”(Et sic
temperantia non est virtus specialis, sed generalis, quia nomen temperantiae significat quandam temperiem, idest
moderationem, quam ratio ponit in humanis operationibus et passionibus; quod est commune in omni virtute
morali. Differt tamen ratione temperantia a fortitudine etiam secundum quod utraque sumitur ut virtus communis.
Nam temperantia retrahit ab his quae contra rationem appetitum alliciunt, fortitudo autem impellit ad ea
sustinenda vel aggredienda propter quae homo refugit bonum rationis. Si vero consideretur antonomastice
temperantia, secundum quod refrenat appetitum ab his quae maxime alliciunt hominem, sic est specialis virtus,
utpote habens specialem materiam, sicut et fortitude).
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pleasure and sorrow according to the rational mean.”207 Given that the primary work of
temperance and courage is to moderate the passions, and that the passions can come up in
any domain of human action, Aquinas thinks that all of the virtues rely on the work of
temperance and courage to order the passions to follow right reason. Being a good friend, a
prudent reasoner, a loving father, a generous donor, for example, all rely on being able to
moderate passions in line with what is good in each case. In this way, Miner writes, all
virtues are connected to the passions. Miner concludes, “if temperance and fortitude
require the appropriate cultivation of the passions, and the other moral virtues require
temperance and fortitude, it follows that possession of the moral virtues as such requires
the passions.”208 More specifically, all virtues require the regulation of the passions, which
is the work of the virtues of temperance and courage.
In addition to the fact that all moral virtues rely on the work of these two virtues,
Aquinas also thinks that all of the virtues require the passions because the presence of a
passion indicates the flourishing of that virtue. One reason the passions add to the

Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 291. Minor refers here specifically to the “concupiscible passions” or
those passions in the sensitive appetite that arise when an agent relates to an object as pleasant. Miner
writes, “Sensitive appetite is inclined in one way toward something apprehended as pleasant, and in
quite another way toward something estimated as useful. Therefore, it must be subdivided into two
powers [namely, the concupiscible and irascible powers], unlike the rational appetite (which admits of no
subdivision) … The concupiscible power seeks pleasure here and now. The irascible power inclines the
sensitive appetite to resistance and defense, even when this appears difficult and unpleasant.” Minor,
Aquinas on the Passions, 48-49.
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flourishing of the virtues is that they add to the goodness of the act. He emphasizes this
point at ST. I-II Q.24.3,
It is part of the perfection of the moral or human good that the passions of the soul
should likewise be regulated by reason. Therefore, just as it is better that a man
should both will the good and do it by an exterior act, so too it is part of the
perfection of the moral good that a man should be moved not only by his will but
also by his sentient appetite—this according to Psalm 85:3 (“My heart and my flesh
have rejoiced in the living God”) where by ‘heart’ we understand the intellective
appetite and by ‘flesh’ we understand the sentient appetite. 209
Being moved not just by reason but also by our sensitive appetite is an important part of the
goodness and perfection of a virtuous act. It is better to not just serve the Lord because we
know it is right but to feel in “heart and flesh” joy and love in doing so. Similarly, Aquinas
emphasizes that “every virtuous individual delights in the act of a virtue and is pained by a
contrary act.”210 Feeling pleasure in doing virtuous acts and pain in the contrary act is part

Ibid. (Unde nullus dubitat quin ad perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum per
rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad
perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem.
Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis
pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum
sensitivum; secundum illud quod in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum,
ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo.)
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St. I-II Q. 59.4 In his reply to objection 1, Aquinas writes: “Not every moral virtue has to do with
pleasures and pains as its proper matter, but instead every virtue has to do with them as something that
follows upon its proper act. For every virtuous individual delights in the act of a virtue and is pained by a
contrary act. Hence, after the quoted passage, the Philosopher adds, “... if the virtues have to do with
actions and passions; but every action or passion is followed by pleasure or pain, and because of this
virtue will have to do with pleasures and pains,” viz., as something that follows upon virtue.” (Ad
primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam
materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et
tristatur in contrario. Unde philosophus post praemissa verba subdit quod, si virtutes sunt circa actus et passiones;
omni autem passioni et omni actui sequitur delectatio et tristitia; propter hoc virtus erit circa delectationes et
tristitias, scilicet sicut circa aliquid consequens.)
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of what it means to have and experience the good that is virtue. Notice also that Aquinas
himself uses the language of regulation by emphasizing that the goodness of passions
consists in their being “regulated by reason.” The regulation of the passions, Aquinas tells
us again and again, is essential to our flourishing and to the goodness of virtuous acts.

IV. Passions and Moral Motivation: An Intimate Connection

An even more central way that Aquinas emphasizes the importance of the passions and
their regulation is through their connection to the will’s act of choosing the right ends and,
by extension, to moral motivation. As discussed in the last chapter, a large part of moral
motivation depends on the will habitually choosing ends that are morally good (i.e.,
conducive to our ultimate happiness (summum bonum)).211 Aquinas thinks that the passions
can affect our ability to choose virtuous ends in two ways. First, unregulated passions can
incline the will to choose ends that are not actually good. Second, regulated passions, on the
other hand, both facilitate our ability to choose as the virtuous person would (i.e., with
promptness, ease, and pleasure) and enable us to make correct judgments.

Miner, Aquinas on the passions, 47-48. Miner writes, “Aquinas holds (§1.1) that appetite seeks the good
under the “formal aspects” (rationes) of the befitting good (bonum honestum), the pleasant(delectable), and
the useful (utile). The threefold division of good corresponds neatly to the single formal object of rational
appetite and the two formally distinct objects of sensitive appetite (§1.3). The will formally tends toward
the bonum honestum, even if what is willed is materially unsuited to human flourishing.... The will chooses
pleasant and useful things in the same way, ‘according to the common notion of goodness,’ that is, the
bonum hon-estum(1.59.4.co).”

211

114

As for the first way that passions affect the will’s choice, when they are left
unregulated by reason, Aquinas thinks they can easily derail the task of choosing the right
ends. How does this happen? Recall that the will makes choices about objects based on its
being drawn to the good or “fitting” quality of the object when presented by the intellect.
The passions have a way of affecting our judgment and our construal of objects as fitting or
good. In turn, this judgment draws the will toward or away from these objects. At ST I-II Q.
9.2 “Can the will be moved by sensitive appetite?” Aquinas states,
Now it is clear that a man is altered in his disposition by the passions of the sentient
appetite. Hence, to the extent that a man is subject to some passion (est in passione),
something will seem fitting to him that would not seem fitting to someone who was
not subject to that passion; for instance, something will seem good to an angry man
that would not seem good to a calm man. It is in this way, on the part of the object,
that the sentient appetite moves the will.212
When experiencing a passion, such as anger, we perceive certain objects and ideas as good
and worthy of choosing. The idea of getting retribution seems like the only right choice
when under the influence of anger, for example. Aquinas thinks that passions, particularly
unregulated or unruly passions, can influence the will to choose the wrong ends by
perceiving them to be good when they are not.
At St. I-II Q. 77, Aquinas specifies how it is that the passions can negatively impact
the will. Here he emphasizes that the passions affect the will by affecting the way the

ST I-II Q.9.2. (Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad
aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non
videtur extra passionem existenti, sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur quieto. Et per hunc modum, ex parte
obiecti, appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem.)
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intellect apprehends the object. The will’s act of choosing an end depends on the intellect’s
apprehending an object as good and then presenting it to the will as good. The intellect’s
apprehension of the object as good (i.e., consistent with or conducive to our happiness), in
turn, depends in many cases on other things going right, specifically our imagination and
sensitive powers. Aquinas writes, “The use of reason requires the appropriate use of the
imagination and other sentient powers.”213 Simply stated, we use our sensory facilities and
imagination to help us reason and apprehend objects we come across. Given that sensory
faculties include the passions, the passions too can influence reason and the will, including
its choices. In ST. I-II Q 77. 1 titled “Is the will moved by a passion of the sentient appetite?”
Aquinas writes,
A passion of the sentient appetite cannot directly draw or move the will, but it can
do this indirectly—and this in two ways...The second way is on the part of the will’s
object, i.e., the good that is apprehended by reason. For as is clear in those who have
lost their minds, reason’s judgment and apprehension, along with the estimative
power’s judgment, are impeded by vehement and disorderly apprehensions on the
part of the imagination. But it is clear that the imagination’s apprehension, along
with the estimative power’s judgment, follow the passions of the sentient appetite,
just as the judgment of the sense of taste follows the tongue’s disposition. Hence, we
see that men who are in a passion do not easily turn away from the things by which
ST. I-II Q. 33.3. ad.3. Aquinas writes, “The use of reason requires the appropriate use of the
imagination and other sentient powers, which employ a corporeal organ. And so the use of reason is
impeded by a corporeal change when the acts of the imaginative power and of the other sentient powers
are impeded.” (Ad tertium dicendum quod usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et aliarum virium
sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali. Et ideo ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito
actu virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.) Cates describes the connection as follows, “Motions of
the intellectual appetite are dependent on acts of intellectual apprehension, for one tends toward what
one apprehends as good; acts of intellectual apprehension go hand in hand with acts of sensory
apprehension, for one abstracts the intelligible goodness from a phantasm; and apprehensions of an
object in respect of its sensible goodness often elicit motions of the sensory appetite.” Diana Fritz Cates.
Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry. Moral Traditions Series. (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2009), 219.
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they are being affected. Hence, as a result, reason’s judgment very often follows a
passion of the sentient appetite. And as a result of this, so does the movement of the
will, which is apt to follow reason’s judgment.214
Two powers on which reason relies to do its job, the imagination and estimative/cogitative
power, are regularly influenced by passion and can impede reason’s apprehension and
judgment and thereby indirectly influence that to which the will tends. One common way
passions do this, Aquinas notes, is by “concentrating the mind,” making it difficult for
“men to turn away.” A prime example of this is pleasure. Aquinas writes, “if [a] bodily
pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind’s
attention on itself; or else it hinders it considerably.”215 Aquinas thinks this disturbance to
reason occurs most often with pleasing sensory appetitive motions that have a strong
material component, for “we attend much to that which pleases us.”216 In addition, Aquinas
thinks emotions have the capacity to influence us in a number of ways. He writes, emotions

ST. I-II Q. 77.1. (Respondeo dicendum quod passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere
voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter.… Et secundum hunc modum, per quandam distractionem,
quando motus appetitus sensitivi fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod remittatur, vel
totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas. Alio modo, ex parte obiecti voluntatis,
quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et
inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum
est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae, sicut
etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes,
non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque
sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est sequi iudicium rationis).
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ST. I-II Q. 33.3. (Tertio modo, secundum quandam ligationem, inquantum scilicet ad delectationem corporalem
sequitur quaedam transmutatio corporalis, maior etiam quam in aliis passionibus, quanto vehementius afficitur
appetitus ad rem praesentem quam ad rem absentem. Huiusmodi autem corporales perturbationes impediunt usum
rationis, sicut patet in vinolentis, qui habent usum rationis ligatum vel impeditum).
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can “overly concentrate the mind,” cause our reason to err by “distracting our attention,”
“overwhelm reason entirely” through “intense bodily changes” (as in the case of intense
anger, love, or insanity), and incline us toward was it contrary to reason (i.e., when fear tells
us to shy away from a difficult task).217 Unregulated passions color perceptual objects so as
to appear more attractive, repulsive, threatening, or valuable than they actually are, all
things considered (i.e., in light of what human happiness consists in).218
Just as unregulated passions can be powerful obstacles to choosing rightly, so can
regulated passions play a powerful role in facilitating our ability to choose good ends and
to choose them as the virtuous person would, with promptness, ease, and pleasure. Practice
at regulating the passions in accord with reason over time, Aquinas thinks, allows us to
develop the right sensory responses to the right objects. We learn to take pleasure in things
that are actually good for us, such as eating healthy foods, doing arduous favors for friends,
acting justly, prudently, and temperately. As Diana Cates writes, “well-ordered emotion”
for Aquinas “alter[s] the way one apprehends a sensible object... in a way that supports,
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See ST. I-II Q. 77.2.

Cates, Aquinas on Emotion, 231. “Generally speaking, a problem arises when an object appears (on a
sensory level) to be highly attractive, repulsive, or threatening, and one tends with vehemence in relation
to the object. In such a situation, the intensity of one’s reaction can further focus and reinforce one’s
sensory impressions of the object’s high value or disvalue, or its immense significance for one’s
wellbeing, which can ramp up one’s emotional response to the object in a way that escapes the judgment
of reason. What happens, in effect, is that one fails to ask the question of whether this emotion is
appropriate to the circumstance; one fails to ask whether the object of one’s emotion is really as
significant as it seems. One takes the powerful sensible attractiveness or repulsiveness of the object to
constitute, in itself, a sufficient reason for tending toward or away from the object on an intellectual
level.”
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rather than undermines, the exercise of virtue.”219 By ordering our emotions, we learn to
apprehend or construe sensible objects in a way that aligns with reason and in turn enables
reason to apprehend the (sensible) good in the object and choose it with promptness and
pleasure.
Aquinas even goes so far as to say that regulated passions create a disposition in the
sensitive appetite that is crucial to our ability to make correct judgments about ends. At ST.
I-II 56.4 he writes, “the act of choosing involves [or arises from] an upright intending of the
end [that] stems from the good disposition of the irascible and concupiscible powers [i.e.,
the sensitive appetite].”220 One way of articulating Aquinas’s point here is by pointing out
that part of what enables the will to choose or be attracted toward the right ends is having a
sensitive appetite that disposes it towards certain ends and away from others. Aquinas
thinks that the sensitive appetite has “has considerable power to condition people in such a

Ibid. Cates gives the following example, “In turn this supports virtuous choice rather than takes away
from it. Emotion help us to apprehend sensible objects as good, pleasurable, or painful sensory
judgments that cause the emotion of love can, on occasion, assume a prominent place in one’s awareness,
and one can be moved accordingly. Pleased by the way this movement feels, and by the way one’s
emotion seems to highlight the attractive qualities of the object of one’s emotion, the object can appear
even more attractive, on a sensory level, than it did before one was moved. Consider the way a parent’s
love for a child can cause the child to appear especially beautiful and wonderful, and it can make it easier
for the parent to do the daily work of caring for that child.”
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ST I-II Q. 56.4 ad.4. (Ad quartum dicendum quod in electione duo sunt, scilicet intentio finis, quae pertinet ad
virtutem moralem; et praeacceptio eius quod est ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quod
autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis et
concupiscibilis. Et ideo virtutes morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed prudentia est in
ratione). Freddoso interprets this statement as follows “The fact that one has a correct intending of the end
with regard to the passions of the soul arises from the good disposition of the irascible and concupiscible
parts.” Alfred Freddoso. Treatise on the Virtues, Q.56.4 ad 4. (Notre Dame: Online Resource, 2018).
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way that things appear this way or that way, with respect to singulars.”221 When the
sensitive appetite is perfected so as to be drawn to (e.g., find pleasure in) and repulsed by
(e.g., feel pained by) certain ends, it causes us to tend toward the right ends and thereby
facilitates choosing the right ends. Again, at II-II Q.51.3 ad.1, Aquinas emphasizes that good
judgment and deliberation require habits of the moral virtues. He writes,
Correct judgment consists in the cognitive power’s apprehending a thing as
it is in itself (apprehendat rem aliquam secundum quod in se est). This stems from a
correct disposition on the part of the apprehensive power. In the same way, the
forms of corporeal things are impressed on a mirror in the way that they are when
the mirror is well disposed, whereas if the mirror is badly disposed, then what
appear are images which are distorted and badly constituted.222
Correctly apprehending something, Aquinas reiterates, requires having correct
dispositions, which includes regulated passions. He gives the example of a mirror to

ST I-II Q. 9.2 ad 2. (Thomas Williams’s translation) (Ad secundum dicendum quod actus et electiones
hominum sunt circa singularia. Unde ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis, habet magnam
virtutem ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo, ut ei aliquid videatur sic vel aliter, circa singularia.)
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ST II-II Q. 51.3 ad1. (Ad primum ergo dicendum quod rectum iudicium in hoc consistit quod vis cognoscitiva
apprehendat rem aliquam secundum quod in se est. Quod quidem provenit ex recta dispositione virtutis
apprehensivae, sicut in speculo, si fuerit bene dispositum, imprimuntur formae corporum secundum quod sunt; si
vero fuerit speculum male dispositum, apparent ibi imagines distortae et prave se habentes. Quod autem virtus
cognoscitiva sit bene disposita ad recipiendum res secundum quod sunt, contingit quidem radicaliter ex natura,
consummative autem ex exercitio vel ex munere gratiae). Aquinas continues, “Now a cognitive power’s being
well disposed for receiving things as they are stems in its origins from nature and in its completion from
exercise or from a gift of grace—and this in two ways...In the second way, indirectly, from the good
disposition of the appetitive power, from which it follows that a man judges well concerning things that
are desirable. And it is in this way that the good judgment that belongs to a virtue follows upon the
habits of the moral virtues; but this sort of good judgment has to do with the ends, whereas synesis has to
do rather with the means to the end.” (Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, directe ex parte ipsius cognoscitivae
virtutis, puta quia non est imbuta pravis conceptionibus, sed veris et rectis, et hoc pertinet ad synesim secundum
quod est specialis virtus. Alio modo, indirecte, ex bona dispositione appetitivae virtutis, ex qua sequitur quod homo
bene iudicet de appetibilibus. Et sic bonum virtutis iudicium consequitur habitus virtutum moralium, sed circa
fines, synesis autem est magis circa ea quae sunt ad finem.)
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display how correct judgments rely on the rectitude of the appetites, obtained through
temperance and courage regulating the passions. Our correct appetitive dispositions serve
as a kind of mirror that construes objects correctly, so we can see them for what they are. If
our mirror is distorted, we construe objects as more pleasant or desirable or good for us
than they actually are which then distorts our judgment and, in turn, our ability to choose
what is good for us.223
Robert C. Roberts illustrates the kind of emotional development that Aquinas has in
mind when we learn to regulate our emotions and how such a development facilitates our
ability to choose virtuously. Much like Aquinas who believes unregulated passions easily
lead us astray, Roberts also thinks that our natural emotional responses resemble emotional
immaturity. He illustrates this immaturity through what he calls “the emotional type.”
Roberts writes, “The ‘emotional type’ is not quite in possession of himself; he is rather
chaotically subject to vicissitudes, whether of his environment or hormones (or both).”224
Roberts continues,
The concerns his emotions go back to are themselves momentary, primitive,
immature, or badly ordered. He lacks personal integration and depth, not because
he feels strongly, but because his feelings are erratic and chaotic, or because he feels
Freddoso gives the analogy of the knife, he writes, “Think of the passions as instruments of reason and
will, and think of the virtues of temperance and fortitude as rendering the sentient appetite fit to play this
role of instrument in the way that sharpening a knife makes it fit to carry out the command of reason.”
Alfred Freddoso. Treatise on the Virtues, Q.56.4 ad 4.(Notre Dame: Online Resource, 2018).
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Robert C. Roberts, Spiritual Emotions a psychology of Christian Virtues, (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 2007) 186. “He is weak, immature, shallow… ‘not together.’ Trivial successes and modest
beauties, which would distract a more mature person only momentarily are to him a gale of ‘ecstasy’ that
blow him away. He gets upset easily, on occasions that would count as a crisis only by a stretch of
melodramatic imagination.”
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strongly about the wrong things, or because he lacks something that ought to be
present in addition to his strong feelings, something we might call presence of mind,
self-possession, or self control…[guided by] stable and worthy master concerns,
such as the concern for integrity…225
Roberts here describes where our emotional lives often begin. Moreover, he indicates many
of the missing elements required for emotional maturity. The path of moving from the
“emotional person” to a mature person requires allowing our ultimate concerns, cares,
and/or reasons to guide the vicissitudes of emotion and ultimately penetrate them over
time so that the emotions begin to habitually align with our values and themselves reflect
our characteristic, long-term, concerns and cares. For example, objects that once elicited
feelings of boredom, through emotional habituation and maturity, can be seen a lovable
and conducive to our central most cares and concerns. Likewise, to use Aquinas’s
terminology, the emotionally mature virtuous person is one who learns to perceive and
tend toward sensible objects in the right way (e.g., as pleasurable, lovable, painful, fearful,
all guided by virtue), and thus have sensory responses to those objects in a way that is
consistent with and reflects her cares and concerns for virtue. In this way, the passions not
only align with reason (i.e., ultimate cares and concerns) but are drawn to certain objects
and ends in a way facilitates our choosing the right ends. Roberts, like Aquinas, believes
that the mark of a virtuous person is that her passions not only characteristically reflect her
values, but also naturally lead her to be drawn to and take joy in virtuous activity. As Miner
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right concludes, “Lacking the cooperation of the passions, it is impossible for the will
habitually to choose what is good.”226

What is striking about Aquinas’s emphasis on regulating the passions, for our
purposes, is that in connecting the passions so closely with choice he also indicates their
role in developing moral motivation. Given that moral motivation, on the efficient-causal
side, involves developing our psychological powers and inclinations in order to choose
virtuous ends in the virtuous way, and carry out the telos (specifically, the teleological
motivation), and that regulated emotions are an intimate part of developing this capacity to
choose, we can see now how emotional development is instrumental to developing
efficient-causal motivation. Similarly, emotion regulation skills promote this development.
As I will go on to argue, Aquinas offers an account of moral motivation and its relationship
to skill that allows certain kinds of skills to enter into the very thing moral motivation is
about: our ability to habitually choose virtuous ends as the virtuous person does. This
instrumental relationship directly opposes the “moral motivation objection,” provides
insight into where this objection went wrong, and charts a path forward by pointing to the
kinds of psychological skills that aid in cultivating moral virtue.

Miner, Aquinas on Passions, 296. Miner also highlights that by regulating our passions we are better
prepared to battle incontinence which is marked by the struggle to align our lower and higher appetites.
He writes, “Lacking the cooperation of the passions, it is impossible for the will habitually to choose what
is good. Aquinas acknowledges that a person may in some cases choose the good in spite of his passions.
This is precisely the situation of the person who is continent rather than virtuous. Aquinas does not
regard continence, characterized by a struggle of the lower appetite against the higher appetite, as a
stable condition. In order to choose the good easily and promptly, the active cooperation of the passions
is required. Without this cooperation, a person will simply be divided against herself, dominated by the
unproductive state of soul that Plato calls stasis (see Republic 252a and 440b).”
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V. Aquinas on Cognitive Control of the Passions
Now that we see the importance Aquinas places on regulating emotions, as well as his
emphasis on their notoriously unruly nature, it should come as no surprise that he spends a
great deal of time offering strategies for regulating the emotions. Furthermore, it should
come as no surprise that he thinks reason can control the passions. In fact, Aquinas’s
strategies for regulating emotion, especially the strategies that parallel modern
psychological skills of emotion regulation, often focus on regulating emotion by modifying
thoughts or cognitions in various ways. But first, why does Aquinas think that the passions
can be controlled by reason? And to what degree can reason control the passions if the
passions can “disobey reason” and are often “contrary to reason”?
Aquinas thinks reason can control the passions. A large reason why he thinks this is
due to the kind of thing a passion is. Peter King writes,
Aquinas is a cognitivist about emotion, since cognitive acts are not only causal
preconditions of emotion, but contribute their formal causes as well. The emotion is
not the feeling alone: it literally would not be the emotion it is without the formal
object it has, and there would be no emotion in absence of the formal object.227

Emotions, for Aquinas, require first having a cognitive act whereby we see or perceive an
object. The common example used to describe this process is the sheep’s cognitive act of
“seeing” the wolf, which is the object of cognition. In the case of humans, the cognitive act
could be sensing, perceiving, imagining, or recalling the object. Next, King writes, “Aquinas

Peter King, “Emotions” in the Oxford Handbook of Aquinas ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 219.

227

124

holds that the sensitive appetite ‘inherits’ its intentional character from cognition.”228 After
the cognitive act, we perceive the object under some intention of good or evil (i.e. “the
sheep perceives the wolf as a natural enemy, the bird perceives the straw as useful in the
construction of a nest”).229 Only when the intention is formed does the sensitive appetite
move in response.230 King writes, “the resulting act of the sensitive appetite is the emotion
of fear when it is caused by the formal object the wolf as a hard to avoid imminent evil, with the
appropriate associated somatic responses.”231 With just this much, we can see that emotions
are “objectual” in that they are responses that arise from our cognitive perceptions of
objects, including our cognitive estimations of the goodness or badness of those objects. For
this reason, Aquinas is considered a cognitivist about emotion.
In addition to thinking emotions are highly dependent on and linked to cognition,
Aquinas also thinks emotions can be controlled by reason or are “cognitively penetrable,”
despite the fact that they can disobey reason.232 Aquinas often is translated as using the
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Aquinas writes, “the lower appetitive power does not naturally tend to anything until after that thing
has been presented to it under the aspect of its proper object” (On Truth. Q. 25 a. 4 ad 4). (Ad quartum
dicendum, quod appetitiva inferior non naturaliter tendit in rem aliam, nisi postquam proponitur sibi sub ratione
proprii obiecti…).
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King, “Emotions,” 217. I am offering a simplified version of Aquinas’s rather complex description of
emotions and their formation. See Peter King’s article for a fuller account.
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language of control when speaking about passion’s relation to reason. In ST I-II Q. 24.3 “On
the Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul,” he writes,
If we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it
belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason…
Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above (I-II:17:7), it
belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also
should be controlled by reason.233
Aquinas holds that passions can and ought to obey reason in attaining the “perfection of
[the] moral good.”
The language of control is strong in this passage and has led many scholars to
believe that reason’s role is to command or control the passions into submission and order.
Anthony Kenny writes, “what else is virtue but the control of the passions?”234 However,
interpreting Aquinas’s use of “regulatae per rationem” as “control” rather than “regulate”
belies the more nuanced interpretation he gives in his favorite metaphor, borrowed from an
evocative sketch of Aristotle’s Politics. In this metaphor, Aquinas describes how reason
takes on a political/constitutional rather than despotic form of control over emotion. In ST I.
81.3 on whether “the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?” Aquinas writes,

233

For context, see the passage (ST I-II Q.24.3) in its entirety: (Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes

motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per
rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto
ad plura quae homini conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad perfectionem moralis boni pertineat
quod actus exteriorum membrorum per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus possit obedire
rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae
sint regulatae per rationem).
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, Vol.22 trans. and ed. Anthony Kenny (New York: McGraw Hill,
1964) xxxiv.
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As the Philosopher says in Politics 1, ‘One finds in the animal both despotic rule
(despoticus principatus) and constitutional rule (politicus principatus).’ For the soul
rules the body with a despotic rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetite with a
constitutional and royal rule.” Despotic rule is that by which someone rules slaves,
who do not have the ability to resist the ruler in any of his commands, since they
have nothing of their own (quia nihil sui habent). By contrast, political and royal rule
is that by which someone rules free men, who, even if they are subject to the rule of
the leader, nonetheless have something of their own (habent aliquid proprium) by
which they are able to resist the leader’s command.235
The relationship between reason and emotion, Aquinas makes clear, is one of
constitutional/ political rule. Rather than ruling the passions despotically, as slaves without
the ability to resist their ruler, if reason is to rule the passions it must do so constitutionally.
Reason governs emotions as free subjects who have an ability to resist the leader’s
command. Implied in this passage is the idea that passions are able to operate
independently of reason, resisting reason’s rule, and offering something of their own.236
Despite their ability to operate on their own terms and resist reason’s rule, Aquinas remains
optimistic about our ability to regulate the passions. Aquinas not only thinks that we can

ST I Q. 81.3 ad. 2. (Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I politicorum, est quidem in
animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico
principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali. Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis
principatur servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent.
Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini
praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio).
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Nicholas Lombardo states that “the metaphor implies that the inclinations of the passions are basically
legitimate, just in need of some guidance. Despite the possibility of internal conflict, Aquinas trusts the
fundamental orientation of the passions, as well as their capacity to be guided by reason. On this point he
departs from his contemporaries.” Nicholas E Lombardo. The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion.
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012) 100. Also, see Eileen C. Sweeny.
"Restructuring desire: Aquinas, Hobbes, and Descartes on the passions." In Meeting of the Minds. The
Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy: Acts of the International Colloquium held
at Boston College, June 14-16, 1996, organized by the Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie
médiévale, pp. 218.
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change our emotions but that we should do so if we want to cultivate virtue.237 What then
are the strategies Aquinas offers in regulating the emotions?

VI. Aquinas’s Regulation Strategies and Their Contemporary Parallel
Throughout his ethics, Aquinas offers a variety of strategies for mitigating emotions. He
devotes a whole question to “Remedies for Pain and Sadness” wherein he recommends
weeping, talking to others, and the consolation of a friend as remedies to lessen sadness.238
He also prescribes remedies such as making jokes, taking part in a feast, and partaking in
non-shameful pleasures as a way to lessen anger.239 In addition, Aquinas explains how the
will can influence an unwanted emotion through deliberate distraction. By investing one’s
energy in some other object and thereby “willing” oneself to think about or otherwise
occupy oneself with something else, one can sometimes avoid dwelling on unwanted

Barad (1991) is illuminating here. She suggests that for Aquinas “failing to modify a negative
emotional response when one is able to do so is just as morally culpable as voluntarily intensifying it.”
Both failure to moderate and voluntary intensification would count as instances of “choosing to be
affected by a passion.” JudithBarad. "Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity."
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 55, no. 3 (1991), 404. But how are we responsible for our
passions? Are there some circumstances under which we are responsible, and others under which we are
not? Though Aquinas does not raise these questions directly, he suggests answers to them. Claudia
Murphy argues that Aquinas can accommodate two apparently conflicting intuitions on the matter.
Murphy attributes two views to Aquinas. First, that passions are directly voluntary, because they are
directly responsive to our reason and will. Second, that we are indirectly responsible for our passions just
in case we could have controlled them if we had tried. (Murphy, p.166) Claudia Murphy. "Aquinas on
our responsibility for our emotions." Medieval Philosophy & Theology 8, no. 2 (1999): 166.
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sensory experiences that give rise to an emotion.240 The will can also choose to not consent
to an emotion when one judges, for example, that feeling the emotion as one currently feels
it is contrary to one’s proper functioning.241
Though there are many strategies Aquinas offers to modify emotions, he thinks that
strategies concerning reason offer some of the most powerful ways to modify emotion. He
offers three reason-focused strategies that all have strong parallels with contemporary
emotion regulation skills. In order to display how each strategy is a psychological skill by
today’s standards, in what follows, I outline each strategy along with its contemporary
parallel. Aquinas’s first strategy emphasizes knowledge of emotion. His second strategy
emphasizes emotional change through the imagination. In his third and final strategy,
Aquinas outlines emotion modification through the contemplation of universal truths.

a. The First Step to Change: Understanding the Problem
An important step to having influence over our emotions is first gaining an awareness of
what they are. Much like psychologists today, Aquinas thinks it is important to become
aware of the multiple ways our affective faculties are influenced by both internal and
external phenomena.242 For this reason, he devotes more than one quarter of ST Ia IIae to an
extended treatment of the passions. One reason for this, Robert Miner states, is that
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See ST I-II Q. 10.3 ad 1.
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Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 298.
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“Aquinas takes seriously the notion that it is possible for a person to acquire insight into the
multiple ways in which she is acted upon, and even (with the help of divine grace) change
those ways, should they lead her away from beatitude.”243 Evidence of Aquinas’s
investigation of this sort can be found in his detailed discussion of the passions of fear, love,
anger, pleasure, sorrow, hope, despair, and courage. In each discussion, he offers a finegrained analysis of the emotional phenomena that constitute and give rise to each passion.
Aquinas seeks a wide knowledge of emotion but consistently focuses on two aspects of
each emotion: 1) its cause(s) and 2) the possible risks of undergoing the emotion. In this
way, Aquinas is similar to psychologists today who think that psychoeducation about
emotion must involve, as Berking et. al describe, an “illustration of the biological and
psychological origins of an emotion, functions, mechanisms, and possible risks and benefits
of emotional reactions.”244 In the case of fear, for example, Aquinas spends multiple articles
identifying fear’s causes, which he argues can be captured by fear’s formal object: “a
perceived evil.” In addition to identifying its causes, Aquinas specifies the various
physiological effects fear can have on the body and our ability to reason. In ST. I- II Q.44,
Aquinas notes how fear “makes one eager to seek counsel” but also “debilitates man’s
deliberative function,” and thus “those under its influence do not themselves make wise
counselors.” In the same article, Aquinas writes, “To a man affected according to some
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M. Berking et al. “Emotion Regulation Skills as Treatment Target in Psychotherapy.” Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 46 (2008) 1233.
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passion, a thing seems greater or smaller than it is according to the truth of the thing – as
what is loved seems better to a person in love, and what is feared seems more terrifying to
the person who is afraid.” The risks passions pose are almost always in regard to their effect
on our ability to reason well while under their influence.
By having knowledge of emotion in these various ways, we prepare ourselves for
the task of influencing our emotional reactions. For example, the brave man’s task of
“curbing fear” in the face of difficulty requires first acknowledging and understanding
what fear is, its physiological effects, and the risks fear poses to reason. Curbing or
decreasing fear, Aquinas notes, requires first understanding fear’s cause as “a perceived
evil” or more specifically our judgment that the object is evil, which is the efficient cause of
fear.245 Miner provides a helpful example of how the knowledge of fear is crucial to
regulating fear in line with reason:
If a person is sufficiently aware of her fears, and senses that something is wrong, she
may be led to pose a question of the form: “How do I become the kind of person
who is not dominated by fear and anxiety?” For her to achieve understanding of
why she fears in the manner she does, she must know what fear is, what it comes
245

ST I-II Q. 42.5. Aquinas writes, “The object of fear is evil. Consequently, whatever tends to increase evil,
conduces to the increase of fear.” (Ergo etiam facit ad augmentum timoris in malis). In ST I-II Q 42.6, Aquinas
writes, “The remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such
a remedy be removed, there is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now
of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an already present evil is removed.” (Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod remedium mali est duplex. Unum, per quod impeditur futurum malum, ne adveniat. Et tali
remedio sublato, aufertur spes, et per consequens timor. Unde de tali remedio nunc non loquimur. Aliud remedium
mali est, quo malum iam praesens removetur. Et de tali remedio nunc loquimur). Peter King writes, “Aquinas
argues in several cases that the formal object of a given passion, such as loathing, must also be the cause of
loathing (ST I-II Q.26)...But, strictly speaking, Aquinas admits that the efficient cause of Jones's loathing is
his perception or cognition of the sheep as an evil.” Peter King, “Aquinas on the Passions” in Thomas
Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Ed.Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
358.
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from, and what it does to her...The first step for her is to recognize that she
characteristically apprehends certain things under the formal object of fear, even if
they do not actually possess those features.246
Miner’s example indicates how knowledge or awareness about the objects that give rise to
fear enables a person to begin figuring out how exactly to mitigate the adverse emotion (i.e.,
Is it the object itself that is especially fear-invoking or is it our judgment about the object
that’s gone wrong?).247 This cognitive awareness of fear begins the process of regulating our
emotions and influencing them so as to not dominate our minds and bodies. Miner rightly
concludes that, for Aquinas, “Right reason is required to perfect the acts of the sensitive
appetite. One implication is that reason must know the passions, in order to direct them,
just as those who govern must understand the nature of the governed.” 248

246

Miner, Aquias on the Passions, 298.

Ibid, 295. Miner writes, “If temperance and fortitude require the appropriate cultivation of the
passions, and the other moral virtues require temperance and fortitude, it follows that possession of the
moral virtues as such requires the passions...Is there a more direct way to connect knowledge of the
passions with the attainment of happiness? There is, if one reflects that each of the eleven basic passions,
including those that moralists of a certain stripe have been quick to reject, has something vital to
contribute to human flourishing. When experienced in the appropriate manner, hatred, sorrow, fear, and
anger are useful. Even the passion of despair (as distinguished from the sin) has its proper role to play. A
sense of the fundamental naturalness of the passions emerges from a close reading of the texts. Thomas
devotes such a large portion of the 1a2ae to the acts of the sensitive appetite because he thinks that
without an adequate grasp of the passions, we can neither know what happiness is nor attain it.”
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Ibid, 296-298. Miner concludes, “Thomas devotes such a large portion of the 1a2ae to the acts of the
sensitive appetite because he thinks that without an adequate grasp of the passions, we can neither know
what happiness is nor attain it.”One further reason Miner gives towards the importance of knowing the
passions is via reference to Pinackaers point. Miner writes, “What makes knowledge of the passions
necessary for beatitude? Pinckaers proposes that for Aquinas the passions enable our first glimpse of
spiritual happiness: ‘Sensibility supplies man with a first image and a fundamental vocabulary for the
expression of spiritual realities’ (1990,p.382). Sensitive love and pleasure function as images of their
spiritual originals. Without the experience of delectatio, it would be difficult to have any grasp of what
Aquinas means by gaudium and fruitio, associated with the last end. As composites of form and matter,
the passions lie at the boundary of the sensible and the spiritual.
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However, similar to psychologists today, Aquinas knew well that psychoeducation
or knowledge about the passions is often not sufficient on its own to modify or regulate the
passions. Aquinas knew that insight along does not always suffice to correct an emotion.249
Similarly, psychologists who study emotion, such as Leslie Greenberg, Sue Johnson, and
Jon Rottenberg, find that gaining insight into the reason behind the emotion is important to
affective change, but insight must be followed up by other emotion regulation strategies,
habits, and practices if change is to be obtained.250 Furthermore, in a recent study, Berking
et al. compare the effectiveness of various emotion regulation strategies. They found that
psychoeducation strategies that emphasize knowledge of emotion (i.e., the ability to
identify, sense, and understand an emotion, including “clarity” and awareness of emotionrelated sensations) “showed the lowest correlations with other outcome
measures…whereas modification, acceptance, and resilience showed the highest
correlations.”251 Once again, based on their findings, we find that successfully regulating
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ST. I-II Q. 44.2 ad2. Aquinas writes, “the stronger a given passion is, the more the man affected by it.”

(quod quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur).
See Adele M. Hayes, Greg C. Feldman, and Marvin R. Goldfried. "The Change and Growth
Experiences Scale: A Measure of Insight and Emotional Processing." in Insight in psychotherapy ed.
Castonguay, Louis G., and Clara Ed Hill. 231-253. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological
Association, 2007).
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M. Berking et al. “Emotion Regulation,” 1233. Berking continues “exploratory analyses demonstrated
that within the CBT condition the subscale modification demonstrated the greatest gain.” This study
describes modification as a change in the quality and/or quantity of an emotional reaction with the help
of a five-step emotion modification plan, which is based on the general problem solving model.
“Modification includes: (1) setting a specific and realistic goal of how one wants to feel; (2) brainstorming
possible ways of changing the antecedents of the emotion; (3) choosing a strategy; (4) making a specific
plan; and (5) evaluating progress, including reinforcement of successful efforts or change of plan/goal if
necessary.
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emotion with reason requires going beyond psychoeducation and exploring methods for
modifying emotions. What then does Aquinas offer by way of strategies for modifying
emotions?

b. Strategies for Modifying Emotions
Aquinas mentions two ways that human emotion is capable of being affected by changes in
belief or thought.252 First, we can imaginatively present things in different lights and
thereby trigger different emotional responses. King gives the example of “the divorced
spouse [who] can think of the former partner with love or hatred, depending on which past
situations and events are recalled or imagined.” In a similar way, the imagination can be
used to provoke emotional responses. Aquinas states,
From the apprehension of something by the intellect there can follow a passion in
the lower appetite ...in so far as that which is understood by the intellect in a
universal way is represented in the imagination in particular, thus moving the lower
appetite. When, for example, the intellect of a believer assents intellectually to future
punishment and forms phantasms of the pains, imagining the fire burning and
worm gnawing and the like, the passion of fear follows in the sensitive appetite.253

252 King,

Emotions, 220. Peter King writes, “Aquinas mentions two ways in which human emotion is
cognitively penetrable, that is capable of being consciously affected by changes in belief or thought after
the quasi-instinctual initial response of the sensitive appetite. For although an emotional response ‘is not
completely in our power since it precedes the judgement of reason, it is in our power to some extent’”
(On Truth, Q.25.5)
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On Truth, Q.26.3 ad 13. Another way the intellect moves passion, Aquinas writes, is “In so far as the

higher appetite is moved by the intellectual apprehension, with the result that the lower appetite also is
stirred up by the higher through a kind of overflow or through a command.” (Ergo huiusmodi non possunt
esse in parte appetitiva sensitiva; et sic relinquitur quod sint in parte appetitiva rationali, scilicet in voluntate).
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Aquinas offers the example of a believer who reflects on punishment in the afterlife to
indicate how deliberate imagination of this sort is in the agent’s conscious control and can
provoke emotions to align with reason. When would someone need to engage in such a
strategy? Cates’s explanation is illuminating. She writes,
The idea/image of hell functions in much the same way as the idea/image of other
negative consequences for one’s actions, such as punishment by human law, which
one might picture as being arrested and thrown in jail, or rejection by others, which
one might picture as a look of disgust in a loved one’s face. An object whose
attainment appears to carry painful penalties is less attractive for most humans than
an object that promises simple and resounding pleasure. But sometimes in order to
appreciate negative consequences, one must represent those consequences in
tangible ways, in the form of fearful images, for the tendency in a state of sensory
pleasure (or its anticipation) is to focus on what is most colorful and delightful in the
object of one’s pleasure, and to neglect its troublesome features.254
When faced with desires that are contrary to reason, Aquinas thinks that we can call on our
imagination to produce images that viscerally remind us of the negative consequences
associated with that desire, thereby lessening the attractiveness of the object in question.

Cates, Aquinas on Emotions, 217. Cates gives an example of how using the imagination in this way helps
to curtail contrary emotions and desires: Suppose one believes in hell. One wishes, generally, to avoid
wrongdoing partly in order to avoid going to hell. Yet one is driven, periodically, by a strong desire to do
something that one finds pleasing but knows to be wrong. At least, one has been taught that the action is
wrong, and there appear to be good reasons for believing it to be wrong. Thus enters an element of doubt,
which can be a sign of intelligence but can also be born of self deception: Maybe what I have thought to
be wrong is not so bad after all; what could it really hurt if I did it just this once? In a quieter moment,
after the impetuous desire is spent, and the reasons for judging one’s behavior wrong appear more
compelling, one might direct one’s imagination to form image after image of the horrors of hell in order
to get at the source of one’s motivation, namely, the desire to enjoy a particular pleasure. When one
imagines something terrible that will happen if one indulges this desire, one causes the object of one’s
desire to appear less attractive. The object now appears as something that is pleasing in some respects but
also threatening and ultimately painful to unite with...”
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Cates calls this strategy a form of “persuasion.” This persuasive method can be used
to both down-regulate negative emotions and upregulate positive emotions.255 Just as visual
negative images can keep certain pleasures at bay, so too can good images direct us. Images
of Christ and imagining Christ’s life, for example, as a form of religious worship, can lead
us to love of Christ.256 Images of a virtuous person, the saints, Christ, or objects that
resemble what is good can cause motions in the sensory appetite and suggest related
actions that are consistent with one’s well-being and are also quite pleasing. 257
How does Aquinas’s strategy resemble contemporary methods of emotion
regulation skills? Emotion regulation, as it is psychologically understood today, “refers to
attempts individuals make to influence which emotions they have, when they have them,
and how these emotions are experienced and expressed.”258 One emotion regulation

Ibid, 216. Cates writes, “Recognizing that one has a similar propensity, when tired or frustrated, to say
things one does not really mean, one might choose to bring a sense of humor to the situation, or to focus
with compassion on how the friend is struggling. In effect, reason persuades the sensory appetite to let go
of anger or move beyond anger, but it does so by directing the interior senses to present or represent
sensible particulars in ways that are likely to cause a shift in one’s appetitive motion.”

255

256

See ST II-II Q.81.3.

King, Emotions, 11. King concludes, ““It is clear that some emotions are indirectly subject to the control
of reason — though it is a bit like controlling digestion by being able to pick and choose what one eats.”
Interestingly, Claudia Murphy calls this technique “the conscious project of forming a certain passion.”
Murphy writes, “Aquinas argues that the passions are subject to the will’s command, and he seems to
think they are subject to both conscious and unconscious command. When the devout person wills to
elicit in herself religiously appropriate passions about hell, she acts on her imagination with the conscious
project of forming a certain passion. And so her passion (if it indeed occurs, and is caused by her willing
in the right way) is voluntary because it is caused by an act of will with this passion as its object—it is
voluntary as an act consciously commanded by the will.” Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our
emotions.", 185.
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Jonathan Rottenberg and James J. Gross. "Emotion and emotion regulation: A map for psychotherapy
researchers." Clinical psychology: science and practice 14, no. 4 (2007): 325. Rottenberg and Gross write,
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strategy that parallels Aquinas’s is what psychologists call “mental simulation.” Taylor and
Schneider define mental simulation as follows:
Mental simulation is the imitative representation of some event or series of events. It
may involve the replay of events that have already happened, such as running back
through an argument one had with a colleague to figure out where the conversation
went wrong. It may involve the cognitive construction of hypothetical scenarios,
such as deciding how to confront a procrastinating graduate student. It can involve
fantasies, such as the imagined sexual exploits that often lull people to sleep, and it
can involve mixtures of real and hypothetical events, such as replaying an argument
and inserting what you should have said into the dialogue (Taylor & Schneider,
1989). Mental simulation can be useful for envisioning the future because it
addresses the two fundamental tasks of self-regulation and coping, namely the
management of affect or emotional states and the ability to plan and solve problems.
Specifically, there are certain intrinsic characteristics of mental simulations that
make them useful for envisioning the future and for engaging the problem-solving
and emotional regulation skills so vital to effective self regulation.259

Mental simulation is an emotion regulation technique that works by imaginatively
representing events and “make the events seem real,” thereby allowing us to engage our
emotions. Similar to Aquinas’s emphasis on imagination’s ability to provoke emotions, one
of the characteristics of mental simulations is its ability to provoke both positive and
negative emotions. Taylor et al. write,
A major consequence of mental simulation is the evocation of emotional states and
their potential control. Imagining a scenario does not produce a dry cognitive
“Emotion regulation is only one of several forms of affect regulation, each of which may be of potential
interest in the context of psychotherapy. More specifically, emotion regulation may be profitably
distinguished from three other forms of affect regulation: coping, mood regulation, and psychological
defense (for a more detailed exposition of these differences, see Gross, 1998b)....[Currently, psychologists
recognize] five families of emotion regulation processes: situation selection, situation modification,
attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation.”
S. E. Taylor and Schneider, S. K. “Coping and the simulation of events.” Social Cognition, 7, (1989) 174194. (1989). And S. E. Taylor and L. B. Pham, I. D. Rivkin, and D. A. Armor. “Harnessing the Imagination:
Mental Simulation, Self-Regulation, and Coping.” American Psychologist, 53, no. 4 (1998): 429.
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representation but rather evokes emotions, often strong ones. Researchers who
manipulate positive and negative affect, for example, have made extensive use of
mental simulations as one of the most effective manipulations of affective states
(e.g., Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Strack, Schwarz, &
Gschneidinger, 1985; Wright & Mischel, 1982). By leading people to mentally replay
one of the saddest or, alternatively, one of the happiest events of their lives,
researchers can reliably evoke positive or negative emotional states.

Research supports Aquinas’s idea that our imaginations do in fact have the capacity to
provoke emotions of all kinds. Furthermore, by provoking these emotions, we are better
able to direct and manage our emotions. An important goal of mental simulation is being
able to use such simulations to problem-solve, plan, and better manage our emotions and
behavior. Furthermore, studies show that mental simulation can be engaged in a way that
reduces negative emotions and increases positive emotions.
For example, Pham and Taylor (1997) conducted a study of nervous undergraduates
preparing for an exam. Students who were asked to practice each day for 5 minutes to
visualize themselves studying for the exam in a way that would lead them to obtain a grade
of A performed significantly better on the exam and reported much lower levels of anxiety
and higher levels of confidence than those who did not engage in such simulations.260 In
this way, Taylor et. al think that mental simulations serve to “engage emotional responses
that help people muster the motivation to achieve their goals.”261

Pham, L. B., & Taylor, S. E. The effects of mental simulation on exam performance. Unpublished
manuscript (1997). See also, Taylor, Shelley E., and Lien B. Pham. "The effect of mental simulation on
goal-directed performance." Imagination, cognition and personality 18, no. 4 (1999): 253-268.
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Similarly, research from cognitive-behavioral therapy also indicates the importance
of mental simulations for modifying emotions and behaviors. For example, an addict in
recovery can better manage his desire for alcohol by imagining the last horrible hangover
he had and the people he hurt while intoxicated.262 The visceral imagery provokes an
emotional response that helps the addict direct his actions toward sobriety. In addition,
Decety and Grezes find that mental simulations are a powerful tool for cultivating
empathy, particularly when used to imagine the pain and suffering of others, and it is
therefore a representational tool to cultivate our social relations to others. Given this
strategy’s use of imagination to provoke emotion, manage emotions, plan, and direct our
behavior, it shows very strong parallels to the kind of strategy Aquinas has in mind. Not
only that, but Aquinas himself describes using this strategy as a way of directing one’s
emotions and planning behavior (i.e., engaging in visions of hell in order to lessen the
desire to sin, imagining images of Christ in order to cultivate one’s love for Christ). For
these reasons, I think it is safe to say that Aquinas’s strategy is a kind of psychological skill
of emotion regulation comparable to what is used today under a different name.
Once more, for emphasis, Aquinas has an account of psychological skills of emotion
regulation that parallel contemporary emotion-regulation strategies. This point marks an
important step in my attempt to unearth the psychological strategies that Aquinas himself
uses and thinks aid in the development of virtue. By indicating their parallels with modern

See G.A. Marlatt and J.R Gordon. Relapse prevention: Maintenance strategies in the treatment of addictive
behaviors (New York: Guilford Press, 2005).
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psychological strategies, I hope to indicate how his strategies are psychological strategies
that today take on more sophisticated forms. As an important note, not only do these
strategies today go by a different name, but we also have a much more developed
understand of the effectiveness of this strategy than Aquinas was able to provide. Thanks to
the work of clinical psychologists, we understand the kinds of problems, populations, and
situational factors for which this strategy works best. Such knowledge, as I will go on to
discuss, is a boon to practical wisdom. p people muster the motivation to achieve
A second strategy Aquinas offers for modifying emotions is through what he calls
appealing to “universal considerations.” Aquinas writes, “it is clear that universal reason
gives commands to (imperat) the sentient appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible
and irascible, and that this appetite obeys it...Anyone can experience for himself that by
applying some universal considerations, anger or fear or the like can then be mitigated or
even stirred up.”263 Reminding oneself of general truths can mitigate our emotions in a
given situation. King gives several examples of Aquinas’s point:
Grief over the death of a friend can be mitigated by thinking of the general truth that
we all die; confidence can increase by the thought that only the brave deserve the
fair…there are all sorts of ways in which intellectual cognition can (attempt to)
influence one’s emotions: thinking about the stringent air-safety regulations in place
in order to curb one’s fear of flying, for example, or thinking about how even lesser
lights have been awarded the Nobel Prize in order to boost one’s hopes. The factor

ST I Q.81.3. (Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per
concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia deducere universalia principia in conclusiones
singulares, non est opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis; ideo irascibilis et concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire
rationi, quam intellectui. Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim aliquas universales
considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigator).
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in common in all of these cases is that the emotional responses seem to follow (when
they follow at all) merely upon having the thoughts.264

Simply stated, Aquinas believes that a promising strategy for influencing an emotion is to
reassess the thoughts that give rise to the emotion in light of more general truths and
considerations. By aligning thoughts with what is true about the world, we subsequently
modify emotions.
Miner provides a helpful example of how this change works for Aquinas by using
the example of Dorothy, a woman who struggles with dysfunctional fear. Miner writes,
“When Dorothy sees a man who reminds her of her abusive uncle, her first reaction is fear.”
As a result, she is stricken with fear regularly when this memory of her uncle comes over
her. To resolve this fear, Dorothy needs “new estimations that are more adequate to
reality.”265 He continues, “If she has good evidence that someone genuinely loves and cares
about her, she will be in a position to take the first step toward replacing fear with
intimacy.”266 In other words, “her universal reason must possess knowledge (or at least true
opinion) that is adequate to reality.” Furthermore, Miner writes, “Dorothy must somehow
acquire the habit of applying this knowledge to particular situations, until the estimations
she learned to make early in life are replaced with better estimations.”267 The process of
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changing emotion based on this strategy requires getting in touch with what is true and
learning, over time, to allow that new belief to correct old errant beliefs that give rise to
dysfunctional emotions.
Though a simple technique, it mirrors almost perfectly one of the leading cognitivebehavioral interventions to date: cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive reappraisal is defined as
“a form of cognitive change involving the reevaluation of a potentially evocative situation
in a way that alters its forthcoming emotional impact.”268 For example, when taking a major
exam, whether or not you were to think of the exam as mental challenge or view it as a lifedetermining test seriously alters your forthcoming episode of anxiety about that exam.269
Similar to Aquinas, a popular way that Cognitive Behavioral Therapy uses cognitive
reappraisal to modify emotions is to cognitively reappraise distorted thinking that results
from overgeneralizations. Typically, emotions become generalized and we need to correct
for this error so that we aren’t left thinking, for example, that all men who look like our
abusive uncles are dangerous.
There are a few differences, however, between the way psychologists think about
the effectiveness of cognitive reappraisal. First, unlike Aquinas, who thinks cognitive
reappraisal can be used during an episode of anger or intense emotion to alter the emotion,
psychologists often look at cognitive reappraisal as an antecedent-focused strategy. This

Denise M. Sloan and Ann M. Kring. "Measuring changes in emotion during psychotherapy:
Conceptual and methodological issues." Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 14, no. 4 (2007): 315.
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means that cognitive reappraisal most efficiently alters the emotional response trajectory
before the emotion unfolds.270 In other words, cognitive appraisal is an emotional planahead strategy. Though Aquinas recognizes the differences between our ability to control
passions before, during, and after we have them, and himself uses the antecedent vs.
consequent passion distinction, his views differ slightly on the effective timing of this
strategy. Aquinas offers this strategy largely as one that works during an episode of anger
or unruly passion.
Another important difference between Aquinas’s use of emotion regulation methods
and those offered by Cognitive Behavioral Therapy is the stark difference in worldviews in
which these strategies exist. Contrary to Aquinas, who is very clear about the end for which
these strategies are to be employed (i.e., virtue, happiness), CBT remains not only neutral
about any definitive end or goal for which these strategies are to be used, but decidedly
functionalist (i.e., whatever makes you function best according to what is “healthy” and
works best for you). CBT is a theory that strives to be explicitly value neutral, aligning with
no particular vision of the good or proper functioning.271 This underlying value system for

Sloan and Kringe, "Measuring changes,” 315. They write, “Antecedent-focused strategies are those that
occur before a person enters a situation in which he or she anticipates emotion regulation being necessary
and before he or she feels a particular emotion (e.g., public speaking). In contrast, response-focused
strategies are those that one employs when one is already feeling an emotion and engaged in a situation
in which emotion regulation is deemed necessary.”
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It is important to note that though CBT theorists claim to be “value neutral,” it is blind to the
instrumentalist values on which this theory is based. For an essay on how philosophically problematic
the instrumentalist view is, see Blaine Fowers “Instrumentalism and Psychology: Beyond Using and
Being Used.” Theory & Psychology 20, no. 1 (February 2010): 102–24.
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cognitive behavioral therapy means that it differs significantly from Aquinas’s, but also that
it could benefit from the structure Aquinas’s moral philosophy provides.
One way this difference shows up is in the kinds of reasons that serve as good
reasons or beliefs. For CBT, the truth or falsity of a belief is not as important as the use that
can be made of it for emotional regulation. Though perhaps most helpful to choose a belief
that is plausible or reality-based, whether or not the belief if actually true or good often
takes second priority to its emotion-regulation benefits. For Aquinas, however, the reasons
one chooses must pass several tests. First, it must align with correct judgment and with
universal reason. Second, Aquinas makes clear that universal reason itself requires the
support of the moral and infused virtues if it is to provide appropriate guidance. For
example, Miner writes, “Dorothy may go from estimating certain men as dangerous to the
universal judgment that ‘all men are threatening.’” He continues, “Without virtue (both
infused and acquired), universal reason stands a poor chance of being able to revise and
reshape the historically established judgments of particular reason.”272 Universal reason
alone stands a poor chance of correctly reshaping the mistakes of particular reason. With
virtue, however, reason can be habituated towards the right ends. For example, correcting
Dorothy’s universal reason away from the judgment that “all men are threatening” may
require understanding the proper amount of fear and how fear is properly directed (the
virtue of courage), or that this universal claim is inconsistent with loving her neighbors (the
virtue of charity). Virtues, including the infused virtues, are essential in cultivating and
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directing reason towards its proper ends. Furthermore, without the infused virtue of
charity, wherein man is directed towards his final end (love of God and of neighbor),
Aquinas is pessimistic about our ability to successful direct ourselves towards our final end.
For Aquinas, universal reason, like all human faculties and operations, needs the support
and direction of both the infused and acquired virtues. As a result, we can see that for
Aquinas, unlike CBT, the successful employment of cognitive reappraisal skills requires a
specific understanding of which reasons are good, an understanding that in turn requires
the virtues. In understanding the strategies CBT offers and their promise as skills that
could aid in cultivating virtue, Aquinas reminds us how important it is to always couch
these strategies within a philosophical framework of virtue.

Skills Concluded

Ultimately, the emotion regulation skills Aquinas offers are interesting not because they are
novel ways to regulate our emotions and habituate our inclinations. They are rather simple
skills that many of us have most likely employed without knowing it. What makes these
skills particularly interesting, however, is twofold. First, they indicate Aquinas’s use of
psychological skills that are themselves parallel to a wide array of emotion regulation skills
offered by leading contemporary therapies. Aquinas’s skills are inchoate phases of a whole
gamut of emotion regulation strategies on offer today. Second, and most importantly, these
skills indicate a certain relationship between moral motivation and skill. They bear an
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instrumental relationship to moral motivation by facilitating the cultivation of moral
motivation, on the efficient causal side. More specifically, they facilitate our ability to
habitually choose the good as the virtuous person does and are instrumental to managing
and aligning our emotions with our long-term cares and concerns. As practices or skills that
enable us to perform virtuous actions, one could argue that they also fall under the domain
of prudence in that these skills contribute to our ability to deliberate well about that which
promotes virtue and its development. It belongs to the prudent person to know and employ
those strategies and actions that facilitate the development of virtue.273 With this account of
skill, moral motivation, and their relation to one another in mind, let us now return to the
authors discussed in the first chapter and weigh in on the moral motivation objection.

For example, one could argue that emotion-regulation skills offered by psychologists today are the
product of “counsel,” or the consultation of many people on contingent matters. Taking counsel before
choosing an act is a potential part of prudence according to Aquinas. Aquinas writes as ST. I-II Q. 14.3,
“Taking counsel’ (consilium) properly implies a consultation (collatio) that is made by several men… in the
case of particular contingent matters, in order for something to be grasped with certitude, it is necessary
to take into account many conditions or circumstances which are not easily thought of by just one
individual, but are seen with more certainty by many; for what the one thinks of does not occur to
another.” (Quod et ipsum nomen designat, dicitur enim consilium quasi Considium, eo quod multi consident ad
simul conferendum. Est autem considerandum quod in particularibus contingentibus, ad hoc quod aliquid certum
cognoscatur, plures conditiones seu circumstantias considerare oportet, quas ab uno non facile est considerari, sed a
pluribus certius percipiuntur, dum quod unus considerat, alii non occurrit, in necessariis autem et universalibus est
absolutior et simplicior consideratio, ita quod magis ad huiusmodi considerationem unus per se sufficere potest. Et
ideo inquisitio consilii proprie pertinet ad contingentia singularia. Cognitio autem veritatis in talibus non habet
aliquid magnum, ut per se sit appetibilis, sicut cognitio universalium et necessariorum, sed appetitur secundum
quod est utilis ad operationem, quia actiones sunt circa contingentia singularia. Et ideo dicendum est quod proprie
consilium est circa ea quae aguntur a nobis). Counsel concerns uncertain or contingent matters, or things that
can be done in diverse ways (e.g., the emotions and their regulation). Using the example of temperance, I
know I have to control my anger to be temperate but how do I deal with my anger? The end is known but
there are diverse ways to achieve that end. Consulting psychologist or their research on emotion skills is a
way to take counsel on contingent matters.
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VII. Returning to the Moral Motivation Objection
By entering into the “moral motivation objection” discourse and outlining the two sides of
the debate, my aim has not been to take sides but to take seriously the challenge that the
motivation objection proposes concerning the ability for skills to cultivate virtue which,
according to Aristotle (and Aquinas), is primarily a moral motivation or a motivational
disposition. In returning to the discourse after having laid out Aquinas’s views on moral
motivation and skill, I find that Aquinas would also not take sides but add important
corrections to both sides of the argument.
To the proponents of the moral motivation objection, Aquinas’s view softens their
harsh distinctions between skill and moral motivation by showing that certain kinds of
skills are closely related to the kinds of interior acts about which moral motivation is
primarily concerned. Moreover, once we see this instrumental relationship between skill
and moral motivation, the fact that psychological skills lack “motivational components” is
not a problem. Aquinas’s view indicates that skills themselves need not have “motivational
components” in order to be useful to cultivating moral motivation and aiding in the
development of moral virtue. As for the second side of the debate, Aquinas’s view clarifies
the role of psychological skills of a certain kind in cultivating moral virtue. His view avoids
the pitfalls of Stichter’s view by accounting for both moral motivation and practical wisdom
in a way Stichter’s account fails to do. By way of displaying how Aquinas’s view corrects
each side, let us first turn to consider each proponent of the moral motivation objection
individually.
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Zagzebski claims that skills are not the kinds of things that cultivate virtue for two
reasons. First, she argues that virtues are “psychically prior” to skills, which are primarily
about “effectiveness in action.” Second, skills lack “motivational components” required for
cultivating virtue. To the first point, Zagzebski gives the example of a courageous person.
She writes, “a courageous person in certain roles would be motivated to acquire the skills of
effective combat. A fair person who is a teacher would be motivated to learn procedures for
fair grading.”274 Zagzebski thinks that skills are concerned with “external effectiveness”
which sequentially comes after first having moral motivation. Once in place, moral
motivation then spurs the acquisition of such skills.275
In reply to this point, Aquinas’s view challenges Zagzebski’s neat divide between
skills and moral motivation. On Aquinas’s view, moral motivation has both teleological and
efficient causal sides that account for both having the correct end/telos and developing the
requisite psychological habits that allow us to choose the right ends and carry out the telos.
Furthermore, Aquinas offers certain kinds of skills that are closely related to the kinds of
interior acts about which moral motivation is primarily concerned. Emotion regulation
skills, as I’ve argued, enter into and facilitate the very kinds of interior acts, or choices,
about which efficient-causal motivation is concerned. Skills are therefore not always about
“effectiveness in action” and they are not always employed after first having moral
motivation because they are part of the process of cultivating moral motivation. With
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Aquinas’s perspective in mind, returning to Zagzebski’s example of the courageous person,
becoming someone who habitually makes this courageous choice requires employing
certain emotion regulation skills over time so as to learn to not be overcome by fear but to
be able to act and deliberate in the face of fear. On this view, we see that skills are more
instrumental and integrated with moral motivation than Zagzebski’s view permits. In this
way, Aquinas challenges both Zagzebski’s sharp divide between skill and moral motivation
and her emphasis on the sequential ordering of moral motivation and skill. 276
Perhaps Zagzebski would reply by arguing that even on this two-sided view of
moral motivation, her initial sequential ordering of moral motivation and skill still holds.
She may reply that, even on Aquinas’s view of moral motivation, it is still the case that
teleological motivation comes before the employment of skills in the efficient-causal side of
motivation. However, it is still not so clear that Aquinas would grant this distinction. If we
think of efficient-causal motivation as primarily about the development and perfection of
our rational and sensitive appetites and teleological motivation the knowledge of the
correct end (telos), often Aquinas says that our ability to choose the right ends (telos) and
know which ends are good requires the rectitude of the appetites. On this picture, a parallel
development of teleological and efficient-causal motivation is more accurate than the

Often this developmental picture of moral motivation and the relevant skills are overlooked because
Zagzebski only entertains examples of the fully virtuous, courageous person. But how can we learn about
developing moral motivation if we only think about those who are already morally motivated? The
relevance of skills and their effectiveness come to light on developmental picture of moral motivation, as
Aquinas offers.
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sequential picture Zagzebski posits. Recall at ST. I-II 56.4 where Aquinas writes, “the act of
choosing involves [or arises from] an upright intending of the end stems from the good
disposition of the irascible and concupiscible powers [i.e., the sensitive appetite].”277 If we
have temperance and fortitude, our sensory appetite proposes ends that are genuinely
pleasant, desirable, and in accord with reason. Furthermore, if we have the virtue of
prudence, we will reason correctly from those good ends to what will genuinely promote or
realize the end; our choice to act to attain the end will therefore be a good choice—its
goodness being a joint product (so to speak) of the virtues of the sensory appetite in setting
the right end and the virtue of the practical intellect in discerning how to attain it. Based on
the joint effort on the part of the appetites and intellect in knowing and choosing the right
ends, there is more of an integrated relationship between knowing the ends (teleological
motivation) and having the right psychological mechanisms to carry out those ends
(efficient causal motivation) than Zagzebski’s sequential ordering of ends suggests.
As for her second main claim, Zagzebski states that virtues are largely about having
moral motivation and that skills lack such “motivational components.” She argues that “the
motivational component of virtue defines it more than external effectiveness does, whereas
the reverse is the case with skills.”278 Though Zagzebski does not work out these
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“motivational components” in detail, pointing to Aristotle’s NE passage at II.4. 1105a, she
emphasizes that virtue is principally about choosing the correct end in the virtuous way
and that skills lack such “motivational components.”279 In reply to this point, now that we
have seen that moral motivation is not just about choosing ends but about both teleological
and efficient causal sides together, and that skills are not just about external effectiveness
but also about interior acts that can be instrumental to the development of moral
motivation, we can again challenge Zagzebski’s distinction between skills and moral
motivation.
More specifically, Aquinas’s perspective challenges the very need to draw this kind
of disanalogy between virtue and skill in the first place. On Aquinas’s view, emotion
regulation skills do not need to have “motivational components” or to be about choosing
the correct ends to be useful for cultivating virtue. Getting the end right for Aquinas
belongs to the intellect and is the focus of the teleological side of motivation to set the goal
or sake for which we act.280 Skills aid in the efficient-causal side of motivation. As a result,
the fact that skills themselves lack “motivational components” in that they are not
themselves choices about the right ends does not diminish the fact that they are useful to
cultivating moral motivation and aiding in the development of moral virtue.
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As Tobias Hoffmann summarizes, it is reason’s job to “correctly assess the end Aquinas calls the ‘due
end’ (finis debitus). Reason judges correctly about that which promotes this end (ea quae sunt ad finem).”
Hoffmann, "Prudence and Practical Principles,” 171.

280

151

Once we gain a more complete view of moral motivation and a more robust
understanding of skill, we can begin looking past particular motivational differences
between virtue and skill and begin answering the central question underlying Aristotle’s
famous skill-virtue analogy: If we can “become builders by building, and ... just by doing
just actions” what can skills contribute to our understanding of how virtue is developed?281
If the goal is to answer this question, then articulating the differences between virtue and
skill is not the best route. As Annas states, “the modern thesis that virtue is a skill is only to
say that virtue is one kind of skill,” which implies that “pointing out obvious differences
between virtues and skills is ineffective.”282 A more promising avenue is to gain a nuanced
understanding of what moral virtue and moral motivation are and the various kinds of
skills on offer today that could aid in their development. Based on my rendering of
Aquinas’s account of moral motivation and of emotion regulation skills, there are certain
skills that, though disanalogous to virtue in that they themselves lack “motivational
components” present in virtue, are highly useful to the end of cultivating moral virtue.
Similar to Zagzebski, James D. Wallace picks out differences between virtue and skill
based on motivational components present in virtue but not in skill. The key difference
Wallace describes is that virtue is primarily about “caring,” having a “change of heart,” and
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“overcoming contrary inclinations” (i.e., overcoming the desire to lie and instead telling the
truth).283 Skill, on the other hand, is about “know-how” and overcoming “technical
difficulties.”284Wallace writes, “Honesty, for example, is a matter of taking certain things
seriously--a matter of caring about certain things. To cease to be honest would be a matter
of coming to care less or ceasing to care--a change of heart rather than a loss of information
or the loss of a skill through forgetting how to do something.”285 In reply to Wallace’s
distinction, given what we now know about moral motivation and psychological skills, it is
clear that, contrary to Wallace’s point, certain skills are not just about “know how” and
“overcoming technical difficulties” but also about overcoming contrary inclinations and
caring. To again use the example of emotion regulation skills, such skills involve “know
how” and could be said to involve overcoming a “technical difficulty,” yet they are also
employed in order to help us do the very things he describes only virtue does: overcome
contrary inclinations. Our inclination to feel fear and withdraw from difficulties, in the case
of courage, is exactly the kind of thing emotion regulation skills help us to overcome and
thereby gain in virtue (i.e., of courage). In a similar way, once we know what we care about
(e.g., being a person of integrity, being a good friend, etc.) we can prudently employ
emotion regulation skills to help us cultivate these cares. Mental simulation, for instance, is
a skill used to both curb fear but also to increase empathy or care for others (e.g., by
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imagining the pain of another, the needs of another, etc.). Such skills both help us to both
overcome contrary inclinations and to increase our care or concern. In this way, Aquinas’s
view challenges Wallace’s distinction. Furthermore, as in Zagzebski’s case, we must
question the usefulness of picking out the differences between virtue and skill if a) the goal
is to understand whether certain kinds of skills are helpful to cultivating virtue and b) skills
need not have every “motivational component” that virtues have in order to be the kinds of
things that develop virtue.
Gary Watson also points out differences between skills and virtue based on moral
motivational elements present in virtue but not in skill. In the case of the virtuous person,
Watson argues, their actions or performances are expressions of the agent’s "’will’… one's
purposes, ends, choices, concerns, cares, attachments, and commitments.”286 Skills do not
require this kind of “wholehearted” performance that virtues do. Watson writes, in the case
of tennis playing, “Indifference in a [tennis] performance doesn't count against one's skill,
whereas a less than wholehearted effort to save someone's life does impugn my moral
character.”287 In other words, Watson challenges the idea that skills are analogous to virtue
and, by implication, the idea that skills are even helpful in cultivating moral virtue if skills
do not manifest or express an agent’s cares, concerns, ends, etc. Aquinas would most likely
agree with Watson concerning the nature of skills. Skills themselves do not entail or require
an expression of an agent’s fundamental cares, concerns, commitments, or
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“wholeheartedness” in the way that virtues do in order for the skill to be considered
adequate. This is even true in the case of emotion regulation skills. Someone can be highly
skilled at regulating their emotions but never really connect this skill with their long-term
goals, commitments, concerns, etc. (e.g., a psychologist may be excellent at regulating his
emotions in order to serve his volatile clients, but such skill may never be employed to help
cultivate the virtue of temperance or courage). In order to be useful for virtuous activity,
Aquinas emphasizes that emotion-regulation skills must be guided prudently such that
they are used in the right ways and for virtuous ends. For instance, engaging in an act of
mental simulation or cognitive reappraisal can be chosen or willed for the end of better
loving or empathizing with a friend in order to cultivate one’s care for the friend or the
virtue of friendship. When skills are prudently engaged, a skill can be used to express and
even cultivate certain ends, cares, commitments, or an act of “will,” as Watson describes.
This points to a further point Aquinas could make. In addition to emphasizing the need of
practical wisdom, Aquinas could once again add that certain skills are central to the kinds
of things that moral motivation is about. Unlike tennis skills, emotion-regulation skills are
about the expression of cares and concerns and therefore are more clearly connected to
“moral motivation components” than other kinds of skills. When they are exercised in order
to become better and more reliable at attaining the virtuous end (rather than merely being
more effective at X activity), emotion-regulation skills have an ability to not only express an
agent’s cares or concerns but also to play an instrumental role in allowing us to more
reliably choose and act on our cares, concerns, and ends. In this way, Aquinas’s account
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allows us to align certain skills with the kinds of things moral motivation is about. In so
doing, he reopens the possibility for skills to facilitate the development of moral motivation.
A final proponent of the moral motivation objection who also makes sharp
distinctions between skill and moral motivation in a way that discounts skill’s ability to
cultivate virtue is Anselm Mueller. However, unlike Zagzebski, Watson, and Wallace who
reject the analogy because virtue has motivational components that skill lacks, Mueller
rejects the analogy for a different reason. He thinks virtues and skills are acquired in
different ways. Virtues are firm motivational patterns in the will to respond to certain ends
as good for certain reasons (i.e., because they are good). For example, Mueller writes, “If
you have promised to fix a bicycle, your purpose – the bicycle’s functioning – does indeed
supply you with a telic reason to make use of suitable means and ways (such as getting the
tools). But qua act of justice, or fidelity, what you do is nonetheless motivated by an
occasioning reason, viz. your promise.”288 Moral motivation requires a practiced
responsiveness to the right kinds of reasons, or ends that extend beyond the practice itself,
that answer to a “why?” (e.g., helping repair a friend’s bike because of the promise you
made to your friend). This is a practice of treating certain ends as imperative. Skills do not
require the practice of such reasoning but rather require a responsiveness to the rules and
procedures that govern the practice (e.g., the rules of bicycle repair). As a result, skills are
not a helpful avenue for understanding the habituation process that forms a motivational
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disposition required for moral virtue. Moreover, skills are not candidates for the kind of
thing that helps us to cultivate moral motivation.
Anselm’s claim here is perceptive and commendable on many fronts, not the least of
which is his articulation of the kind of moral development and responsiveness to reason
specific to acquiring virtue. Mueller also does the best job of the group in identifying moral
motivation as it originates from Aristotle’s notion of virtue as a hexis prohairetikê, which
Mueller describes as “a disposition unconditionally to choose the right way of behaving for
the right kind of reason.”289 What is missing then is not so much his account of moral
motivation, though Aquinas’s view includes two sides of motivation. Most of all, Mueller
needs a more robust understanding of psychological skills and how these kinds of skills
cultivate the kind of responsiveness to reason relevant for virtue. The kinds of skills
Mueller thinks are representative of skills generally are skills of carpentry, bicycle repair,
gardening, and those of a computer technician.290 While all are examples of skills to be sure,
they are quite removed from psychological skills whose content are the thoughts, feelings,
and actions that make up much of the moral life. If we entertain psychological skills,
particularly emotion regulation skills, we see a new possibility for skills to contribute to the
kind of responsiveness to reasons required for moral virtue. Though emotion regulation
skills themselves do not cultivate a responsiveness to the right kinds of reasons, they do
cultivate a responsiveness to reason and, when they are guided by practical wisdom
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wherein the right reasons are supplied, these skills can cultivate a responsiveness to the
right kinds of reasons. For example, the skill of cognitive reappraisal can be used to help
overcome feelings of anger at the injustice of a friend by reappraising such anger in terms
consistent with the end of charity. Though I am upset, for example, that my best friend
forgot it was my birthday, I can cognitively reappraise the situation to modify my anger in
light of more prevailing reasons (e.g., I need to be understanding of my friend’s lapse in
judgment because it is good to be charitable to our friends). In this example, cognitive
reappraisal works to modify anger so that it aligns with more prevailing sorts of
“occasioning” or “Anscombian Why?” reasons, as Anselm calls them. As Anselm states,
“one’s x-ing does not manifest charity unless one would answer an Anscombian Why by
pointing to another’s need or wish, or the like.”291 Given that Aquinas’s emotion regulation
skills work to align our affections with reason, they are the kinds of things that, if guided by
practical wisdom, are an example of a skill that helps to create the kind of responsiveness to
reason that Anselm describes is central to habituating a moral disposition in the will.
Aquinas also could argue that this is exactly why such a skill cultivates efficient-causal
motivation; it facilitates our ability to more easily choose or respond to the right reasons
over time, which is what the efficient-causal side of motivation is. By dividing up moral
motivation as both teleological and efficient-causal, Aquinas’s view accounts for the
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psychological development needed to create the appetitive responsiveness to choose in the
way the virtuous person does.
Aquinas’s view of both moral motivation and psychological skill help to correct each
proponent of the moral motivation objection by both challenging the distinctions they draw
between virtue and skill and reimagining the relationship between moral motivation and
skill. Thanks to Aquinas’s nuanced account, we can see where this skill-averse group of
scholars went wrong. In addition, as we will see next, his account helps to correct the other
side of the discourse that advocates for psychological skills.

VIII. Aquinas, Stichter, and Virtue as Skill
On the other side of the contemporary debate, we have Stichter, who claims to have
resolved the moral motivation objection by arguing that psychological skills of selfregulation, contrary to the proponents of the moral motivation objection, do in fact account
for all motivational components necessary for moral virtue.292 As I argued in the first
chapter, though Stichter claims his account of psychological skills of self-regulation
captures motivational differences between skill and virtue and thus overcomes the
motivation objection posed by Zagzebski and Watson, what he has really done is interpret
their views of moral motivation as on-going commitment to an end goal, a responsiveness

Stichter writes, “expertise does capture the motivational aspects of virtue that give rise to the putative
disanalogy between virtues and skills in the case of halfhearted performances.” Stichter, “Role of
Motivation,” 208.
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to demands of a practice, and changes in perception that happen in the pursuit of becoming
an expert.
Yet these interpretations do not address the fullness of what these authors meant by
moral motivation. Both Zagzebski and Watson emphasize that the motivational
components involved in a virtuous act differ from skill because skills are an expression of
interior choices about the right ends (Zagzebski) and moral motivated acts are ones that
express an agent’s fundamental cares, concerns, commitments or “will” (Watson).
Stichter’s account of skill ignores these elements of moral motivation. In turn, it is not safe
for Stichter to conclude that psychological skills of self-regulation and expertise “capture
the motivational components of virtue.”293 I argued that a central problem with Stichter’s
account is his lack of clarity about what moral motivation is.294 Stichter’s reply to the
motivation objection rests on accounts of moral motivation from the first group that
themselves are ambiguous. Furthermore, even he admits that his argument struggles to
account for “practical wisdom.”295 Now that we have a full account of moral motivation and
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its relation to psychological skills, we can see how Aquinas’s view provides a corrective to
Stichter.
Unlike Stichter, Aquinas’s view of both teleological and efficient causal elements of
motivation account for the motivational components proposed by Zagzebski and Watson.
For Aquinas, an agent is morally motivated when his or her intellect discerns something as
fitting for an agent’s happiness and presents it to the will, and the will, recognizing this
goodness, chooses that end in the distinctively virtuous way (i.e., with pleasure and
promptness). For Aquinas, psychological skills play an instrumental role in developing our
ability to choose ends in the distinctly virtuous way. Contrary to Stichter’s view, this means
that skills cannot themselves account for all of the motivational components. Though
emotion-regulation skills facilitate choice, if they are to play a role in cultivating virtue,
onece again, psychological skills must be directed by the intellect and practical wisdom. As
discussed above in response to Watson, skills themselves do not entail or require an
expression of an agent’s fundamental cares, concerns, commitments, or “wholeheartedness”
in the way that virtues do in order for the skill to be considered adequate. Recalling the
example of the psychologist described above, someone can be highly skilled at regulating
their emotions but never really connect this skill with their long-term goals, commitments,
concerns, etc. The question always remains, in light of what goal or reason or end are we
regulating our emotions? In order to be useful for virtuous activity, this skill, like all skills,
must be guided prudently so that it is used in the right ways and for virtuous ends. When
skills are prudently engaged, a skill can be employed in ways expressive of those ends,
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cares, commitments, or an act of “will,” as Watson describes. Unlike Stichter’s account,
which struggles to account for practical wisdom or a reflection on which ends are worth
pursuing, Aquinas’s view provides a nuanced account of moral motivation, skill, and their
relationship all of which highlights rather than minimizes practical wisdom’s central role.
As a result, Aquinas provides us with a more promising solution to the moral motivation
objection and the role of psychological skills in cultivating moral virtue than Stichter’s
account can offer.

A Final Response
As a final response to Stichter and the contemporary discourse on moral motivation-skill as
a whole, it has been my hope to display how Aquinas’s moral psychology has the resources
to weigh in and provide important corrections on both sides of the contemporary discourse.
His robust understanding of moral motivation and skill contributes to this discourse by
overcoming unhelpful distinctions between virtue and skill and by paving the way for a
new relationship between psychological skills and moral motivation. Aquinas teaches us
that certain kinds of psychological skills are closely related to the kinds of interior acts
about which moral motivation is primarily concerned and, as a result, he keys us into the
kinds of skills that are instrumental to facilitating our ability to choose the right ends as the
virtuous person does. I find that Aquinas’s view of moral motivation and psychological
skill helps to remove the “moral motivation” roadblock that faces the cultivating virtue
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literature and gives his blessing, so to speak, to the trajectory of research that looks to
psychological skills as the kinds of things that aid in the cultivation of moral virtue.
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Conclusion
By way of a conclusion, in what follows, I discuss how Aquinas’s work contributes to the
research at large on “cultivating virtue” in a way that paves the way for philosophers to
incorporate psychological research into their understanding of virtue and its cultivation. In
addition, I offer several ways to further develop answers to the question “how to cultivate
virtue?”

I. Attending to Psychological Resources
Psychologists and psychologically-minded moral philosophers often complain that
philosophers need to attend more closely to psychological research on human behavior. For
example, Stichter challenges moral philosophers to stop making “recommendations for
moral development” merely from “the philosophical armchair.” Instead, philosophers need
to become more “aware of the psychological mechanisms that affect how people actually
behave.”296 In other words, moral philosophers need to engage with psychological research
on human behavior and moral development because it will challenge and sharpen their
claims. This critique picks out an important reality, especially for those philosophers

Stichter, The Skillfulness of Virtue, 7. Stichter’s complaint stems from Flanagan’s “Principle of Minimal
Psychological Realism,” which states that “any prescription of a moral ideal should involve only those
processes or behaviors that we have reason to believe are possible for humans.” Narvaez and Lapsley
also challenge philosophers in this way. See Narvaez and Lapsley, Psychological Foundations, 141.
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concerned primarily with an Aristotelean account of virtue. Many contemporary
philosophers with this orientation do not engage with the psychological literature on moral
development, psychological skill, or behavior. As evidenced by the authors discussed in the
first chapter (i.e., Zagzebski, Wallace, etc.), their discussion of skill omitted any discussion
of psychological research on skill and its development that is well-respected in the field of
developmental psychology. However, as I argued, engaging with the psychological
literature can add much-needed nuance to the way these philosophers think about skills
and their relation to moral motivation. One reason for this general “failure to engage,” so to
speak, is that combining research from two disciplines is difficult. It is challenging to work
out how exactly psychological research contributes to an Aristotelian understanding of
human nature, virtue, and/or moral development. As a result, even if moral philosophers
are sympathetic to the complaint waged against them by psychologists, it is a difficult task
to know how to address this worry.
Given my work on Aquinas is aimed at connecting Aquinas’s concept of emotionregulation with contemporary psychological research, I find that my work serves to help
contemporary moral philosophers respond to this sort of worry (albeit, if only in a way that
concerns psychological skills and emotion). Aquinas builds out a space for psychological
skills in his account of moral development. Furthermore, in virtue of finding a place for
psychological skills, he indicates a place for psychological research on emotion and its
regulation to help us learn how to train our emotions and become aware of factors that
affect successful regulation. Aquinas’s account of the emotions indicates a way for
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psychologists to enter the moral-development discussion in a way that facilitates the
development of virtue. As a result, if contemporary moral philosophers take a cue from
Aquinas, they can work toward attending to the criticisms waged by psychologists.
Moreover, they can do so by using a historical resource that they already trust.

II. Where to Go from Here
There are a number of ways to further develop the discourse on cultivating virtue using
skills. I’ll mention just two. First, and perhaps most obviously, we need to know more
about what kinds of psychological skills are relevant and helpful in cultivating virtue. In
addition to studying emotion-regulation skills, what other kinds of psychological skills
might help to develop one or more of the moral virtues? In order to answer this question,
we need to push moral philosophers to make a shift. As I noted in chapter one, one reason
why this question has not been explored at greater depth is that, currently, the research on
skills and virtue stops short of addressing this question. On the one hand, there are those
who are proponents of cultivating virtue using psychological skills and propose selfregulation type skills (e.g., Stichter) as the relevant kinds of skills. But this side, as I’ve
argued, ignores important philosophical points about what virtue and moral motivation is
and therefore falls short of offering compelling ways that certain psychological skills
cultivate virtue. On the other hand, there are those who think that skills are merely helpful
in some way to understanding how virtues are developed. However, this side is stuck
picking out similarities between virtue and skill and stops short of actually thinking
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through which skills are useful for cultivating virtue. For example, Annas famously
advocates for the usefulness of skills in understanding how virtue is developed, but she
remains focused on skill insofar as it is like or analogous to virtue. She writes, “We find the
important similarity of virtue to skill in skills where two things are united: the need to learn
and the drive to aspire...Virtue can most illuminatingly be seen as like this kind of skill; it
shares the intellectual structure of a skill where we find not only the need to learn but the
drive to aspire.”297 While her account is helpful in articulating the characteristics of skill
most similar to virtue, her account stops short of investigating actual skills on offer today
that are useful for cultivating virtue. What we need then is to shift the focus from the way
virtue is like a skill to the kinds of skills that actually help to cultivate virtue.
Beyond investigating psychological skills, I find that more work needs to be done to
understand how moral motivation is developed. If moral motivation involves psychological
development, as I’ve argued, more work needs to be done to understand how we change
and develop our psychology so as to learn to habitually will an end/telos. For example,
what kinds of things facilitate our ability to make a conscious choice? In order to do this
research into moral development, I think we should keep two things in mind. First, we
must focus not just on mature adults but on the processes by which we become mature,
morally-motivated adults. All too often moral virtue and its development is done from the
perspective of what should be or the ideal case. This approach fails to acknowledge our
normal starting place. Most of us walk onto the moral scheme preloaded with emotional
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baggage, poor cognitive habits, situational difficulties, and educational deficiencies that
must be accounted for and addressed if we are to cultivate virtue. As Annas writes, “It is
important here to start in the right place, which is not by examining a mature adult to find
virtues of this kind. The crucial point about skill under discussion is a point about how it is
taught and learnt, and so the context to examine is the analogous one for virtue, namely
contexts of teaching and learning.”298The starting place needs to be one that focuses on
processes of change and learning, taking into account the struggles we commonly face.
Second, moral development research needs to take seriously the import of our
emotions on our ability to change. There is an ever-growing body of research in
neuroscience, cognitive science, and social psychology that supports the fact that we are, by
nature, far more emotional than we are rational beings. Our moral judgments are often
automated responses, preprogrammed by our emotional habits and intuitions.299 If we are
to understand how to change, we must commit ourselves to learning about emotion. As
Johnathan Haidt puts it, psychological change mirrors a rider, our conscious rational
control, on top of an elephant, our emotions, feelings, and intuitions. The “elephant holds
the reins” and “lasting change” requires appealing to and “retraining the elephant.”300
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Moral Judgment.” Psychological Review 108. no. 4 (2001): 814. Also see: Antoine, Bechara. Hanna Damasio,
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Seeing that change is a central part of understanding moral development, research into
moral development must make the study of emotion a priority.
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